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Abstract 
 
HENRY JAMES’S THE AMBASSADORS: ANATOMY OF SILENCE 
 
by 
 
Marie Leone Meyer 
 
Adviser: Professor Joan Richardson 
 
This dissertation examines the use of silence in Henry James’s novel The Ambassadors.
James uses silence rich in meaning to portray the protagonist Lewis Lambert Strether’s 
unfolding consciousness.  James creates different types of silences that reflect a shift 
from the spoken or written word to alternate symbol systems.  James’s novel perches on 
the threshold of modernity, as his work reflects the ideas of a line of thinkers extending 
back from James and his brother, William, to Ralph Waldo Emerson, Sampson Reed, and 
Emanuel Swedenborg.  At the same time, the novel draws on the contemporary ideas of 
Charles Darwin, prefigures modern narrative techniques, and even anticipates such 
current neuroscience theorists as Gerald Edelman and Antonio Damasio.  Chapter one is 
an overview which contextualizes the novel, considering its link to Emersonian thought 
as well as to William James’s description of consciousness, theories of silence, and 
Darwin’s examination of the development of language in The Descent of Man and The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Chapter two considers the remnants of 
language and symbol systems, with the silences, language as thing, resonance, and 
syntax explored. A close reading of the novel demonstrates the artificiality and 
concreteness of language, with James ultimately moving away from those remnants.  
vChapter three incorporates the current field of acoustic communication with an analysis 
of vagueness, impression, and charged silence as Strether searches them for what 
Wallace Stevens would term the “unalterable vibration,” or meaning.  Chapter four charts 
the movement to physical representations of Strether’s consciousness emerging in 
moments of what James calls “responsive arrest,” and Strether’s awareness after a fact,
examined in relation to current work by Edelman and Damasio.  Chapter five describes 
James’s movement to silences that reflect physical expression.  Gesture, meeting of eyes,
and recognition reflect an awareness of Darwin’s view of the development of language 
from its physical and gestural nature.  James develops an alternative to articulated 
language that portrays Strether as an emerging modern figure whose consciousness is 
attained through silence. 
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1Chapter One: Why Silence? 
 
“Let us be silent, for so are the gods.  Silence is a solvent that destroys personality, and 
gives us leave to be great and universal” (Emerson, Intellect, 419). 
What is silence?  Is it the absence of sound, or is it, as John Cage suggests in 
Silence, sound that is not notated?  Does silence imply that meaning is wanting, or 
perhaps, instead, that there is a depth of meaning to be plumbed?  Throughout the last 
century, silence has come to represent a number of things, from William James’s 
description of the mystical state of mind as “ineffable” (The Varieties of Religious 
Experience 380) to John Cage’s unnotated sounds, with many subtle variations between. 
Silence has implications not only for philosophers and musicians, but also for all who 
examine the origins and nature of language and expression.  
In the fiction of Henry James, for example, silence is so rich with meaning that in 
The Ambassadors, a 1903 major phase novel, he uses a series of modes of silence to 
demonstrate the protagonist Lewis Lambert Strether’s unfolding consciousness, shifting 
from the spoken or written word to alternate symbol systems.  In fact, when writing to 
James about his “Scene in America” in May 1907, William James critiques his style, 
saying his “account of america [sic] is largely one of its omissions, silences, vacancies” 
(The Correspondence of William James, vol. 3, 338).  While acknowledging that the 
“core of literature is solid,” William James urges his brother to write in his former, more 
direct style.  I contend, however, that it is precisely Henry James’s omissions, from 
Strether’s refusal to name “the article produced” (II, 1, 48) back home in Woollett, 
Massachusetts, to vague sensation, to interpretations of Chad Newsome’s gaze to arrive 
2at understanding, that signal James’s movement to writing which reflects his 
contemplation of the workings of consciousness and the richness in silence.  Since 
language can be manipulated, it cannot be fully trusted to express truths. For example, 
Strether redefines terms so that the situation comes to mirror the language used to 
describe it.  Language becomes just another method of expression, along with silence and 
alternate symbol systems, but it is not a preferred method.  Ruth Yeazell’s captures the 
complexity of James’s method when she observes “the subject of [Strether and Maria’s] 
talk is talk itself” (69), and talking results in their reexamining and redefining terms.   
Strether comes to understand the term “virtuous attachment,” used by Bilham to describe 
Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship (75-6), not through language, but through a 
form of non-linguistic perception. Initially trapped within the traditional definition of 
“virtue,” Strether must escape it, arriving at a sense of the adulterous relationship as 
indeed virtuous.  Yeazell characterizes Jamesian dialogue as cryptic, allowing for both 
character’s and the reader’s questioning motive and fact, and creating meaning (65). She 
calls truth as Maria Gostrey tells it “inseparable from her personal manipulation of it” 
(71).   Therefore, in order to arrive at cognition, one must interpret and surpass words. 
James’s movement to silence, in this text and elsewhere, incorporating physical gesture 
and expression, reflects a progression in the changing use of and thinking about language 
through the nineteenth century. 
Heralding Modernism, with its more extreme representations of the working of 
the mind, such as stream of consciousness, James depicts consciousness.  F.O. 
Matthiessen makes a distinction between James’s method and that of some of his 
contemporaries and Modern novelists when he observes   
3[‘the stream of consciousness’] was used by William James in his 
Principles of Psychology, but in his brother’s novels there is none  of the 
welling up of the darkly subconscious life that has characterized the novel 
since Freud.  James’ novels are strictly novels of intelligence rather than 
of full consciousness.    (23) 
While Matthiessen’s distinction may appear contradictory to this argument, I contend that 
Strether does come to consciousness, not of his “subconscious” life, but of meanings, 
connections, and relationships. The plotting of the levels of awareness changes, however, 
through the course of his novels.  As Sharon Cameron observes in Thinking in Henry 
James, “James’s attempts to reconceive consciousness are neither single nor continuous” 
(1).  This assessment is both accurate and significant.  Cameron equates “thinking” with 
“not speaking” in The Golden Bowl, and asserts that by creating this connection, James 
predicts “how the relations between speech and thought, between one consciousness and 
another, hence between consciousness and power, are to be discovered.” In doing so, he  
deduces “what might be called a grammar of the relation between thought and speech,” 
and attempts to “anatomize consciousness” (11).   The term “anatomize” is particularly 
appropriate, as in the nineteenth century there was a growing awareness of the 
relationship of the mind to the body and physical world.  In The Wisdom of Words Philip 
Gura explores an aspect of this growing awareness in describing the theories of 
“Swedenborgian  mystics and transcendental idealists [who] claimed that innate 
correspondences existed between the worlds of matter and spirit” and considers “whether 
or not the roots of all languages, supposedly based in sensory experience, might not 
originate in the intuitive experience available to all men?” (9).  Linking its origins to 
4sensory experience reshaped how writers thought about language. Similarly, the growing 
awareness of man’s animal nature as presented by Charles Darwin, especially in The 
Descent of Man, resulted in an understanding of expression through gesture rather than 
spoken language.  For those like James, spoken language began to lose its authority as 
alternate modes of expression and meaning were recognized. 
Cameron’s appraisal, taken in context with contemporary nineteenth-century 
theories and concerns, informs my analysis of The Ambassadors. The completion of The 
Golden Bowl in 1904 follows the publication of The Ambassadors by one year, and 
develops from the representation of consciousness in the preceding work.  James’s 
understanding of consciousness as exemplified in The Ambassadors becomes the 
foundation of his further fictional theorizing of it in The Golden Bowl. Cameron suggests 
that consciousness is used as an instrument of power in The Golden Bowl.  In order to 
wield this instrument, a character must be aware of it as such.  When Strether is first 
introduced, he is not sensible of the fullness of consciousness, and the complexities of its 
workings.  That fullness reverberates in the silences that James crafts.   In The 
Ambassadors James also attempts to “anatomize consciousness,” but in a much more 
tangible way, depicting it, as William James describes, as an awareness of one’s relations 
to “the larger objects of our thought” (Principles of Psychology I, 245). If the 
Swedenborgians and Transcendentalists were concerned with expressing spiritual truths, 
Henry James, as an emerging modern figure, was concerned with expressing truths about 
consciousness, which, by the late nineteenth century,  was seen as underlying spirituality.  
He presents this relationship in many ways, from symbol to syntax; among the ways is 
silence.  
5Just as there are many stages in William James’s sense of unfolding 
consciousness, there are many different types of silence depicted by his brother.  The 
kinds of silence range from information withheld between speakers in the text and 
information withheld from the reader, suggesting an absence or omission, to silence 
regarded as a positive phenomenon.  This latter kind of silence is described by Bernard P. 
Dauenhauer in Silence: The Phenomenon and Its Ontological Significance. As he 
observes, “Discourse arises within the broad range of experience by virtue of silence, 
expands in its several types and by virtue of silence, and culminates as a unitary domain 
by virtue of silence.  In its unfolding, in turn, discourse makes it possible for silence to 
appear as senseful.” As a “positive, senseful phenomenon,” (77) an originary point of 
expression, silence modifies experience.  Henry James makes uses of a number of 
different positive silences, each with a nuance suggesting a fine distinction in emerging 
consciousness.  But before discussing how consciousness is represented in James’s 
nuanced silences, I would like to consider the subtleties of silence as suggested by others, 
working within the same traditions, if not the same moment, as James. One of the sources 
on which I shall draw in anatomizing James’s silences is John Cage’s collection of 
lectures and essays, Silence, compiled in its complete form in 1961. As both a work of art 
and an articulation of philosophy, it follows in some of the same theoretical traditions as 
James does, presenting silence concretely.  For example, in his “Lecture on Nothing,” 
Cage addresses the relationship between sound and silence, saying, “words              make            
help make                                  the silences” (109) (sic).  While this seems to be in 
contrast with Dauenhauer’s above-cited comment about discourse arising from silence, 
what is significant about both is the acknowledgment of the interrelationship of the two.  
6Cage’s placement of the words on the page, moreover, emphasizes their codependence, 
as space, or silence, encroaches where one would expect to see words.1 Silence takes 
form in James’s writing as well, as will be explored in great depth in the following 
chapters.    
Additionally, in “Experimental Music: Doctrine,”  when Cage addresses the 
perceived oppositions of sound and silence, his language is reminiscent of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s.  Cage writes, “If, at this point, one says, ‘Yes! I do not discriminate between 
intention and non-intention,’ the splits, subject-object, art-life, etc., disappear, an 
identification has been made with the material” (14).  The reconciliation of opposites he 
suggests recalls Emerson’s discussion of intellect in his essay “Intellect.”  There Emerson 
warns against the “detachment” of the intellect from its works, saying instead that it must 
have “the same wholeness which nature has” (425).  Cage’s identification with the 
material, and Emerson’s separation of “the fact considered from you” (417) indicate 
arriving at truth, which could otherwise be lost or muddled. 
Emerson writes, “Happy is the hearing man; unhappy the speaking.  As long as I 
hear truth, I am bathed by a beautiful element, and am not conscious of any limits to my 
nature” (426). He is “hearing” truth literally from  “the eloquent man”  in whom “it 
seems something the less to reside” and metaphorically when he sees “the world reappear 
 
1 A similar technique is used by Stèphane Mallarmè in his 1897 poem Un Coup de Dès, in which, 
according to Henry Weinfield, “one can picture the Master (seaman or poet), from the wreckage of 
experience, of phenomena, attempting, as by a leap of faith, to create an ordered world of some kind;  such 
an attempt, however, must itself be governed by contingency” (266). The arrangement on the page, words 
spaced in a non-uniform pattern, allows the “ ‘blanks’ ” to “assume importance,” according to Mallarmè’s 
Preface to the poem (121).  Additionally, the differences in type face and size privilege words which 
express contingency, such as, of course,the title, “A Throw of the Dice,” the qualitative phrase “THOUGH 
IT BE,”  the repetition at the top and bottom of the page of “AS IF,” and the enlarged single word 
“CHANCE.”    The technique and ostensible subject of the poem, a shipwreck, underscore the loss of order 
in the modern world and the attempts of the artist to restore it through manipulation of language and form, 
just as James does as he synthesizes modern philosophical and artistic concerns in his work.  
7in miniature in every event” (425).  Emerson’s sense of hearing truth here correlates with  
that of with Sampson Reed, the Swedenborgian scholar whose aesthetics had a direct 
influence on Emerson.  In “Growth of the Mind,” Reed writes  
There is a language, not of words, but of things.  When this language shall 
have been made apparent, that which is human will have answered its end; 
and being as it were resolved into its original elements, will lose itself in 
nature. . . .It is because we are unwilling to hear, that we find it necessary 
to say so much; and we drown the voice of nature with the discordant 
jargon of ten thousand dialects. (33)   
 Emerson’s and Reed’s work arise from the same foundation even though Reed’s work 
clearly connects to Swedenborgian religion and Emerson’s branches off into the more 
secular philosophy of Transcendentalism.   Emerson is said to have “turned Growth of the 
Mind into a manifesto for himself, deriving from it the philosophic perspective that would 
permeate all his writing—the Swedenborgian concept of the correspondence between 
nature and spirit” (Shaw ii). Each addresses the distance from truth that is created under 
the cover of words. 
For Henry James’s protagonist Strether, the truth can only be heard once the 
words are gone; in many instances in The Ambassadors, words serve to separate one from 
truth.  Strether arrives at “wholeness” or truth, here represented as consciousness, only 
when he operates in silence.  The language no longer distances Strether from truth as it 
did when he was made to interpret Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s “virtuous 
attachment.”  In fact, while not presented in this exact context, the following passage, to 
some degree, illustrates this point.  Relatively early in their encounter, Strether questions 
8Chad Newsome, the young man he has been assigned to bring back to Massachusetts, 
about what has kept him in Europe.  Chad responds quite vociferously “Do you think 
one’s kept only by women?”  This catches a rather staid Strether off guard, as “[Chad’s] 
surprise and his verbal emphasis rang out so clear in the still street that Strether winced 
till he remembered the safety of their English speech” (101).   This, of course, refers to 
their being in Paris, where most bystanders would not necessarily understand their 
conversation.  It is analogous, however, to words masking truth; Chad is indeed 
misleading Strether with his question.  It is not until Strether transcends language and 
arrives at what Emerson calls a “universal language” that he can understand the truth. 
Strether begins to approach and recognize this state when he lunches with Madame de 
Vionnet, following their chance meeting at Notre Dame.  In this scene, Strether feels that 
he has “traveled far” from his first night in London, when he required explanations.   In 
Paris with Madame de Vionnet, “he had either soared above or sunk below 
[explanations]” and “saw reasons enough in the mere way the bright clean ordered water-
side life came in at the open window.”  Granted, Strether has still not arrived at 
consciousness as he is still misreading the relationship, but his consciousness is, as 
Emerson might suggest, “unfolding.”  Strether is getting closer to Emerson’s sense of the 
“wholeness” of nature, especially as “proverbs sounded for his memory, in the tone of 
their words and the clink of their glasses, in the hum of the town and the plash of the 
river” (177).  While ostensibly paradoxical, there are ways other than language to arrive 
at truth, or consciousness, in The Ambassadors. I will address this movement more 
thoroughly in Chapter 3, tracing a line of thinking which connects Emerson back to 
Emanuel Swedenborg through Sampson Reed, and forward to William James.   While I 
9am not the first to make this connection, I shall demonstrate how Henry James translates 
theory into fiction. 
The movement away from words returns us to silence, whose characteristics I 
shall now consider more fully.  Bernard P. Dauenhauer, cited above, analyzes the subject 
of silence thoroughly.  He categorizes different types of silence and considers the role of 
silence in discourse.  Significant is Dauenhauer’s argument that “the domain of discourse 
is widely experienced as either insufficient or incomplete, as unable to cope definitively 
with God, or with immediate perceptual experience, or with what it is to be a self, or with 
love, etc.” (75).  Identifying silence as an “act rather than a spontaneous performance” 
clearly likens the role of silence to, if not privileges it over, discourse, and implies 
deliberate intent.  Silence assumes comparable weight in The Ambassadors. Dauenhauer 
categorizes silence as a “cut” in discourse, and as such shapes discourse and the 
relationship between “perceptual and predicative” experiences (82).   By identifying 
silence as a “cut,” Dauenhauer is not suggesting emptiness.  Quite the contrary; he 
explains, “Discourse arises within the broad range of experience by virtue of silence, 
expands in its several types and shapes by virtue of silence, and culminates as a unitary 
domain by virtue of silence.  In its unfolding, in turn, discourse makes it possible for 
silence to appear as senseful” (77). Even the silence he classifies as “terminal” silence 
does not end discourse; in fact, it reveals the limits of discourse and allows for 
subsequent, changed discourse (76). Dauenhauer’s use of the term “unfolding” recalls 
Emerson’s sense of “all our progress [as] an unfolding” (419).  The interplay of silence 
and discourse and sense experience and thought mirrors the interplay of Strether’s 
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consciousness and the world, from which he shapes meaning and ultimately finds 
expression through alternative modes. 
While Sharon Cameron’s analysis in Thinking in Henry James, addresses the role 
of thought and its connection to speech in many of James’s works, The Ambassadors is 
not among them.  In her discussions of The Golden Bowl and The Wings of the Dove she 
introduces concepts that invite elaboration.  Cameron suggests that in The Golden Bowl 
James blurs distinctions between speech and thinking, and speech, called empty, must be 
“seen through.”  Meaning is ultimately “projected onto another” (109) as Maggie controls 
how much of her knowledge of his adultery she will reveal to Amerigo.  By contrast, 
thinking in The Wings of the Dove is equated with looking; Milly Theale sees a thought 
and is then given words, or meaning for it. Cameron cites the scene in which Milly looks 
at the Bronzino portrait and sees herself in the image of the lady; the reflection “inspires . 
. . the thought of death” (129).  The power equated with thought in each case is expressed 
in silence; I contend that silence has similar weight in The Ambassadors, with the 
emphasis on Strether’s growing awareness.  Silence is a positive phenomenon, a means 
for Strether to come to consciousness, not yet manipulate it.  Again, the dating of the 
publication of the texts, beginning with Wings in 1902, followed by The Ambassadors in 
1903, and finally The Golden Bowl in 1904 suggests that a progression or unfolding 
occurs. 
Similarly, John Auchard introduces his analysis of James’s work with the 
observation, “In James’s fiction, vitality often derives from the force of silence.  . . . 
Language itself becomes anti-language, and silence—not merely dumb tribute to the 
incommunicability of things—becomes charged expression and the major force of human 
11
action” (8).  Again, The Ambassadors is omitted from the discussion, but Auchard’s 
account of the purpose and effect of silence in Wings and The Golden Bowl magnificently 
captures James’s subtleties and movements within silence.  Auchard characterizes the 
silence in Wings as approaching “the transcendence of the religious consciousness” (87), 
and in The Golden Bowl as “Opposed to the impulses of the flesh and even the spirit, 
silence means nothing so much as control” (149).  This reading parallels Cameron’s sense 
of thinking, but again, does not account for the bridging silence that The Ambassadors 
provides.  As Auchard notes, in The Golden Bowl James “offers a compromise.  He 
presents, translated into words, the potential for dignity, for vitality, of a language of 
silence which might work to rejoin the pieces of a rapidly fragmenting world” (151).  I 
agree with Auchard’s assessment, but maintain that Strether’s coming to consciousness 
about a fragmenting world, a falling away from the spiritual values, or even social mores 
that once held, characterized by Bilham’s “virtuous attachment,” must be accounted for 
in silence before an imposition or recreation of meaning is possible as suggested through 
the patterns and events in The Golden Bowl. The Ambassadors ends with Strether’s 
recognition and decision to return home, but he is unsure what he will do when he is 
there.  He is, as he tells Maria, afraid of and “done” with ideas.  He clearly is not 
prepared to use the language of silence he has discovered to control or enact change on 
others.   The silence here provides a space for Strether to define himself in relation to a 
world which has shifted morally for him. The progression of these three texts parallels 
the progression of thought in the nineteenth century, away from the spiritual or mystical 
to an awareness of the physical, and ultimately to the psychological as emerging from the 
physical.  Depicting the use of silence in The Ambassadors as a bridge between the two 
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other major phase novels establishes this text as illustrative of emerging nineteenth 
century theories, specifically the understanding of psychology with a physical basis, as 
presented by William James, and the awareness of man’s animal nature and its 
relationship to expression, uncovered by Charles Darwin.  The use of silence for 
expression will suggest the connection of mind and body, which emerges as significant 
scientific theory in the years to follow Henry James’s writing.  
A text exploring James’s presentation of Strether as one of several characters who 
“end up as unusually excellent examples of human nature, or of ‘fine consciousness’” (2) 
is Courtney Johnson, Jr.’s Henry James and the Evolution of Consciousness. Johnson 
also considers The Ambassadors through the seemingly disparate lenses of science and 
philosophy; the fields he explores, however, are unified field theory and meditation.  Just 
as my work considers the concept of “wholeness” in the tradition of Swedenborg and 
Emerson as a starting point for Strether’s consciousness, Johnson considers unity, ending 
with what he calls the “unified consciousness,” which  is arrived at through a “sufficient 
number of experiences of moving into and out of transcendental consciousness,” which 
entail moving from the inactive, silent consciousness to the active, noisy consciousness of 
everyday living until “the conditions of that transcendent consciousness will persist and 
become dominant in the person or literary character during everyday life” (16).  This 
process is later connected to the concept of a unified field theory of physics. In the 
unified field theory, all physical phenomena are explained by underlying unity. While 
Johnson’s analysis resembles that being presented here in considering the relationship 
between science and philosophy, the silence Johnson addresses is “an immobility, a sense 
of completion, and a harmony with nature or the environment” (43).   In Johnson’s 
13
analysis, Strether arrives at stability; it will be demonstrated here that rather than 
stability, Strether attains an active silence that comprises various means of expression and 
is tantamount to consciousness.  Developments in scientific thought have implications for 
language as well.  Just as Johnson sees physics underlying the presentation of character, 
Gillian Beer sees wave theory as underlying changes in language. Beer cites William 
James’s The Meaning of Truth, written in 1904 and roughly corresponding with the 
composition of The Ambassadors: “ ‘Our mind has become tolerant of symbol instead of 
reproduction, of approximation instead of exactness, of plasticity instead of rigor.’”  She 
agrees with William James’s estimation, “we find a heightened awareness of the 
instability of language, certainly, and also—more strikingly—of the insufficiency of 
symbol and of algebra” (Wave Theory 199). This is tied into an understanding of the 
“relativity of knowledge” which Beer claims is “absolutely necessary to the emergence of 
modernism” (200).  As the sense of an objective reality is replaced by an understanding 
of the relativity of the universe and perception, so too, must the symbol be replaced as an 
attempt to capture it.  One cannot capture what is relative in language.  Silence, as one 
method of expression among others in modernism, replaces the insufficient symbols 
previously used. 
William James explicitly addresses language’s insufficiency when he states in The 
Principles of Psychology, “language works against our perception of the truth.  We name 
our thoughts simply, each after its thing, as if each knew its own thing and nothing else.  
What each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for, with dimly perhaps a 
thousand other things” (I, 241).  Here James is discussing an awareness of thunder; his 
explanation forecasts the relationship that John Cage expresses between silence and 
14
sound.  James suggests that the term thunder is not sufficient to capture a sense of what 
that thunder is, i.e. “thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.”  The 
thunder, or a thought, must be considered in light of its transitions as well, with William 
James calling that transition “no more a break in the thought than a joint in a bamboo is a 
break in the wood” (I, 240).  Although William James describes this phenomenon 
metaphorically, Henry James circumvents this literary device in favor of silence, as the 
consciousness cannot be captured even through metaphor.  
While the impact of William James’s thinking on Henry James’s fiction will be 
explored in greater depth in later chapters, it is significant to note here his depiction of 
the very physical nature of consciousness.  As noted above, he writes of consciousness as 
awareness of the relation of the self to objects of thought, and argues that “the relations 
are numberless, and no existing language is capable of doing justice to all their shades” 
(I, 245). Before one can arrive at this stage, however, sensation must be experienced 
because “Sensations. . . first make us acquainted with innumerable things, and then are 
replaced by thoughts . . . sensations are first things in the way of consciousness” and both 
are preceded by nerve-current (II, 6).  A major plot and thematic development in The 
Ambassadors is the moment that Strether first meets Chad.  Strether is in a box at The 
Theatre de Comedie Francaise with Maria, discussing how the state of affairs is 
progressing.  Chad, unknown to Strether, enters their box.  As Strether faces Chad, he 
experiences a stage in the development of his consciousness, preceded by sensation.  The 
vignette is introduced and concluded with reference to sensation; it opens with Strether’s 
“sense” of how Maria was always paying and being paid (85).  It closes with his 
recognition of Chad and the observation that “his perception of the young man’s identity . 
15
. . had been quite one of the sensations that count in life; he certainly had never known 
one that had acted, as he might have said, with more of a crowded rush.  And the rush, 
though both vague and multitudinous, had lasted a long time, protected, as it were, yet at 
the same time aggravated, by the circumstance of its coinciding with a stretch of 
decorous silence” (89).  This significant moment illustrates what William James 
describes.  The very physical presence of relations and knowledge is captured through 
Strether’s recognition of Chad, with all its reverberations.  In The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals, which will be discussed more fully in chapter 5, 
Naturalized Silence, Darwin writes, “the principle of the direct action of the sensorium on 
the body, due to the constitution of the nervous system, and from the first independent of 
the will, has been highly influential in determining many expressions” (81).  It is in the 
moment of “decorous silence” that Strether becomes conscious of “lingering 
rearrangement” and emerging meaning, so that ultimately sensation and silence together 
create expression.  
It is at moments such as the above that Strether begins to become aware of his 
place in a larger system.  It is within this system that he must ultimately develop a self, or 
individual consciousness, and then must express it.   Consciousness and its expression 
can be viewed through a Darwinian lens.  George Levine observes that Sally 
Shuttleworth, in her 1984 text George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science, 
shows that uniformitarian thought was allied to a conception of the self as 
unified and continuous, and thus to important elements of characterization 
and narrative form; she shows also that the psychology based on 
evolutionary biology introduces elements of discontinuity that in turn led 
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to revised notions of the self, and consequently of character in fiction, and 
of course of the way narratives move and are resolved. (Darwin and the 
Novelists 7)
Strether’s development reflects these “elements of discontinuity.”  The sense of self he 
has when the text opens is challenged by his encounters and experiences, and then 
undergoes revision, so that by the end, he possesses a conscious self.  William James 
addresses the continuity of consciousness in Principles of Psychology when he writes that 
despite felt gaps in consciousness, it remains “sensibly continuous and one” and “does 
not appear to itself chopped up in bits” (I, 238-9), hence his naming it the stream of 
thought.  He then refers to the “common whole” as “myself, I, or me.” It is a sense of “I” 
that Strether must develop in relation to his awareness of consciousness in the course of 
the novel; Henry James’s narrative flow reflects its emergence, including what might be 
called “gaps in consciousness.”  For example, after Strether’s encounter with Chad and 
Madame de Vionnet on his ride to the countryside, Strether finally becomes fully aware 
of the nature of their relationship.  James presents Strether’s analysis of the situation 
upon his return home.  At that point, “He then knew more or less how he had been 
affected—he but half knew at the time” (311). The sentence itself is divided, as is 
Strether’s knowledge, and presumably, his sense of “I.”  As Strether relives the encounter 
in his mind, he examines what had been said in his presence, and speculates about what 
passed between Chad and Madame de Vionnet in order to keep up the appearance that 
they had planned to return home themselves at the end of the day.  The narrative moves 
back and forth from Strether’s revelation, to his speculations, to his earlier misreading.  
17
He recognizes those gaps in consciousness, and their final resolution as he comes to 
awareness and develops a new social, moral and conscious sense of  “I”. 
The theory of evolution, while faced by resistance, transformed, and continues to 
transform, every discipline.  In On the Origin of Species, Darwin explicitly addresses the 
subject of psychology and the mind, saying “in the distant future I see open fields for far 
more important researches.  Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the 
necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation.  . . . all corporeal 
and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection” (488-9).  The human 
mind, then, develops according to the same pattern of natural selection and adaptation as 
what had been seen as the purely corporeal.  In their paper “Evolutionary Psychology: A 
Primer,” Leda Cosmides and John Tooby connect this thinking to William James’s 
observation in Principles of Psychology that man has more instincts than other animals, 
but tends to be blind towards them “because they work so well” (1), disputing the 
distinction made between man and other animals because of the ability to reason.   They 
argue, in keeping with James, that there is no dichotomy between instinct and reasoning 
or innate and learned behavior; instead, genes are seen as “simply regulatory elements” 
which give rise to psychological behaviors which are adaptive in nature.   James 
examines the relationship between the physical and the psychological in Principles,
writing “In other words, however numerous and delicately differentiated the train of ideas 
may be, the train of brain-events that runs alongside of it must in both respects be exactly 
its match, and we must postulate a neural machinery that offers a living counterpart for 
every shading, however fine, of the history of its owner’s mind” (Principles of 
Psychology I, 128).  In an unpublished article, Jonathan Schull examines the relationship 
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of Darwin’s and William James’s concepts, noting that James defines consciousness as 
“primarily a selecting agency” (I, 139), which clearly connects James’s thinking to 
Darwinian theory (Schull 6). Henry James recognized Darwin’s impact on psychology 
when he created in Strether a figure whose developing consciousness reflects the 
interaction of the physical and psychological, and how this interaction is rendered 
through modes of expression.  Robert Richards calls William James’s notion of the mind 
one  
rest[ing] on Darwinian principles.  The mind comes already outfitted with 
fixed sensory and emotional responses, instinctive reactions, and basic 
rational abilities; these constitute our evolutionary history.  But the 
acquisition of new ideas is also Darwinian: spontaneous hypotheses, 
guesses, notions, etc., erupt in our pedestrian and scientific encounters 
with the world; those that survive the pitiless forces of reality live for 
another day.  (417) 
Strether’s mind evolves according to the model Richards describes.  Prior to his 
encounter with Chad and Madame de Vionnet, Strether responds to his environment in 
his customary way, that is, with his fixed sensory and emotional response;  Strether is one 
who, in a sense, must survive in the environment of Woollett among and under the 
influence of Mrs. Newsome and her associates.  It is not until he becomes receptive to the 
new milieu in which he finds himself that he begins to develop new ideas and, ultimately 
consciousness, which is continually in the act of becoming. 
 The reader observes Strether’s actions in relation to how aware he becomes of his 
surroundings and reaction to them. He comes to confront a new environment with which 
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he must negotiate and  to which he must adapt, and encounters new ideas, which become 
tantamount to his needing to solve moral and social issues in an adaptive way.  The 
reader watches Strether’s development, while he is not necessarily aware of what is 
happening in terms of his consciousness; remember that the process is not articulated in 
language for him. Ultimately, the reader is compelled to consider how language and 
expression are presented through his developing character; if details are not spoken, they 
must be conveyed in an alternative way in order to further the adaptation of the 
consciousness.  The examination of James’s methods in subsequent chapters  will reflect 
George Levine’s observation that 
Darwinian science had an impact on natural theology, and in the process 
nature, society, narrative, and language itself were desacralized, severed 
from the inherent significance, value, and meaning of a divinely created 
and designed world.  The Darwinian quest for origins was the signal and 
the authoritatively scientific means by which fact was severed from 
meaning and value, ‘presence’ became absence, and the world had to be 
reconstituted not from divine inheritance but from arbitrary acts of human 
will.  (viii)    
This is a particularly striking passage from which to consider Strether’s developing 
consciousness.  For Strether, presence does indeed become absence; to simplify, 
Strether’s world is upturned.  He abandons what he had set out to do, bring Chad back to 
the United States, because the social and moral system under which he operated no 
longer has meaning for him.  Just as he begins to see Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s 
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relationship as a “virtuous attachment,” thereby reexamining meaning, Strether 
reexamines values, which were, of course, a part of his sense of social order. 
Strether’s emergent consciousness requires some method of articulation.  Darwin 
writes of expression developed through habit.  He equates language and gesture, 
observing “conventional expressions or gestures, acquired by the individual during early 
life, would probably have differed in the different races, in the same manner as do their 
languages” (The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 15).  Additionally, 
these expressions and gestures appear to have developed in the same way, through 
sensory stimulus, and also through habit, which “played a large part in [the voice’s] 
employment” (84).  William James addresses the role of habit in consciousness and 
expression via Darwin, calling living creatures “bundles of habits,” with some of those 
habits instinctual, resulting in “concatenated discharges in the nerve-centres, due to the 
presence there of systems of reflex paths”  (I, 108).  However, James does not deem 
consciousness mere habit; on the contrary, he writes “Consciousness, for example, is only 
intense when nerve-processes are hesitant.  In rapid, automatic, habitual action it sinks to 
a minimum.  Nothing could be more fitting than this, if consciousness have the 
teleological function we suppose; nothing more meaningless, if not” (I, 142).  Hence one 
can see the development of James’s sense of the stream of thought, with its development 
of consciousness appearing in the alternation of substantive and transitive parts, with the 
substantive, or resting-places, occupied by “sensorial imaginations of some sort” and the 
transitive, or places of flight, “filled with thoughts of relations” with its goal “the 
attainment of some other substantive part,” consciousness (I, 243).  The connection of 
sensation to consciousness is furthered to expression, as James likens its rhythm to that of 
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language, through which thoughts are expressed in sentences and “resting-places are 
usually occupied by sensorial imaginations.” This, then, brings us to Henry James’s 
representation of the process of coming to consciousness and its expression through the 
character of Lambert Strether, whose development must be conveyed through the writer’s 
tool, language.  Just as habit has a physiological basis, so, too, has expression, whether it 
is articulated or gestural.  Darwin’s project in Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals was to discover how habits “now rendered innate” had been acquired as “each 
expression demanded a rational explanation” (19).  It will be demonstrated that in The 
Ambassadors, Strether, though not consciously, appears to require a rational explanation 
for each expression. For example, he must interpret deliberate verbal ambiguities, as 
when Bilham describes Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship as a “virtuous 
attachment;” he must interpret his “impressions” and “ask himself soon afterwards . . . 
what had really happened” (137) when Maria Gostrey seems to abandon him after he 
misreads Chad’s relationship with Jeanne de Vionnet. The only way for him to decode 
the expression and communication of which he is in the midst is to step outside of it, and  
recognize alternative forms of expression.  Strether is approaching unmediated 
consciousness; to do so, he must transcend the boundaries imposed by the social 
construction of language. In fact, Bernard Dauenhauer suggests that “ a certain kind of 
silence is a necessary condition for any expression whatsoever” because “unless 
perception had occurred there would be nothing to express” (58-9).  As the reader 
watches Strether, he steps away from discourse, and through various alternative modes, 
confronts meanings.  This involves pausing, perching, interpreting impressions, facing 
meaning as well as those who present it and their method of presentation, among many 
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other methods.  When he recognizes the need for and validity of approaching meaning, he 
becomes conscious of his consciousness, returning to “the same wholeness which nature 
has,” becoming part of the pattern of discourse and silence, meaning and interpretation.  
Articulated language is, as noted above, suggested through its use and absence as less 
than satisfactory.  Its insufficiency is based on an understanding of language described by 
William James.   In the “Stream of Thought” chapter of The Principles of Psychology,
James addresses the relationship between thought and its expression, calling human 
speech “signs of direction in thought.”  In James, speech is not unalterably linked with 
meaning.  In fact, he observes “the relative unimportance of the means appears from the 
fact that when the conclusion is there, we are rarely able a moment afterwards to recall 
our exact words, though we can express it in different words easily enough”  (I, 260).    
Speech’s lack of definitiveness can be considered in Darwinian terms.  In The Descent of 
Man, Darwin locates the origin of language in “the imitation and modification of various 
natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and man’s own instinctive cries, aided by 
signs and gestures” in a non-deliberate way; “it has been slowly and unconsciously 
developed by many steps” (379-380).  Darwin’s sense of language mirrors his sense of 
human development: words, too, emerge as a result of natural selection culminating in 
“the survival or preservation of certain favoured words” (385).  Darwin’s depiction of 
language reappears in William James’s description of the mind’s focusing on things, or 
the substantive points of language. James calls these moments of attention, saying the 
mind “selects again” from among “certain of the sensations to represent the thing most 
truly, and considers the rest as its appearances, modified by the conditions of the 
moment” (I, 285).  Modification by momentary conditions reminds one of the above-
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noted description of William James’s sense of the “great man” who both modifies and is 
modified by his environment.  It is clear that natural selection is applicable to virtually all 
aspects of human existence, from psychological development to social development to 
the creation of a shared language.   
An intrinsic characteristic of natural selection is accidental variation.  If words are 
selected just as physical characteristics of humans, at times without clear or concrete 
explanation, why not then spoken language as a variant of other possible modes of 
communication?  When Henry James employs silence, it is, again, not an empty silence, 
but one filled with potential energy of expression, a variant of articulated language.  After 
all, as Darwin suggests, “every language has to be learnt” despite humans’ “instinctive 
tendency to speak” (Descent of Man 379).   The selection of language suggests a 
relationship between the development of reasoning abilities and the development of the 
brain.  Just as “the greater number of the more complex instincts appear to have been 
gained in a wholly different manner, through the natural selection of variations of simpler 
instinctive actions,” so too are reasoning and language developed.  The similarities in 
Darwin’s and James’s vocabularies are striking: both, of course, speak of variation, and 
both attribute the  “intellectual progress of man” (Darwin, Descent of Man 363) to 
attention. 
Gerald Edelman, a contemporary neuroscientist who sets out “to describe a 
biological theory of how we come to have minds” (1) examines the physical matter, the 
brain that underlies mind, which is applicable to a discussion of silence as 
communication and Strether’s coming to consciousness.  Edelman describes the 
emergence of consciousness, calling language a function of “higher-order consciousness” 
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which “requires the continued operation of the structures serving primary consciousness” 
and involves the ability “to construct a socially based selfhood, to model the world in 
terms of the past and the future, and to be directly aware.  Without a symbolic memory, 
these abilities cannot develop” (125).  A connection between the evolution of the brain, 
consciousness, and speech emerges.  Strether has, of course, “the evolutionary acquisition 
of the capability for language,” but comes to construct a “socially based selfhood,” one 
that he sees as “right,” only once he has come to read what is communicated beyond 
language.   
What is interesting is the connection between the more abstract concept of mind 
and the physical matter of the brain ; the evolutionary development of Strether’s 
consciousness anticipates the evolutionary sense of the mind and brain .  As Eugene 
Taylor suggests in his discussion of William James’s analysis of the mind/body problem, 
James “maintained that while science had set the stage for a more sophisticated handling 
of the problem, the very presuppositions of science were being called to account by the 
analysis.  This meant for [William] James that one place to look for a solution was 
beyond language, but nevertheless within the realm of experience” (4).  Henry James, 
seeming to have this sense already, has Strether evolve through experience; in “Project of 
the Novel,” Henry James addresses Strether’s consciousness which emerges in the midst 
of “sensations, impressions, a whole inert or dormant world of feeling or side of life” 
(556), terms used by William James in Principles of Psychology. Of course, much of 
Strether’s development is dependent upon his interaction with and observation of Chad, 
whose character acquires metaphoric value.  James says that “Chad’s case becomes for 
him a concrete case in a kind of big general question that his actual experience keeps 
25
more and more putting to him” (560).  While Strether does not experience what Chad 
does, his observations and growing awareness become his experience.  Strether becomes 
“conscious of his evolution; he likes it—wouldn’t for the world not have had it; albeit 
that he fully sees how fatal, in a manner, it has been for him” (Project of the Novel, 568).  
James deems Strether’s evolution “fatal” because he is no longer the Strether who started 
out from Woollett, and cannot, in good conscience or consciousness, perform the task for 
which he had been sent.  Ultimately, according to James, Strether “does his best to get, as 
it were, into relation.  He sees and understands, and such is the force in him of his alien 
and awkward tradition, that he has, almost like a gasping spectator at a thrilling play, to 
see himself see and understand” (572).  This is the “relation of the mind to other things” 
that William James describes; it is a negotiation that will be addressed more specifically 
in the analysis following which traces how Henry James employs particular silences in 
the text of The Ambassadors.
Significant, as well, is how Strether’s negotiation relates to William James’s sense 
of the social evolution of man, as presented in “Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the 
Environment.”  While Strether is not drawn as a “great man” per se, his development 
mirrors that of the great man whose environment “selects him. And whenever it adopts 
and preserves the great man, it becomes modified by his influence in an entirely original 
and peculiar way” (5).  Schull also notes the connection of James’s sense of social 
selection and Darwinian philosophy (4).  James addresses this further in The Principles of 
Psychology when he again uses Darwinian concepts to describe the relationship between 
the mind and the brain: “Every scientific conception is in the first instance a ‘spontaneous 
variation’ in someone’s brain. For one that proves useful and applicable there are a 
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thousand that perish through their worthlessness” (II, 636).    Robert J. Richards explains 
the process succinctly when presenting “William James’s Psychological and Moral Uses 
of Darwinian Theory,” saying “the mind comes already outfitted with fixed sensory and 
emotional responses, instinctive reactions, and basic rational abilities; these constitute our 
evolutionary legacy” (417).  As such, the mind is separate from but dependent upon the 
physical structure of the brain which provides the framework for response. Richards 
further discusses James’s description of the material, social, and spiritual selves “as the 
inherited products of a long evolutionary history” (420). He cites James in The 
Principles, (I, 324): “All minds must have come, by the way of the survival of the fittest, 
if by no directer path, to take an intense interest in the bodies to which they are yoked, 
altogether apart from any interest in the pure Ego which they also possess.”  This 
description is reminiscent of the depiction of the “great man” who is both influenced by 
and influences his environment.   The mind experiences attention and selection; 
Strether’s changes in response to Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship, Maria 
Gostrey, Bilham, and Paris are paradigmatic of physical, psychological, and social 
evolution, realized without verbalization. As Strether negotiates his way through his new 
environment, his consciousness undergoes discrete moments of development, 
communicated to both the reader and other characters through a series of silences.  The 
silences allow for a range of communication which bypasses language in favor of 
alternate modes which may capture the perception more adequately.  In Bright Air, 
Brilliant Fire  Edelman addresses the role of the body-brain and the environment  in 
creating cognitive models.  According to Lakoff, “cognitive models involve conceptual 
embodiment and . . .conceptual embodiment occurs through bodily activities prior to 
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language” (246).  This contemporary understanding of the brain and the mind mirrors 
Strether’s development. Edelman concludes that “gestalts, mental images, bodily 
movements, and the organization of knowledge must all to some degree be the result of 
evolutionary and developmental constraints” with the “bases for truth and knowledge 
com[ing] from” the “conceptual apparatus contained in real brains,”  which are “symbol 
manipulator[s]” (239).    If, as Edelman says, “the appraisal of meaning and truth comes 
from this path. . . . the mind is not transcendental. There is no God’s eye view of the 
world” (241), the mind arises from its physical foundation.  
 In Descartes’ Error, Antonio Damasio, who praises William James’s assessment 
of the connection between emotion and its physical foundation, describes the process by 
which he sees subjectivity, “a key feature of consciousness” (236), emerge. This “arises 
out of the content of the third kind of image,” namely, the image of an object in relation 
to the organism’s response to the object.  Here, of course, Damasio connects the sensory 
body and the more abstract concept of mind.  From the state of subjectivity,  a “nonverbal 
narrative document of what is happening to those protagonists   . . . can be accomplished 
without language”  (243).  Humans have what Damasio terms a “refined form of 
subjectivity” within which language provides the ability for a “second order narrative,” 
resulting not in what Damasio calls “the self,” but the “I.”2
Strether’s consciousness develops in this fashion; the reader witnesses his mind 
“forming neural representations which can become images, be manipulated in a process 
called thought, and eventually influence behavior by helping predict the future, plan 
 
2 The “refined subjectivity” within language can be seen in the opening of Thoreau’s Walden, in which the 
pronoun “I” is used 19 times in the first two paragraphs.  Thoreau employs the first person narrative 
because “I should not talk so much about myself if there were any body else whom I knew as well” (325).  
Thoreau has clearly established a sense of subjectivity in relation to what he terms, “the narrowness of my 
experience.” 
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accordingly, and choose the next action” (Damasio 90).  This happens for Strether 
wordlessly, images and impressions are nonverbally translated as his sense of self is 
being redefined in relation to his stimuli.  This is exemplified in the following, and final, 
exchange between Strether and Maria Gostrey, when he tells her he is returning to 
America and Mrs. Newsome.  Strether tells Maria that Mrs. Newsome has not changed, 
but “I do what I didn’t before—I see her.”  Of course, this is in the metaphoric sense of 
seeing, a creation in the mind.  Their conversation continues: 
“I know.  I know.  But all the same I must go.” He had got it at last.  
“To be right.” 
“To be right?” 
 She had echoed it in vague deprecation, but he felt it 
already clear for her. “That, you see, is my only logic.  Not, 
out of the whole affair, to have got anything for myself.”   
She thought. “But with your wonderful impressions you’ll have got a great 
deal.” 
“A great deal”—he agreed. “But nothing like you. It’s you who would 
make me  wrong!” 
Honest and fine, she couldn’t greatly pretend she didn’t see it.  Still she 
could pretend just a little.  “But why should you be so dreadfully right?” 
“That’s the way that—if I must go—you yourself would be the first to 
want me. And I can’t do anything else.”  (345) 
The above illustrates Strether’s development.   He can form images, engage in a process 
of thought, and plan accordingly.  All this is done without James stating it explicitly to 
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the reader or Strether stating it to Maria. Maria’s evocation of Strether’s “impressions” is 
reminiscent of language used by William James; so too is Strether’s desire “to be right,” 
which is the result of following one’s instinct.  William James writes “every impulse and 
every step of every instinct shines with its own sufficient light, and seems at the moment 
the only eternally right and proper thing to do” (Principles of Psychology II, 387). After 
negotiating his environment and relations to others, Strether can successfully read or 
interpret the relation of his mind to others, and envision the result of his actions. 
Additionally, Maria’s depiction as “honest and fine” seems to contradict Strether’s 
comment that it is she who would make him wrong.  The paradox exemplifies the 
limitations of spoken language as Maria, too, acknowledges this statement as a truth.  
Now Strether can be “right;” he can reach understanding and a moral, as well as 
conscious, sense of self, one not defined by language and meaning externally imposed.   
In fact, just prior to this encounter he pleads with Maria “in various suggestive and 
unspoken ways for patience and understanding” (342).  He has achieved consciousness.    
Before this, even with language Strether could not read situations or people. Edelman 
describes higher-order consciousness as “an inner life,” which is highly individual and 
tied to affect and reward, “based on the emergence of language in a speech community” 
(133).  Language, with grammar and syntax, can only emerge once the brain has 
“reentrant structures that allow semantics to emerge first” (130).  Therefore, it would 
appear that this allows for an alternative to spoken language to emerge, for example, 
James’s grammar of silence.  If, as William James says “no existing language is capable 
of doing justice” to all the relations we “feel to exist between the larger objects of our 
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thought,” (Principles of Psychology I, 245) what will?  Henry James suggests a number 
of ways. 
James’s grammar chronicles Strether’s development as it unfolds.  Neither 
Strether’s development nor James’s depiction follows a linear path.  Strether’s 
consciousness emerges through the shifting uses and awareness of silence, beginning 
with symbol and ending with recognition, mirroring Emerson’s sense that “all our 
progress is an unfolding, like the vegetable bud.  You have first an instinct, then an 
opinion, then a knowledge, as the plant has root, bud, and fruit” (419).  James’s portrayal 
falls within the line of thinking that extends from Goethe, through Emerson, to Alfred 
North Whitehead.  Goethe writes of a sense of  “evolution toward a state of perfection 
[which] is the goal of intensification. . . Driven by inner forces and outer environment, it 
changes in a spiraling cycle” (Miller, Goethe: Scientific Studies xiii).  Perfection in 
humankind mirrors that in all of nature, as Goethe asserts “Nothing happens in living 
nature that does not bear some relation to the whole. . . All things in nature. . . work 
incessantly upon one another” (15-16).  Similarly, Whitehead depicts the wholeness of 
the universe.  In Science and Philosophy, he presents mental cognition as “the reflective 
experience of a totality, reporting for itself what it is in itself as one unit occurrence” 
(148).  While he calls consciousness the “function of knowing,” he qualifies it, calling 
“what is known . . .  a prehension of aspects of the one real universe.  These aspects are 
aspects of other events as mutually modifying, each the others” (151).  James is clearly 
part of a philosophical line which understands consciousness within a larger organic 
system, arrived at through an evolutionary process, mirroring the natural world of which 
it is a part.  James’s grammar reflects a different type of silence for each stage of 
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emergent consciousness.  For discussion purposes, these modes of silence will be 
grouped in like categories within each chapter. 
 The first grouping includes those with residual associations with language and 
sound.  In the mode labeled language as thing, for example, the reader witnessing 
Strether’s reaction, learns that he receives a telegram, but not what it says.   The reader is 
thereby presented with a level of meaning, if not language. The written and spoken word 
does, at times, take on physical presence, becoming the “terministic bridge” described in 
Kenneth Burke’s discussion of Emerson. In his essay “I, Eye, Ay—Concerning 
Emerson’s Early Essay on ‘Nature,’ and the Machinery of Transcendence,” Burke 
defines transcendence as the ‘building of a terministic bridge whereby one realm is 
transcended by being viewed in terms of  a realm ‘beyond’ it” (187).  Just as Emerson’s 
method makes it possible to view the realm beyond the here and now through the terms 
of the here and now, James allows the reader to transcend the object containing the 
written word, such as a telegram or receiving card, and arrive at meaning.  This process is 
tantamount to what Burke sees Emerson doing, using “commodities” or 
“instrumentalities” to carry out a “unitary purpose.” Similarly, in this grouping, musical 
rhetoric is manipulated in a category called resonance, where “tone” and “note” 
reverberate with meaning, intimations, and vibrations into which Strether taps.  Finally, 
James’s use of syntax is explored, as he uses the mapping of language to make the reader 
aware of its concreteness and artificiality, reflecting the movement of Strether’s 
consciousness, only to move beyond represented language again.  This use of syntax is 
unique in that it is not like the generative grammar described by Noam Chomsky, in 
which “syntax is independent of semantics” (Edelman 243).  On the contrary, the syntax 
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James employs is not only closely intertwined with semantics, but grows from it.  The 
meaning is presented in a concrete manner through the structure of the sentences.  A clear 
example of James’s method is found in the description of Strether and Madame de 
Vionnet’s interaction over lunch.  Consider the structure of the following sentence: “The 
sense that he had had before, the sense he had had repeatedly, the sense that the situation 
was running away with him, had never been so sharp as now” (176).  This is a periodic 
sentence, which is not syntactically complete until its end, and expands, creating for the 
reader a sense of movement.  The sentence runs away as Strether’s sense of the situation 
does.  It is difficult to rein in structurally, mirroring Strether’s inability to grasp exactly 
what is happening to him.  As such, the syntax is inextricably linked with meaning. 
The movement away from the concrete and artificial is seen in the next grouping, 
which was developed from Sampson Reed and Ralph Waldo Emerson’s thinking, and 
furthered in William James’s writing.  These modes, which I name impression,
vagueness, and charged silence, reflect presences and meanings into which Strether taps 
These silences have both mystical and psychological ramifications.  While impression 
and vagueness, in familiar usage, are disparaged as imprecise, they are crucial to William 
James’s and Emerson’s sense of the mystical.  For William James, “vague impressions of 
something indefinable” signal intuitions, which the consciousness ultimately “absolutely 
knows” (Varieties of Religious Experience, 73).    Emerson, too, urges his reader to “trust 
the instinct” and assigns to logic the role of “unfolding. . . the intuition” (Intellect 419).  
These descriptions of intuition and instinct, as well as Darwin’s, will be examined fully 
as the chapters unfold;  when Strether encounters these particular silences, he employs 
both his senses and intuition, until he reaches “a deeper level of nature than the 
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loquacious level which rationalism inhabits” (James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 
73).  In order to arrive at the moral awareness he ultimately reaches, Strether must 
negotiate the vagueness, which contains meaning without words. 
The next set of silences indicates Strether’s growing reflection.  Once he can 
interpret impression and vagueness, he arrives at a new stage of consciousness which is 
more suggestive of articulation.  The modes awareness after a fact and responsive arrest 
have their basis in William James’s description of the awareness of thought. At this point, 
one becomes conscious of the self as the seat of thinking. It is almost as though Strether 
comes face to face with thinking itself, distancing himself from language in order to 
contemplate meaning clearly.  Meaning, or “a still sharper sense”  assumes real physical 
presence in these moments of silence.  When in conversation with Maria Gostrey, 
Strether finds that “it had broken as with a slight arrest into the current of their talk, and it 
held him a moment longer” (292).  Strether is placed in relation to the aforementioned 
“objects of thought” and, as such, approaches consciousness.  Through these moments, 
the reader discerns James’s awareness of the physical basis of thought, grounded in the 
theory and language of William James’s description of the “stream of thought,” while 
prefiguring later theorists.  
Finally, the last set of silences denotes a culmination of Henry James’s thought 
about language and silence; here, several representations may be expressed through each 
example, but they share a sense of language “multiplying its forms of representation” 
(Gura 63).  Gura schematizes a nineteenth-century shift towards symbolic language, 
tracing Emerson’s call for the naturalization of language; similarly, James’s   rendering of 
the methods meeting of eyes, gesture, and recognition, establishes them within the range 
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of expression suggested by Darwin in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals. James takes us further, however; while Strether may start with gesture, such as 
when “a single gesture from [Maria Gostrey] could pass for him as a vivid answer” (194), 
he progresses to the point where he can, as Emerson describes, encounter the “unfolding 
of intuition.”  Recognition is the most complex of these categories, in which we see a 
grammar that combines several types of silence.  Ultimately, Strether perceives, and 
finally expresses his understanding of his moral and social consciousness to Maria 
Gostrey, albeit in a manner seemingly vague to the reader, but clear in terms of his 
development.  He comes to intuit and encounter his place in the larger stream of thought 
and morality as he learns what it means “to be right” without the benefit of articulated 
language.  
What is so striking about The Ambassadors is the complexity of the 
characterization of Lewis Lambert Strether.    He is conscious man, aware of his 
connection to his animal/natural state, no longer needing articulation as consciousness, 
developing and transforming from the mystical as the new sublime, emerges in silence. 
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Chapter Two: Token Words 
 
Strether’s final standpoint that he must return to the States “to be right” is a signal 
both to the reader and Maria Gostrey that he has realized consciousness, not just of Chad 
and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship, but also of the nature of his own relationships 
with Mrs. Newsome and Maria Gostrey, and that he has succeeded in piercing language 
and appearances to arrive at meaning.  The reader may question what “rightness” means.   
Emerson uses the example of the word “right” in his chapter “Language” in Nature, to 
illustrate the word as a natural fact, with right derived from the root for “straight” (20).    
Viewed through an Emersonian lens, this can be seen as a return to “wholeness,” as the 
human condition should be one of connectedness with the universe. “Wholeness” or 
“rightness” is addressed in Nature:
A man’s power to connect his thought with its proper symbol, and so to 
utter it, depends on the simplicity of his character, that is, upon his love of 
truth, and his desire to communicate it without loss.  The corruption of 
man is followed by the corruption of language.  .  . . In due time, the fraud 
is manifest, and words lose all power to stimulate the understanding or the 
affections. . . but wise men pierce this rotten diction and fasten words 
again to visible things; so that picturesque language is at once a 
commanding certificate that he who employs it, is a man in alliance with 
truth and God. (22-3)   
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By simply acknowledging his need “to be right,” Strether is expressing his 
recognition that a corrupt language has been used to manipulate people and 
situations, and that he must go beyond even Emerson’s “picturesque language” to 
silence, the system by which he will come to awareness.  Strether’s bypassing 
picturesque language does not render Emerson’s observations irrelevant for this 
text.  Because existing symbol systems fail for Strether, however, he must 
circumvent them to arrive through silence at both the meaning and condition, or 
natural fact, of rightness.  Emerson prefigures this when he writes in “Intellect” of 
the unfolding of the intuition, declaring that “its virtue is as silent method; the 
moment it would appear as propositions, and have a separate value, it is 
worthless” (419). Throughout The Ambassadors, the propositions remain as the 
tokens of a language that works against the truth, and inhibit Strether’s awareness 
from emerging out of intuition. This chapter addresses remnants of language and 
other symbol systems through James’s use of them in the text, and Strether’s 
reading of them. 
 Kenneth Burke discusses the nature of one’s relationship with language, 
observing that “language referring to the realm of the nonverbal is necessarily talk about 
things in terms of what they are not—and in this sense we start out beset by a paradox” 
(5).  He describes language as a tool created by humans, and notes that as a result, man is 
“separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making” (13).  The 
natural condition can be seen as man’s physicality, as well as “wholeness” in the 
Emersonian sense.  James manipulates the emerging modernist self-consciousness about 
the nature of language as a subject.  It is presented somewhat humorously when the 
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narrator, clearly choosing to gloss over some details, summarizes, “if we should go into 
all that occupied our friend in the watches of the night we should have to mend our pen” 
(91).    Strether unknowingly faces the paradox of language and ultimately reconciles it 
through silence, but before he can do so, he must address the remnants of language and 
other existing symbol systems that surround him and separate him from truth.  The 
paradoxical nature of language is encapsulated in Burke’s description of terministic 
screens: “Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a 
terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a 
deflection of reality” (45).  Like a photograph, a term simultaneously captures and 
distorts an image.  To get to the reality, one must transcend the screen.  In his discussion 
of Emerson’s work, Burke identifies terministic bridges, which allow for transcendence.  
Burke defines transcendence as  “the building of a terministic bridge whereby one realm 
is transcended by being viewed in terms of a realm ‘beyond’ it” (187).  In transcending, 
one arrives at “ ‘highly’ generalized terms like ‘entities’ or ‘beings’—whereupon all that 
is left is a further step to something like ‘Pure Being,’ or the One, or First, or Ultimate” 
(190), or for Strether, perhaps, the condition of rightness.  But, how is this transcendence 
to be achieved?  For Emerson, “even the crudest of sensory perceptions can be treated as 
the revealing of nature’s mysteries” (Burke 192), and then represented through imagery.  
James, however, must leave the image behind.  In fact, it becomes clear that the bridge 
must lie elsewhere, as suggested when Strether meets the artist Gloriani at Chad’s, when 
“the famous sculptor seemed to signal almost condolingly, yet oh how vacantly! as across 
some great flat sheet of water.  He threw out the bridge of a charming hollow civility on 
which Strether wouldn’t have trusted his own full weight a moment” (156).   The 
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language of this passage suggests the failure of words as conveyances of meaning: the 
bridge will not hold, the word has no substance and is merely a “civility,” a word which 
resonates with his relationship with Mrs. Newsome.  
This scene is not the first in the novel to address the nature of the word.  In fact, 
the word is, for the reader, paradoxically under scrutiny by its absence from the novel’s 
very opening. Upon his arrival in Chester, Strether has a question about his friend 
Waymarsh, and is given a telegram from him, which is not replicated for the reader.  
Instead, it is summarized, so instead of the concrete communication, the reader has 
Strether’s “wholly instinctive” reaction to it. The telegram can be viewed emblematically; 
it is what remains of a prior symbol system, but because it is not adequate, its contents 
are not revealed to the reader.  In fact, despite the telegram, Strether is not quite sure  
how to “read” Waymarsh, a situation that lingers and even escalates throughout the work.   
One must get to meaning, but the word does not serve as the bridge. The novel opens 
with self-conscious references to symbol systems; of course, the word, but there is also 
reference to what Strether was missing by his delay in seeing Waymarsh: “the first ‘note,’ 
of Europe” (17).  The word “note” is repeated three times in as many sentences; the 
musical rhetoric evokes another symbol system that reverberates with meaning.  This 
symbol system, too, will be presented in the novel and later in this chapter as inadequate 
as it too is a token that may misrepresent.   
Strether’s attempt to “read” Waymarsh through his telegram is emblematic of the 
physicality of language that lingers in the text.  When Strether first speaks with Chad, it is 
said that “he had frequently, for a month, turned over what he should say on this very 
occasion, and he seemed at last to have said nothing he had thought of” (95).  Of course, 
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one may read “turned over” metaphorically as “considered.”  Metaphors, however, often 
have their origins in the physical; Strether considers by examining, lifting, and turning 
the word itself.  Finally, he says something other than he had planned; the word, so to 
speak, is inverted.   
The remnants of language take on life when Strether and Maria Gostrey first 
meet.  They exchange cards, an act that is, of course, a common civility and would seem 
to have no greater significance.  James’s description of the exchange, however, renders it 
greater.  After taking her card, Strether put in into his pocket and “it was positively droll 
to him that he should already have Maria Gostrey, whoever she was—of which he hadn’t 
really the least idea—in a place of safe keeping.”  He then thinks of the card as “the little 
token he had just tucked in” (22). The card, then, resonates with life, and the token 
becomes interchangeable with the self.  Significantly, though, Strether, again, cannot read 
the token or the person.  When he presents his card to her, however, it is even richer.  She 
reads it over and “ ‘I like,’ she observed,  ‘your name.  .  .  . It’s the name of a novel of 
Balzac’s’” (23).  The token of Strether’s card not only encompasses Strether, but also 
reverberates with literary past.  When Maria then deems the novel “an awfully bad one,” 
she may appear to be passing judgment on Strether’s character also.  
As they come to know one another better, the question of identity becomes tied 
even further into the written word.  Strether describes, in a halting, incomplete manner, 
Mrs. Newsome’s business concerns.  He tells Maria that he is involved with “the 
Review.”  When she asks for more detail, he tells her only that it is green; she reads it 
symbolically, he means it literally.  When she says that he “effaces” himself by not 
putting his name on the cover for himself, Strether replies, “that’s exactly what I do put it 
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on for.  It’s exactly the thing that I’m reduced to doing for myself.  It seems to rescue a 
little, you see, from the wreck of hopes and ambitions, the refuse-heap of 
disappointments and failures, my one presentable little scrap of an identity” (51).  This 
passage is so powerful because it contains not only Strether’s sense of self as a failure, 
but also resonates with the weight of the written word.  It can confer identity on one who, 
in his own estimation, has none.  It also confers the weight and value of the literary past.  
Significantly, the reader is never told the contents of the Review; one may reduce it to a 
symbol of the clichéd admonition that one must not judge a book by its cover.  In the 
hands of Henry James, however, it is far richer than that.  It becomes a symbol of the 
sense of self that Strether has at the outset of his voyage; the sense of self he would like 
to convey; the value of the word as symbol; and, the inadequacy of the symbol.  It is a 
particularly poignant moment in the novel when Strether’s sense of failing is revealed, 
culminating in the statement, “He was Lambert Strether because he was on the cover, 
whereas it should have been for anything like glory, that he was on the cover because he 
was Lambert Strether” (62).  This resonates with hollowness, of Strether’s character, of 
the Review, and of how society judges accomplishment.  Again, because the contents of 
the Review are never revealed to Maria or fully to the reader, it becomes part of a symbol 
system that does not work; representative, perhaps, of Emerson’s “corrupt language” 
which separates from rather than fastens to the truth. Strether becomes the name on the 
cover, a hollow identity.  In his essay What Are the Signs of What?, Kenneth Burke 
describes the views of the naturalist and supernaturalist regarding language, concluding 
that if the “views of the natural would embody the forms of language . . things would be 
the signs of words” ( 379) an inversion of Emerson’s statement that words are the signs 
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of things.  Through the Review, Strether himself becomes a sign of a word, i.e. his name 
as it appears.  This is the language failing; in order to get to the reality of Strether and his 
sense of what it means “to be right,” the remnant of the token word must be pierced.  
The token of the word as symbol is taken even further as Strether contemplates, 
and contrasts with the Review, the “lemon-coloured volumes” he sees in shop windows, a 
dozen of which he had brought back from Paris many years earlier.  They, too, fail to 
convey meaning as written works, but as volumes that, unlike the Review, pay “tribute to 
letters,” symbolize Strether’s failure in creating a “temple of taste” as he never even had 
the books bound.  They remain, instead, “stale and soiled” (63).  The physical presence of 
the books serves as a reminder to Strether of the unfulfilled promise of the past, and he is 
conscious of their physicality.  While “Strether’s present highest flights were perhaps 
those in which this particular lapse figured to him as a symbol, a symbol of his long grind 
and his want of odd moments, his want moreover of money, of opportunity, of positive 
dignity” (63), neither the books nor the “highest flights” contain a sense of who he is, 
only of what he has not accomplished. This phrasing cannot help but remind one of 
William James’s description of the stream of thought as “an alternation of flights and 
perchings” with “the places of flight [as] the ‘transitive parts,’ of the stream of thought” 
(The Principles of Psychology I, 243).  As James presents it, the transitive parts serve to 
lead from one substantive part to another.  That is not all, however; he writes of the 
attempt to analyze the transitive parts, which, if stopped, are then annihilated.  He 
describes the transitive parts as containing “numberless” relations, saying “no existing 
language is capable of doing justice to all their shades” (245). Strether’s flight indicates 
an attempt at consciousness, but as a flight in William James’s sense, it cannot capture 
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the relations in feelings or relation of self to the larger world.  Significantly, it especially 
cannot be done in language.  The passage cited above conveys emptiness, or to use 
James’s word, want.  The repetition and mirroring of the word “symbol” serves to 
underscore Strether’s self-analysis; as such, it takes on even greater physical presence: 
symbol as symbol.  It cannot function as a means of communication, however, because it 
does not impart meaning, only failure.  The token of an existing symbol system must be 
transcended. 
The connection of person to written word is further made when Strether later 
enters Sarah Pocock’s room.  Mrs. Pocock, Mrs. Newsome’s daughter, has come on her 
mother’s instructions to accomplish what Strether has failed to do, bring Chad home.  Her 
presence, therefore, only exacerbates Strether’s sense of humiliation.  Strether sees a 
letter from Mrs. Newsome to her daughter, and 
It brought home to him the scale on which Mrs. Newsome—for she had 
been copious indeed this time—was writing to her daughter while she kept 
him in durance; and it had altogether such an effect upon him as made him 
for a few minutes stand still and breathe low.  In his own room, at his own 
hotel, he had dozens of well-filled envelopes superscribed in that 
character; and there was actually something in the renewal of his 
interrupted vision of the character that played straight into the so frequent 
question of whether he weren’t already disinherited beyond appeal.  It was 
such an assurance as the sharp downstrokes of her pen hadn’t yet had 
occasion to give him; but they somehow at the present crisis stood for a 
probable absoluteness in any decree of the writer.  He looked at Sarah’s 
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name and address, in short, as if he had been looking hard into her 
mother’s face, and then turned from it as if the face had declined to relax.  
But since it was in a manner as if Mrs. Newsome were thereby all the 
more, instead of the less, in the room, and were conscious, sharply and 
sorely conscious, of himself, so he felt both held and hushed, summoned 
to stay at least and take his punishment.  (246) 
This is a lengthy and significant passage in relation to both the sense of the physical 
presence of the word and its relation to character, and Strether’s “unfolding” sense of 
himself, his reading of the situation, and his relationship with Mrs. Newsome. Much as in 
the earlier description of Maria’s calling card, the words here become character, with 
James self-consciously manipulating, again, the word “character” itself referring to both 
the written letter and the person of Mrs. Newsome.  The physical presence of the word 
has many levels here.   Strether reads the “downstrokes” of the name, not the meaning of 
the words, as an admonition and indictment of his failure to act according to Mrs. 
Newsome’s wishes.  Despite the words, however, communication is not adequately 
accomplished.  He still withholds information from Mrs. Newsome; she bypasses him to 
communicate with Sarah.  In fact, the number of words seems to increase in inverse 
proportion to the meaning they convey.  At an earlier moment, when Strether learns that 
the Pococks are to be dispatched to Europe, he responds somewhat misleadingly to Mrs. 
Newsome in a cable that he appreciated her action and that he would be writing to her.  
He contemplates: “but he was of course always writing . . . Wouldn’t the pages he still so 
freely dispatched by the American post have been worthy of a showy journalist, some 
master of the great new science of beating the sense out of words?  Wasn’t he writing 
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against time, and mainly to show he was kind?—since it had become quite become his 
habit not to like to read himself over.  . . . He might have written before more freely, but 
he had never written more copiously” (194-5).  James presents here the chasm between 
the word and meaning.  The words, in their copiousness, a word used in both this and the 
above-cited passage, both “reflect” and “deflect” reality, as Burke suggests. The 
Modernist self-consciousness about and manipulation of language is reflected in this 
passage, so that it becomes meaningless in terms of conveying reality, and a tool in social 
situations.   Additionally, Strether is said to prefer not to “read himself over,” so the word 
becomes equivalent to character once again.  The symbol system remains, but the more it 
multiplies in volume, the less meaning it has, and thereby does not allow for 
transcendence.  As representative of character, the  word can also mask and allow for 
misreading. 
There are many moments in the text when, in addition to the sense of character 
they adopt above, the words take on physical presence, but remain unspoken.  When 
Sarah Pocock meets Madame de Vionnet for the first time, for example, they allude to 
visiting Chad’s.  Strether anticipates Sarah’s response, “he guessed that for five seconds 
these words were on the point of coming; he heard them as clearly as if they had been 
spoken; but he presently knew they had just failed . . . This left [Madame de Vionnet] 
free to reply only to what had been said” (221).  This passage manipulates words, silence, 
and meaning brilliantly.  The words, which have not been spoken, have a real presence 
and weight.  In fact, Madame de Vionnet is prepared to respond to them.  It would seem 
that if they are not spoken, they cannot convey meaning.  On the contrary, they are 
present in their absence, inviting first one response, then by their failure, another.  The 
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symbol system as it has conventionally operated is not working.  This calls into question 
the role of the terministic bridge, which, as defined above, allows for transcendence by 
viewing one realm in terms of the realm beyond it, and can be accomplished for Emerson 
through imagery.  By contrast, language, which should function as the bridge in the 
context described above, serves only to deflect attention from the reality, if you will, of 
the situation.  This separates them all from the realm in which Strether is to acknowledge 
the truth of the situation and “be right;” the words that are spoken are incomplete, and 
those that remain unspoken encapsulate the makeup of the relationships among the 
participants.  In presenting language in this way, James illustrates the paradoxical nature 
of language.  With their physical weight and presence, the token words contained in the 
text should be the quintessence of meaning.  Paradoxically, it is precisely by their 
presence that they call attention to their malleability, becoming remnants of a system that 
no longer holds up as the words adopt other functions.   This is a moment that signals the 
move to silence as an alternate symbol system. 
Before silence can be attained, however, other symbol systems are explored.  Just 
as the word is a traditional method of conveying meaning, so too are music and visual art.  
As the word fails, James puts forward other systems which have been established means 
of communication.  Because of the lingering reverberations associated with it, the art of 
music is a particularly appropriate method for conveying meaning.  Its richness is not 
only in the notes played, but as explored by John Cage, is in the silences as well.  In 
Lecture on Something he writes, “And no silence exists          that is not pregnant                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
with sound” (sic) (135).   Sound reverberating through the silence conveys a sense of 
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wholeness that may be conveyed through art.  Cage addresses form in his Lecture on 
Nothing, citing the need for structure in art:  
Structure      without life            is dead.                       But life     without 
structure is un-seen                        .                                   Pure life 
expresses itself                               within                   and through structure. 
(sic) (113) 
While this breaks from traditionally accepted line arrangement, it has a structure and 
symmetry of its own.  The structure of which he writes is the art which gives form to 
meaning, and which can be seen in the silences which reverberate with wholeness.  
Emerson writes of art in Nature as the creation of beauty: “Truth, and goodness, and 
beauty, are but different faces of the same All.  But beauty in nature is not ultimate.  It is 
the herald of inward and eternal beauty, and is not alone a solid and satisfactory good” 
(19).  The form, or beauty, is another mode of arriving at meaning; James uses the 
rhetoric of both musical and visual art in his writing.  As George Steiner writes, “The 
notion that the structure of the universe is ordered by harmony, that there is a music 
whose modes are the elements, the concord of the planetary orbits, the chime of water 
and blood, is as ancient as Pythagoras and has never lost its metaphoric life” (42).  The 
use of musical rhetoric is a way to suggest the notion of the music of the spheres.  Steiner 
cites the value of music for communication, calling it “unique to itself (untranslatable) 
yet immediately comprehensible” (46).   Ultimately, though, music fails too, until 
Strether arrives at the reverberation, or the silence that conveys the meaning. At this 
point, one approaches Steiner’s “third mode of transcendence” in which “language 
simply ceases, and the motion of spirit gives no further outward manifestation of its 
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being.  The poet enters into silence” (46).   Just as the token words remain, however, the 
tokens of the symbol system of music linger in the text.   
In his description of Strether in Project of Novel, James writes, “It has all come 
over him since his disembarkment at Liverpool that he responds to his holiday more even 
than he had expected, and that he is now responding—after the first few days—to a still 
quicker tune” (553).   In the course of the novel, the “quicker tune” becomes associated 
with silence.  During the period when, sensing his failure, Mrs. Newsome stops writing to 
Strether, he realizes “the increase of his darkness, however, and the quickening, as I have 
called it, of his tune, resided in the fact that he was hearing almost nothing. [ . . .]  He had 
never so lived with her as during this period of her silence; the silence was a sacred hush, 
a finer clearer medium” (195).  The language of music is used interchangeably here with 
the references to silence, so that the two become intertwined.  The reference to the 
“sacred hush” elevates silence to a means of transcendence, the “finer clearer medium” 
approaching the sublime.  The passage calls to mind Emerson’s dictate in Self-Reliance:
“Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string” (260).  The vibration, or music, is a 
link to universal wholeness.  In The Ambassadors, meaning takes form through the 
rhetoric of music, but its essence exists ironically through silence. 
The connection of musical rhetoric to silence and meaning is strikingly made in a 
passage surrounding, but never fully revealing, the contents of another telegram.  This 
telegram arrives midway in the text and Strether’s adventure, and delivers, the reader 
learns after several pages, an ultimatum from Mrs. Newsome.  She informs Strether that 
if he does not immediately return to the States, she will send the Pococks to join him and 
Chad.  The scene involves Waymarsh again; Strether, however, does not reveal the 
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contents of the telegram to Waymarsh, not even referring to it even though Waymarsh 
has seen Strether reading it.  They eat their dinner in near silence: 
Our friend had moreover the consciousness that even less than usual was 
on this occasion said between them, so that it was almost as if each had 
been waiting for something from the other.  Waymarsh had always more 
or less the air of sitting at the door of his tent, and silence, after so many 
weeks, had come to play its part in their concert.  This note indeed, to 
Strether’s sense, had lately taken a fuller tone, and it was his fancy to-
night that they had never quite so drawn it out.  Yet it befell, none the less, 
that he closed the door to confidence when his companion finally asked 
him if there were anything particular the matter with him.  ‘Nothing,’ he 
replied, ‘more than usual.’  On the morrow, however, at an early hour, he 
found occasion to give an answer more in consonance with the facts.”   
(183)    
One might question why the passage is included; Waymarsh and Strether do not 
discuss the contents of the telegram, and it would appear to have no bearing on 
the situation with Mrs. Newsome that Strether dined with Waymarsh.  It does, 
however, recall the opening telegram from Waymarsh, again one whose contents 
are undisclosed.  Through this emblem, Strether and Waymarsh’s changing 
relationship is charted; as their silence deepens, Strether is able to read Waymarsh 
more clearly.  Additionally, the rhetoric of music is clearly employed, and here, 
again, is used to describe their silence.  The references to concert, note, and tone 
underscore the reverberations of meaning that are exchanged between the two; the 
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use of the word “consonance” toward the end of the passage suggests both 
harmonic sound and agreement.  The notes and remnants of the symbol system 
are there, but again, are ultimately bypassed in favor of the silence that reveals the 
depth of the situation. Finally, in discussion with Maria Gostrey, Strether 
anticipates confronting Waymarsh about his belief that Strether should return, in 
effect, a betrayal of Strether.  He tells Maria, “any discussion we may have will 
bring us quite together again—bridge the dark stream that has kept us so 
thoroughly apart” (191).  The language here recalls both William James’s stream 
of thought and Burke’s description of the terministic bridge. James defines the 
“object of every thought” as “neither more nor less than all that the thought 
thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the matter, and 
however symbolic the manner of the thinking may be.”  He makes the further 
point that “however complex the object may be, the thought of it is one undivided 
state of consciousness” (Principles of Psychology I, 276).  Strether and Waymarsh 
appear to contemplate an object of thought; however, at this stage of their 
relationship and the situation with Chad, they are on other sides of the stream.  If 
the stream of thought is individual consciousness, they must arrive at a way to 
view the object in consonance.  When that happens, they will, in effect, have 
found their terministic bridge.  For Strether, it may also involve the need “to be 
right,” which he has not yet articulated.  He is aware, though, that his emerging 
sense of being right is not the same as Waymarsh’s.  Strether may find 
transcendence to meaning through discussion with Waymarsh, but only after they 
have arrived at understanding, or consonance, through silence.   Their relationship 
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evolves, just as symbol systems are recognized and rejected in favor of silence.   
William James even likens the effect of neuroses on the consciousness to the         
“ ‘overtones’ in music,” noting that “different instruments give the ‘same note,’ 
but each in a different voice, because each gives more than that note, namely, 
various upper harmonics of it which differ from one instrument to another” and 
blend with the basic note.  So, too, do the “brain-processes at every moment blend 
with and suffuse and alter the psychic effect of the processes which are at their 
culminating point” (Principles of Psychology I, 258).  The rhetoric of music, 
silence, and the stream of thought are used together to signal the consciousness 
emerging through resonance for Strether. 
Finally, in his Project of Novel, Henry James indicates that Strether recognizes the 
conclusion of his affairs in Paris through sonic metaphors.  Strether, he writes, 
“recognizes that his hour has sounded.  The sound is like the bell of the steamer calling 
him, from its place at the dock, aboard again, and by the same act ringing down the 
curtain on the play” (573).  The bell reads and signals the depths, and brings the situation 
to an end.  It, too, resonates. 
The symbol system of music cannot fully express meaning; on the way to silence, 
other systems are explored.  James progresses through different symbol systems as 
Strether intuits the limitations of others.  Another system represented is visual art.  It is 
introduced early, and significantly, in the novel when Strether visits the sculptor Gloriani 
at a gathering in his garden.  When he arrives, Strether has “the sense of names in the air, 
of ghosts at the windows, of signs and tokens, a whole range of expression, all about him, 
too think for prompt discrimination” (120).  It is this moment which initiates Strether’s 
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examination of the situation.  When Strether meets Gloriani, he is struck by  “the medal-
like Italian face.”  Not only is Strether aware of Gloriani’s art, but likens Gloriani to a 
work of art himself.  Again, there are layers and levels of representation.  In fact, Strether 
sees Gloriani’s eyes as “the source of the deepest intellectual sounding to which he had 
ever been exposed,” the rhetoric similar to that of music noted above.  It is through 
discussion and contemplation in this art dominated setting that Strether is inspired to 
exhort Bilham to “Live!” (132).  This moment is cited by James in his Preface to the text 
as “the whole case” of the novel (1); as a result of this moment of crisis for Strether, his 
consciousness ultimately evolves.  Interestingly, the entire scene was modeled by James 
on an incident reported to him by his friend Jonathan Sturges, and a discussion he had 
with William Dean Howells, who tells him “You are young.  Live!”  The exchange 
becomes the inspiration for the novel and character of Strether  (The Complete Notebooks 
of Henry James 141).  Here, life inspires art which, in turn, inspires life.  It is a multi-
faceted scene that Strether begins to read, but at this point in his development, finds  “too 
thick for prompt discrimination.” He must ultimately go past the artistic discourse to 
arrive at understanding. 
In Silence: The Phenomenon and Its Ontological Significance, Bernard P. 
Dauenhauer examines artistic discourse in relation to silence.  He describes the failure of 
artistic discourse to capture a universe called “unencompassable in discourse.”  As a 
result, it will have to yield to another utterance, “thus, the new utterance itself at the very 
moment of its origin, is infected with that silence which reveals not merely the finitude of 
previous artistic discourse but precisely its own finitude” (48). Dauenhauer describes an 
unfolding here, what he calls a “fore-and-after silence,” with silence as a positive 
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phenomenon allowing for evolution of expression.  This description captures the essence 
of Strether’s movement through myriad symbol systems, including that of visual art.  
Because symbol systems are indeed finite, they must give way to new systems, or 
utterances, and silence, according to Dauenhauer, becomes “the background against 
which an utterance or sequence of utterances unfolds.”   Such a representation may be 
seen in what is arguably the most crucial scene in the novel: Strether’s journey to the 
countryside, during which he encounters Chad and Madame de Vionnet and recognizes 
the true nature of their relationship. 
Strether takes the train without a clear destination in mind; he is in search of a 
place reminiscent to him of “a certain small Lambinet that had charmed him, long years 
before” (301), and which he never purchased.  He attempts to capture the essence of his 
romanticized vision of rural France, called “a land of fancy for him—the background of 
fiction, the medium of art, the nursery of letters; practically as distant as Greece.”  When 
he finds the right stop, he gets off the train, and  
the poplars and willows, the reeds and river—a river of which he didn’t 
know, and didn’t want to know, the name—fell into composition, full of 
felicity, within them; the sky was silver and turquoise and varnish; the 
village on the left was white and the church on the right was grey; it was 
all there, in short—it was what he wanted: it was Tremont Street, it was 
France, it was Lambinet.  (302) 
Strether enters a work of visual art and has “the sense of success, of a finer harmony in 
things . . .this moreover was what he had dropped to, and now he was touching bottom” 
(303).  The language here also echoes musical rhetoric; his touching bottom creates the 
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sense of sounding.  The arts would seem to get him to consciousness.  Then, “in 
midstream of his drama” Strether approaches the river, and sees Chad and Madame de 
Vionnet in a boat.  The moments before his sighting are described in terms of the drama 
where “the play and the characters had, without his knowing it till now, peopled all his 
space for him” (306).  The artistic discourse seems to give Strether a heightened 
awareness; the scene becomes rich with reverberations and intimations that will be more 
fully examined in terms of other silences. He is not fully prepared, however, for what he 
sees, as “such a river set one afloat almost before one could take up the oars” (307); his 
consciousness cannot yet permeate the discourse of the scene.  
Strether sees Chad and Madame de Vionnet; they spot him almost simultaneously.  
In fact, as Strether replays the encounter in his mind, it appears Madame de Vionnet had 
spotted him first, and tells Chad, “bid[ding] him keep still.”   The scene seems to freeze 
momentarily, like a painting or dramatic moment, with Strether perceiving “they were 
thus, on either side, trying the other side, and all for some reason that broke the stillness 
like some unprovoked harsh note” (308). The silence underlies the artistic rhetoric; they 
are in the stream of consciousness together, but Madame de Vionnet attempts to 
manipulate the reality of a situation that Strether sees “as queer as fiction, as farce.” 
Strether decides to take control and call to them, forcing them to acknowledge his 
presence.  Of course, they do meet and dine together, and Madame de Vionnet and Chad 
must return to Paris, pretending that they had not intended to spend the night in the 
countryside.  Strether realizes that “fiction and fable were, inevitably, in the air” and “It 
had been a performance, Madame de Vionnet’s manner” (311).  In addition to 
recognizing the artifice of the situation, he comes to recognize the reality: “they hadn’t 
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been alone together a moment since and must have communicated all in silence.  It was a 
part of the deep impression for Strether, and not the least of the deep interest, that they 
could so communicate” (312).  A critical moment, indeed, for Strether, as he finally 
confronts not only the nature of their relationship, but also how to communicate.  He had 
been reading the artistic discourse, but discovers that he must ultimately go past it, as 
Madame de Vionnet and Chad had on their boat in the river.  As a climactic scene in the 
novel, it is rich with many different modes of silence that will be addressed in greater 
depth in subsequent chapters. 
Finally, references to the remnants of symbol systems, merged with other 
techniques, occur throughout the novel as Strether’s consciousness unfolds.  Earlier, 
when Strether meets and then dines with Madame de Vionnet at Notre Dame, the 
language used suggests artistic discourse, and manipulates syntax to imply greater depth 
of meaning.  Before spotting Madame de Vionnet, Strether is in Notre Dame, trying to 
“reduce it in fact to the convenient terms of Victor Hugo” (173), that is, he is using the 
world of artifice to order reality. Significantly, in the Modernist tradition, the secular 
world of art supplants the spirituality implied by the setting of the Cathedral; later, art 
will be supplanted by consciousness expressed through silence. Strether sees and speaks 
with Madame de Vionnet, telling her about his purchase of the seventy volumes of Hugo; 
at this point, the diction and syntax become visibly manipulated.  James repeats words: 
He had spoken of the great romancer and the great romance, and of what, 
to his imagination, they had done for the whole, mentioning to her 
moreover the exorbitance of his purchase, the seventy blazing volumes 
that were so out of proportion.
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‘Out of proportion to what?’ 
“Well, to any other plunge.’ Yet he felt even as he spoke how at that 
instant he was plunging. He had made up his mind and was impatient to 
get into the air; for his purpose was a purpose to be uttered outside, and he 
had a fear that it might with delay still slip away from him.  (174) (italics 
added) 
The repetition of the words “romance,” “proportion,” “plunge,” and “purpose” call 
attention to the artifice and self-consciousness of the situation, Strether’s emerging 
consciousness, and the process of writing the text.  There is a sense of mirroring words 
and holding them up to scrutiny, with the word “plunge” having further reverberations in 
terms of sounding and exploring consciousness.  The words are tokens that James offers 
to the reader, and the artifice signals the fuller meaning that lay elsewhere.  Madame de 
Vionnet communicates silently in this significant scene in which Strether, without 
explicitly saying so, offers himself as a source of support to her.  It is done, instead, 
through the discussion of Hugo and the offer to dine together.  James’s syntax here brings 
the reader further into a circle of communication, as he repeats, “The sign would be 
that—though it was her own affair—he understood; the sign would be that—though it 
was her own affair—she was free to clutch” (175).  At first reading, one may be tempted 
to reread, to check if an error was made; then, however, it is clear that the reader is drawn 
into the whirlpool of meaning that Strether and Madame de Vionnet communicate 
through the “sign.” 
The scene reverberates with literary and musical rhetoric; he first sees Madame de 
Vionnet in the Cathedral, but does not realize it is she as she is deeply involved in her 
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thoughts with her back to him.  Strether is reminded, however, of “some fine firm 
concentrated heroine of an old story, something he had heard, read, something that, had 
he had a hand for drama, he might himself had written” (172).   When Madame de 
Vionnet finally greets a confused Strether, she is said to use “an art of her own” (173), all 
of which is surrounded by the discussion of Victor Hugo.  Strether experiences reality 
through the lens of artifice, and “ancient proverbs sounded, for his memory, in the tone of 
their words and the clink of their glasses, in the hum of the town and the plash of the 
river” (177), with sound suggesting fuller meaning.  That, combined with the self-
consciously distancing syntax of such sentences as “He supposed himself to have 
supposed that Chad might have taken her” to the restaurant indicate Strether’s attempts at 
using symbol systems, the remnants of which remain in the text, as terministic bridges.  
While Strether attempts to arrive at consciousness, he also remains distanced from 
it.  The approach to and separation from consciousness are captured in the syntax used.  
Ruth Yeazell addresses what she calls James’s characters’ “passion for delay,” because it 
is in staying removed from consciousness that they remain safe.  The flirtation with 
consciousness is revealed in the syntax.  As Yeazell writes, “it is in the very shape and 
form of the Jamesian sentence that the terror of full consciousness most makes itself felt” 
(22).  The physical movement of the sentences reflects the movement towards and pulling 
away from knowledge. Yeazell describes, “even as Strether has lingered so long in Paris, 
postponing all final confrontations, so too does his mental syntax characteristically 
hesitate and delay” (24).  The state of consciousness is connected, for Strether, to moral 
awareness, what Martha Nussbaum calls “perceptive equilibrium.” The term names “an 
equilibrium in which concrete perceptions ‘hang beautifully together,’ both with one 
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another and with the agent’s general principles” (183).  Nussbaum suggests that Strether 
is somewhat bewildered and hesitant, indicating “marks of fine attention,” a term 
evocative of William James’s work.  Paradoxically, the dense and sometimes circular 
sentences suggest clarity; as Nussbaum explains, “the fullness, the density, of the 
narrative style is itself the fitting expression of a certain sort of moral imagination.  
Indeed, James recalls to us that even the novel, with all its richness, can actually express 
but a fraction of the crowded consciousness of someone who is really making an effort to 
see” (185).  Hence the dependence on silence and alternate symbol systems.  By contrast, 
those who are not making an effort to see speak more directly.  Nussbaum calls the 
“sentences of Woollett. . . crisp, ‘straight,’ and, as Strether says, ‘pat.’”    When Strether 
discusses the situation with Jim Pocock on the latter’s arrival in Paris, “he felt on the spot 
that this was the real word from Woollett” (217).  The directness is in marked contrast to 
the understandings that are veiled and revealed slowly to Strether, emerging from the 
vagueness and complicated syntax.  They reflect, as Nussbaum suggests, the fact that 
Strether and the Woollett contingent do not perceive the same reality (184).   
As Strether begins to emerge from the vagueness to understanding, the syntax 
changes and reflects exigency.   When he answers a request to see Madame de Vionnet 
after the outing in the countryside, for example, Strether feels that sternness is 
appropriate.  This sense is syntactically represented in his thought that they should meet 
in an uncomfortable place so that there would be the sense “that somebody was paying 
something somewhere and somehow” (315).  The repetition of the word-part “some,” and 
the absence of commas or pausing suggest sternness, as if the words are striking with 
punitive force.    
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The forceful syntax of Strether’s thoughts takes time to develop.  Early in the 
novel, when Strether arrives in Paris and has yet to reunite with Chad, Strether begins to 
become aware of the effect Paris has on him, and that effect is conveyed to the reader.  
Strehter reaches Chad’s house, and “had at this very moment to recognize the truth that 
wherever one paused in Paris the imagination reacted before one could stop it” (69).  The 
reader is made to pause here as well, as Strether looks up and contemplates Chad’s 
balcony, and sees a young man smoking.  The young man, who is to remain unnamed for 
several pages, spies Strether. The reader is told “This was interesting so far as it went, but 
the interest was affected by the young man’s not being Chad.”   Again, the significant 
information of this sentence is withheld until its end.  Only moments pass, but a great 
deal happens in Strether’s recognition.  He is aware of the time passing, and of being 
watched: “The young man looked at him still, he looked at the young man; and the issue, 
by a rapid process, was that this knowledge of a perched privacy appeared to him the last 
of luxuries.  To him too the perched privacy was open” (70).  Notice the mirroring effect 
and rapidity of the syntax.  Strether and the young man, who is John Little Bilham, face 
each other, as the two parts of the sentence mirror one another.  Also repeated is the 
phrase “perched privacy,” suggesting William James’s substantive moments in the stream 
of consciousness.  Strether recognizes, at that moment of perching, that he shares 
something with the young man, a place in Chad’s home. This knowledge emerges from 
within the reaction of Strether’s imagination to Paris.  The term “perching” resonates, as 
several significant scenes in the novel take place around balconies: this scene, Strether’s 
first encounter with Chad in the balcony at the theatre discussed earlier in chapter one, 
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and Strether’s final approach to Chad’s balcony at the end of the novel, to be addressed 
later.  The perching moments involve watching and recognition, and the syntax echoes it.  
While this is Strether’s first introduction to Little Bilham, he becomes a 
significant figure for Strether.  In fact, it is through Bilham that Strether has a sense of 
what it means to be American, questions how he has lived his own life, ultimately 
exhorting Bilham to “live,” and reconsiders his definition of morality when Bilham terms 
Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship “virtuous.”  Soon after Strether’s first 
meeting with Bilham, he and Maria Gostrey meet Bilham at the Louvre.  The narrative 
flow of the scene, which runs from pages 83 to 85, serves as a paradigm of the mind’s 
construction of knowledge, what William James calls “a thorough-going dualism” which 
“supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known,” and is “constituted by a new 
construction that occurs altogether in the mind” (Principles of Psychology I, 218-219).  
Bilham becomes a signal of recognition for Strether, becoming objectified through a 
distancing process, partially achieved through syntax.  It is also accomplished in part by 
the narrator’s detached tone; he objectively observes and reports, with earlier first person 
intrusions and allusions to “poor Strether” or “our hero” clearly replaced by an objective, 
impersonal tone.  In addition, the reader is further removed from the inner workings of 
Strether’s mind as he views the scene in a way which resembles drama: the reader 
watches Strether watch Bilham.  There are references to events of which the reader is 
unaware, namely that plans for the visit to the Louvre had been made with Maria Gostrey 
at Chester. The reader is distanced from complete knowledge, just as the words alone 
keep complete knowledge from Strether.  The syntax is another remnant of a symbol 
system that supplements an incomplete spoken language.  The distancing created by the 
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absence of detail is underscored by the physical distancing created by the sentence 
constructions. 
Maria murmurs to Strether that Bilham is one of them, and from that point, the 
two  “proceeded and paused and while a quick unanimity between the two appeared[ . . 
.]”.   The acts of proceeding and pausing are significant in tracing Strether’s ultimate 
apprehension of consciousness.  The reader sees Strether moving and halting, with the 
adjective “quick” suggesting lurching, as moments of near recognition, and then loss.  
The subordinate clause itself lurches into the sentence; the reader is set up to expect 
another verb because the coordinating conjunction “and” was used earlier and establishes 
a rhythm.  Strether undergoes the process described by William James, the “duplication 
of the object by an inner construction,” while pausing and proceeding, combining his 
impression of Little Bilham with Maria Gostrey’s assessment, to create “the conception 
of an American intense as little Bilham was intense.” 
The rapid movement of the passage suggests William James’s concept in “The 
Stream of Thought” of “a bird’s life . . . made of an alternation of flights and perchings.  
The rhythm of language expresses this [. . .]” (243).  The language of movement and 
halting reflects this, as does the rest of the line.  The narrator’s observation that “a quick 
unanimity between the two appeared to have phrased itself in half a dozen remarks[. . .]” 
is a movement, a transition, which reflects a merging and splitting: the two become one
mind through half a dozen remarks.  The construction of unanimity appears to occur 
independently of Strether; he is passive as it “phrased itself,” part of the “new 
construction” of which William James writes.  The new construction is later referred to as 
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a moment of “light,” which is also suggested by the merging and splitting imagery 
created by the one-two-half reference.  
Distance between the mind and its new construction is further emphasized as the 
line continues.  Significantly, James uses a dash, causing a leap to the apprehension the 
“Strether knew that he knew almost immediately what she meant.”  The rhythm of this 
line reflects its meaning.  There is a distancing effect through the use of the subordinate 
clause, which also creates ambiguity.  Why not, simply, “Strether knew almost 
immediately . . .”?  The use of the pronoun “he” in the subordinate clause gives the reader 
the sense that there might be another “he.”  Upon closer analysis, however, it is evident 
that “he” refers to Strether.  What the sentence construction appears to represent is the 
construction of knowledge according to William James’s model, as Strether is distanced 
from his own observation.  “That he knew” is a noun clause functioning as the direct 
object of the verb “knew,” which creates a layering effect, showing Strether’s mind in the 
process of apprehending some knowledge created by the interaction of the object (Bilham 
and Maria’s comment) and his mind.  This is followed by “and he took it [. . .]” which 
refers to his knowing almost immediately, giving it  a physical presence as the direct 
object of the transitive verb “took.”  Like the earlier merging and splitting, pausing and 
proceeding, levels of awareness are created, both in the presentation of the language, i.e. 
syntax, and within Strether’s mind.  The levels are reminiscent of William James’s theory 
that “knowledge becomes . . . an ultimate relation that must be admitted, whether it be 
explained or not” (Principles of Psychology, I 216).  Strether does not seek to explain the 
knowledge, but merely becomes aware of grasping it, as some object outside of himself.  
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In fact, he thinks of his knowledge of Maria’s statement that “he’s one of us” as a “sign 
that he had got his job in hand,” just as Bilham is a signal, and later, a specimen. 
The succeeding sentence serves to illustrate further William James’s theory about 
the rhythm of language.  He expands the metaphor of the bird in flight, suggesting that 
“resting places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort [ . . .].  Let us 
call the resting places the ‘substantive parts,’ and the places of flight the ‘transitive parts’ 
[. . .] it then appears that the main end of our thinking is at all times the attainment of 
some other substantive part” (243).  This is the process that Strether is apparently 
working through.  The sentence begins, “This was the more grateful to him,” leading the 
reader to question “what was?”  “This” is further explained by the clause “that he could 
think of the intelligence now serving him as an acquisition [. . . ]”.  Strether is both 
distanced from his “intelligence” and is brought to that point of rest at which the mind 
attains knowledge.  The relative pronoun allows Strether to reach the substantive part, 
which is, for him, intelligence as an “acquisition,” i.e. some construct outside of himself.  
It becomes, in itself, an object that Strether tentatively grasps, much like the unanimity 
that had heretofore eluded him. 
As the passage continues, Strether’s uncertainty is indicated.  In the following 
line, the reader is shown Strether’s awareness of knowledge, followed by self-doubt, 
another example of leveling.  This is achieved by both sentence structure and content: 
“He wouldn’t have known even the day before what she meant—that is if she meant, 
what he assumed [. . .]”.  The timeliness of the revelation is indicated by the adverb 
“even,” which suggests immediacy, and William James’s observation that “some 
[thoughts] are always things known a moment ago more clearly; others are things to be 
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known more clearly a moment hence” (Principles of Psychology I, 241).  The adverb is 
the transitive part that carries Strether to another substantive part.   Certainty is 
undermined by qualification: the dash seems to underscore the tentativeness, reminiscent 
of the earlier starts and stops.  This is further emphasized by the use of the conjunction 
“if” which serves to introduce yet another clause which qualifies that which it follows.  
The reader witnesses Strether’s self-questioning, “if she meant, what he assumed [. . .]”, 
which is subjective, with the use of the relative pronoun “that” leading again to the 
substantive “they were intense Americans together,” which had remained unnamed in the 
preceding clause, allowing for further qualification and fixing of meaning. This, again, 
gives a sense of the merging hinted at earlier.  Here it appears to be a complete moment 
of recognition for Strether, but the object of knowledge, intense Americans, needs to be 
further clarified for the reader.  This can be done through consideration of the “signal,” 
Bilham. 
A sense of movement is further emphasized as Strether recognizes that “he 
wouldn’t have known even the day before [. . .]”.  It is a knowledge he arrives at by fits 
and starts, over time, as the mind travels in flight.   In addition, he gets to the substantive 
having “just worked round,” giving a sense of tentative approach, which is strengthened 
by the interposition of the significant phrase, “and with a sharper turn of the screw than 
any yet” which fixes the movement.  The new substantive is arrived at and rested on.  
What he has worked round to is “the conception of an American intense as little Bilham 
was intense,” which is signaled earlier on by the approach of little Bilham.  Here, finally, 
the signal becomes “his first specimen.”  The use of the word specimen evokes the earlier 
references to merging and splitting, as a specimen is cut open and analyzed.  The tone 
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and structure of the description remains objective and analytical: “The young man was 
his first specimen; the specimen had profoundly perplexed him; at present however there 
was light.”  The repetition of “specimen” underscores the definitive nature of scientific 
observation; the use of semi-colons to link independent clauses implies clarity and order, 
unlike the vagueness suggested at other points.  Bilham, a young, diminutive “artist-man” 
comes to embody the American for Strether as several impressions fuse.  As he sees little 
Bilham approach, he hears Maria Gostrey murmur, and he recognizes that “in Bilham’s 
company contrarieties in general dropped.”  While Strether had at first thought of 
Bilham’s “serenity” as European, he comes to view it as “being more American than 
anybody.”  His first recognition is referred to as “light,” suggesting the merging of the 
earlier splitting that occurs with his first conception of Bilham.  Strether recognizes that 
he can “like his specimen with a clear good conscience” because in him he represents “a 
special little form of the oldest thing they knew.”  He embodies, then, the old values with 
a new self-satisfaction and passion for one’s life.  Bilham looks at a world “in respect to 
which he hadn’t a prejudice.”  All is stripped away in Strether’s newly-formed view of 
Bilham’s singularity. 
“Fusion” is a concept suggested by the narrator, who uses the term when he 
speaks of Strether’s “scheme”: visiting the Louvre with both Maria Gostrey and Bilham.  
“Fusion” appears to be the key to Strether’s acquisition of knowledge.  Through fusion, 
unanimity is achieved, and Strether recognizes in Bilham, oneness.  As his specimen is 
cut open and analyzed, Strether recognizes that Bilham can fuse contrarieties, a sense of 
which is recalled in Bilham’s approach.  Strether is standing before a Titian portrait of a 
young man, described as “overwhelming,” when he turns and sees Bilham.  A 
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connection, or fusion, is made for the reader between the two: an old, grandiose work of 
art, and a young, diminutive maker of art.  It is observed that Strether had already visited 
the Luxembourg Museum, which houses contemporary artists, with Bilham.  The rest of 
the “scheme” involves a visit to the Louvre, and the old masters.  Through Bilham, 
Strether can experience extremes, just as Bilham himself embodies extremes: he lives 
temporarily in luxury in Chad’s home, while retaining “his own poor place, which was 
very poor: and which gave him, to Strether, an odd and engaging dignity.”  Bilham’s life 
further fuses contrarieties as he had originally come to Paris to study painting, but “study 
had been fatal to him.”  Despite this, Bilham maintains dignity and identity.  This 
recognition causes Strether to “take hold,” and form a “new construction,” i.e. 
knowledge. 
With the recognition of the fusion of contrarieties in Bilham, Strether again feels a 
link to Bilham, earlier hinted at when Strether feels that Chad’s “was the only domicile, 
the only fireside, in the great ironic city, on which he had the shadow of a claim” (70). 
The ultimate “work[ing] round,” then, is an awareness, perhaps of the contrarieties in 
himself: Strether is not the grand, old, unbending American as personified by Waymarsh; 
he comprises contrary emotions and pulls, which are acceptable and even good to him in 
Bilham.  Having gotten “his job in hand” does not mean that he can perform the task of 
bringing Chad back; instead, it signals the beginning of the creation of identity through 
knowledge.  The old view of a dispassionate, unchanging American can fall away in 
Bilham’s presence, validating the extremes within Strether.  Finally, “there was light” as 
Strether’s mind apprehends that Bilham is a “special little form of the oldest thing they 
knew.”  Bilham’s failed attempt at study does not ultimately destroy him, as Strether’s 
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failed “mission” to retrieve Chad does not ultimately destroy him.  Rather, this adventure 
has helped define Strether.  At the end, “unanimity” of his contrarieties is achieved, and 
communicated to the reader through the language and syntax.  Even as an American he  
can make choices based upon the intensity of passion that he learns to accept, and 
therefore, he learns to live, just as he exhorts Bilham to do. 
Strether’s recognition occurs when Bilham, as a signal along with other 
impressions, strikes Strether’s mind, causing a totally new construction, i.e. the 
apprehension of the object.  Strether’s recognition is reflected in the language of the 
passage that reports it, so that the reader can recognize the approach to cognition.  
Ultimately, the light is arrived at, and the language itself fuses when “the ultimate 
relation . . .must be admitted,” as William James suggests.  The passage ends, “But it now 
for the time put Strether vastly at his ease to have this view of a new way,” calling 
attention to the concept of time, with the juxtaposition of “now” and “for the time” 
suggesting immediacy and transience, as Strether is en route to other understandings.  He 
accepts “a new way” which is empty of prejudice; this is the light that he sees, and that is 
represented by the passage’s ending in an unqualitative manner, bringing together the 
fragments of Strether’s earlier impressions and uniting them in a “new construction,” 
something like a sentence, i.e. that of being “more American than anybody.” 
It is impossible to separate completely a discussion of meaning and syntax, as, of 
course, they work together, but the syntax here becomes a physical presence.  Much like 
the telegrams and calling cards, the sentences themselves become remnants through 
which one can see the text constructed. 
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Just as, at times, the syntax of the text becomes circular to convey the 
circuitousness of meaning, the narrative comes full circle.  In a somewhat symmetrical 
scene, toward the very end of the novel, Strether once again approaches Chad’s balcony, 
and “it was as if his last day were oddly copying his first” (333).  While the situation 
appears the same, there is, however, a major difference.  This time, instead of mistaking 
Bilham for Chad, Strether mistakes Chad for Bilham.   Just as Strether’s consciousness 
emerges a bit at a time, with slight alterations, so too does the scene, materializing as 
Chad does: “it quickly defined itself in the tempered darkness as Chad’s more solid 
shape.”  This scene takes place after their meeting in the countryside, when Strether 
finally fully understands the situation.  In the first scene, he thought he knew Chad, but 
was wrong. It was Bilham, whom Strether came to understand.  Now Strether can read 
Chad’s character also.  Interestingly, he recalls Maria Gostrey’s assessment that Chad had 
been “absent and silent.”  It is in the state of silence that Strether experiences real 
enlightenment.  Strether’s state of mind and the magnitude of his feelings are conveyed 
through the sentence constructions.  This scene symmetrically complements the earlier 
balcony scene; the sentences symmetrically complement one another.  The parallel 
structure of “Chad’s was the attention that, after he had stepped forward into the street 
and signaled, he easily engaged; Chad’s was the voice that, sounding into the night with 
promptness and seemingly with joy, greeted him and called him up” implies climbing. 
The sentences are delayed by the interruption of the subordinate clauses, in the first by 
another subordinate clause that acts as the signal that is described.  The second is 
interrupted by a participial phrase that sounds a greeting.  Notice, however, that the 
reader is not told how Chad’s attention is engaged or what his greeting consists of. The 
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interrupted sentences create a zig-zag effect. The reader climbs, in effect, the syntax as 
Strether climbs the stairs to Chad’s apartment.  The paradoxical nature of language 
described by Kenneth Burke is again evident here; the obviously malleable syntax is one 
of the “instruments of his own making” that can separate man from his “natural 
condition” (13). 
As Strether climbs, which in itself suggests transcendence, he imagines what 
Chad had done when he was gone from Paris.  The reader is not told what actually 
happened, again, a silence, “though the visitor’s [Strether’s] fancy liked to fill it out.”  
The flight of fancy takes Strether to consciousness, and to the apartment.  As he climbs, 
Strether paused anew, on the last flight, at this final rather breathless sense 
of what Chad’s life was doing with Chad’s mother’s emissary.  It was 
dragging him, at strange hours, up the staircases of the rich; it was keeping 
him out of bed at the end of long hot days; it was transforming beyond 
recognition the simple, subtle, conveniently uniform thing that had 
anciently passed with him for a life of his own. (333-334) 
This passage is rich with reverberations.  The word “flights” conveys dual meaning, both 
as the stairs Strether climbs, and the flight of the consciousness in William James’s 
earlier cited description of the stream of thought as “an alternation of flights and 
perchings.”  Strether perches breathlessly on the landing, i.e. his moment of wordlessly 
articulated consciousness.  He sees himself objectively, hence the distancing technique of 
referring to himself in thought as “Chad’s mother’s emissary.” It is the interaction with 
the object personified.  Once again, the parallel structure builds; the sentences become 
longer as Strether climbs, and the reader climbs along.  The terministic bridge is not in 
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the word, but in the syntax and the silence that come to reflect Strether’s consciousness.  
Again, in this novel, the word is not sufficient, so Strether must negotiate the remnants of 
whatever symbol systems are available to him. 
Each of the symbol systems addressed here, the physically present tokens, the 
evocation of visual and musical art, and the manipulation of syntax, serves as attempts at 
building terministic bridges which will allow Strether to transcend one realm in order to 
achieve a state of rightness, which he can only do when he understands its meaning. They 
still, however, have characteristics of terministic screens in that they alone do not convey 
meaning; the “flight” to consciousness is only suggested once Strether has learned to 
read, or read beyond, the token words. 
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Chapter Three: The Unalterable Vibration 
 
“To be right” is the response Strether gives Maria Gostrey at the end of The 
Ambassadors, when she asks why he must return to Woollett.  After all, the life he had 
established there would no longer be possible, with his having failed, in effect, in the 
mission conferred upon him by Mrs. Newsome.   His reason has, of course, moral 
ramifications.  One cannot use the word “right” without suggesting a moral sense.  He 
calls it is his “only logic.  Not, out of the whole affair, to have got anything for myself.”  
Maria counters, “But with your wonderful impressions you’ll have got a great deal” 
(344).  In this final exchange between the two, Strether and Maria succinctly articulate 
Strether’s experience.  He has come to consciousness, ultimately able to verbalize his 
motivations and identify his “logic.”  In Intellect, Ralph Waldo Emerson calls logic “the 
procession or proportionate unfolding of intuition; but its virtue is as silent method; the 
moment it would appear as propositions, and have a separate value, it is worthless” (419).   
The impressions that Maria observes he has garnered are connected to Emerson’s sense 
of intuition, or knowledge of which he has become aware.  Strether’s single response to 
Maria epitomizes what has happened throughout the novel:  the unfolding through the 
senses of emotional, social, and psychological relations which have a moral dimension, 
and thereby spiritual ties, expressed through a “silent method.” The methods to be 
explored in this chapter include vagueness, impression, and charged silence.  Inherent in 
understanding these silences is an awareness of the nature of sound, as each conveys 
meaning in an alternative manner. Current work on acoustic communication 
demonstrates how sound “defines the relationship of the individual, the community and 
ultimately, a culture, to the environment and those within it” (Truax 4).  Barry Truax’s 
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work expands on the energy transfer model of sound, in which “the energy originates 
with a vibrating object that radiates its energy to the air or through any object with which 
it is in contact” (5).  Although the focus of this discussion is on silence, sound theory is 
significant in that each of these silences resonates with meaning, ultimately allowing 
Strether to know what it means to be right.   
Martha C. Nussbaum calls The Ambassadors a “major work in moral philosophy” 
which addresses “what it is to be assailed by a perception” (172).  Strether, though 
perhaps at first overwhelmed, has been shaped by his perceptions, learning to read and 
communicate through vagueness, impression, and charged silence.  The language used on 
the final page of the novel and the modes of silence place this within the Emanuel 
Swedenborg—Ralph Waldo Emerson—William James tradition of identifying the senses 
as means of expressing the spiritual.  This chapter addresses the acknowledgment of the 
relationship between the material, spiritual, and rational worlds, i.e. a theory of 
correspondences becoming knowledge, through the movement to these modes of silence.   
In “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words,” Wallace Stevens writes of the 
“deepening need for words to express our thoughts and feelings” which “makes us listen 
to words when we hear them, loving them and feeling them, makes us search the sound of 
them, for a finality, a perfection, an unalterable vibration, which it is only within the 
power of the acutest poet to give them” (663).  Stevens emphasizes that words are 
sounds, and that “a poet’s words are of things that do not exist without the words” (663).  
As with the poet’s words, the sounds of the silences Strether hears, the vagueness, 
impression, and charged silence that speak to him, convey to him meaning inherent in 
them that he comes to recognize in the course of his experiences.  
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Richard Poirier says that through his description of words, Stevens does not give 
them the position once occupied by God, but “deifies the activities by which a sense of 
these things and a feeling for them might, on occasion and very rarely, be produced” 
thereby generating “a corresponding activity in us only because we are aware of a 
‘deepening need’” (Poetry and Pragmatism 160-1).  Strether’s engagement with silences 
becomes the activity through which he can recognize meaning. Poirier earlier discusses 
the use of the language of daily life in poetry, saying that while it “creates structures we 
can believe in, it just as beneficially creates gaps in those structures,” and that when a 
word is “used as the sign of a thing it creates a sense of the thing’s absence more than of 
its presence” (149).  This description of language recalls Emerson’s in Nature, derived 
from Swedenborg’s Theory of Correspondences, of words as signs of natural facts.  The 
gaps, abounding with the reverberations of meaning, are not empty.  In “The Stream of 
Thought” William James describes the “overtones” of words:  
Now I believe that in all cases where the words are understood, the total 
idea may be and usually is present not only before and after the phrase has 
been spoken, but also whilst each separate word is uttered.  It is the 
overtone, halo, or fringe of the word, as spoken in that sentence. It is never 
absent; no word in an understood sentence comes to consciousness as a 
mere noise.  (Principles of Psychology I, 281)   
Language, according to Poirier, embodies “whatever it was that stood in the way of 
transparency,” but he posits that Emersonian-Jamesian Pragmatism allows that 
“language, and therefore thinking, can be changed by an individual’s acts of imagination 
and by an individual’s manipulation of words” (135).  Stevens cites Croce’s description 
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of language as “perpetual creation” (663), manufacturing both  “reality” and the subject’s 
understanding of it.  Strether’s navigation and movement through the silences results in 
his change in thinking; his method of communication has also changed. By the end of the 
novel, Strether is capable of reading “the quaver of [Madame de Vionnet’s] quietness,” 
aware that “there was always more behind what she showed” (321).  The vibration, or 
quaver, is the language of sound-silence, the changed method of communication. 
Somewhat similarly, Ross Posnock parallels Strether’s “gropings” early in the 
novel (The Ambassadors 9) with the “surrender to impressions” that James recounts in 
The American Scene. Posnock observes that when Henry James writes of disembarking, 
he has a  
sense of being floated by sensations. He feels imbued with the 
vulnerability of a child innocent of language, and the cognitive grids and 
categories that fix experience even as they render it intelligible.  Indeed, 
legibility is precisely what James, as usual, seeks to make problematic. 
(89)  
His feeling is described by Posnock as “pre-rational pure experience,” which one might 
link to a romantic, Emersonian sense, a privileging of sensation over ordering.  Posnock, 
too, implies a connection to the Emersonian view of life as process, aligning it with 
James’s assessment late in The American Scene of the United States as “perpetually 
provisional” (87).   Remaking oneself is an Emersonian concept, as he suggests all things 
spiritual and natural are in flux.  In Compensation he writes,  
The changes which break up at short intervals the prosperity of men are 
advertisements of a nature whose law is growth.  Every soul is by this 
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intrinsic necessity quitting its whole system of things [. . .].  In proportion 
to the vigor of the individual, these revolutions are frequent, until in some 
happier mind they are incessant, and all worldly relations hang very 
loosely about him, becoming, as it were, a transparent fluid membrane 
through which the living form is seen, and not, as in most men, an 
indurated heterogeneous fabric of many dates and no settled character, in 
which the man is imprisoned.  Then there can be enlargement, and the 
man of today scarcely recognizes the man of yesterday.  (301-2) 
Taking Emerson’s language even further, Posnock observes, “a year before his creator,” 
in James’s observations about his country in The American Scene (1904),  “Strether quite 
unexpectedly found his self open to remaking and renewal” (87). Strether advances, to 
the point where he “gains sufficient ‘momentum’ to ‘toddle alone’ and delights in what 
he calls his ‘surrender . . . to youth, an echo of his creator’s ‘surrender to impressions’ 
(Posnock 89).  Clearly, this rhetoric of youth and rebirth suggests a new life through a 
return to a more primordial sense of self, one which understands its relation to a universe 
larger than the social milieu through which Strether previously defined himself, and 
which allows for Emerson’s “revolution” of the soul.  Additionally, while Strether’s 
development obviously predates current sound theory, considerations of acoustic 
communication inform Strether’s change.  Barry Truax describes the relationship 
between the listener and his environment:  
The exchange of acoustic information in a soundscape can also be thought 
of in terms of ‘feedback’ concepts to describe the types of 
communicational relationships produced by “hi-fi” and “lo-fi” 
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environments.  The sound made by a person takes on the characteristics of 
the environment through the processes of reflection and absorption 
described earlier.  Therefore, what the listener/soundmaker hears is a 
simultaneous image of self and environment.  (23) 
Truax’s explanation is particularly fitting to Strether, as his development occurs in 
relation to his reading of the “voice of Paris” and the “vibrations” and “quavers” 
he comes to recognize in it and those whom he encounters.  According to Truax, 
“the way in which a sound functions for the listener depends on its social and 
environmental context” (27), therefore, it is impossible to separate the sound from 
the place and social milieu, all factors which contribute to Strether’s emerging, 
fluxional sense of self. Viewed in this way, the acoustic relationship is seen as 
“highly interactive”; it has a role in “mediating or creating relationships between 
listener and environment” (Truax 12-13).  Only by reading the vibrations in their 
environmental and social context does Strether derive a sense of what he needs 
“to be right.” 
The process of renewal and reexamination applies to the James family as well.  
Following a crucial spiritual crisis in 1844, Henry James, Sr. turned to the writings of 
Emanuel Swedenborg for comfort.  The elder James’s adoption of Swedenborg’s 
philosophy helped to shape the entire family’s thinking.  James was attracted to 
Swedenborg’s application of scientific method to religious thought, and his “belief that 
the physical world possesses a deeper spirituality which is here and now merely clothed 
in matter” (57); Paul Jerome Croce calls William James’s Pragmatism a secularization of 
his father’s Swedenborgian outlook, “with a psychological rather than spiritual 
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explanation of larger purpose” and an awareness of “the way relations influence 
perception and meaning” (59).  Strether comes to understand this too, and in his Project 
of Novel, Henry James identifies the impact of this on Strether, saying “sensations, 
impressions, a whole inert or dormant world of feeling or side of life, find themselves 
awake and sitting up around him; and so, in short, he goes on” (556).  His use of 
personification elevates the sensations to the same position of the mind with which they 
are in relation.  When Henry James writes The Ambassadors, he considers the effect 
relationships and perceptions have on Strether’s understanding, both of concrete meaning 
and experience, and their moral implications.  James represents in fiction his hero’s 
successful attempt to achieve what Nussbaum terms “perceptive equilibrium,” which she 
defines as “an equilibrium in which concrete perceptions ‘hang beautifully together,’ both 
with one another and with the agent’s general principles; an equilibrium that is always 
ready to reconstitute itself in response to the new” (183).  This echoes Emerson’s above-
cited language in Compensation, where he describes “worldly relations” as “hanging 
loosely” about one.  That, too, culminates in the process of remaking the self. In Heaven 
and Hell, Swedenborg describes “equilibrium,” writing “that any thing may exist, there 
must be an equilibrium of all things . . . equilibrium is between two forces, one of which 
acts, and the other reacts” (Compendium 91).  Through his ultimate acknowledgment of 
and reaction to his concrete perceptions, Strether is able to remake himself.  
As James writes in his Preface to Roderick Hudson, “Really, universally, relations 
stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, by a 
geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall happily appear to do so” (vii). 
Relations are critical in The Ambassadors, and for Strether, because they are precisely 
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what Strether must come to understand. His comprehension of Chad and Madame de 
Vionnet’s relationship, and his and Mrs. Newsome’s, among others, signals his emerging 
consciousness and moral sense.  Croce cites R.W.B. Lewis’s idea of James’s paradoxical 
theory that “religious seekers must resign their moral conscience and realize their vanity 
and limitations before a more complete spirituality can be achieved” as a “doctrine of a 
‘fortunate fall’ from innocence toward the salvation of spiritual understanding and social 
connectedness” (59-60).  The spiritual is not purely a concern of the individual, but of 
one in a larger context; it is the process of understanding this connectedness of the 
spiritual, social, psychological, and physical worlds that marks James’s and Strether’s 
Emersonian progression. 
The principal idea of Swedenborg’s that was developed by Sampson Reed and 
passed along to Emerson is the Doctrine of Universal Correspondency.  This asserts,  
bodies are the generation and expression of souls; that the frame of the 
natural world works, moves and rests obediently to the living spiritual 
world, as a man’s face to the mind or spirit with.  Now this plainly makes 
all things into signs as well as powers; the events of nature and the world 
become divine, angelic, or demoniac messages, and the smallest things, as 
well as the greatest, are omens, instructions, warnings, or hopes.  
(Compendium 51) 
Swedenborg’s sense of correspondence counters the senior James’s concept of 
“selfhood,” which James saw as keeping “our manhood so little and so depraved,” and 
resulted in his “vastation,” or crisis. By contrast, Swedenborg’s view of the “other world 
[. . .] furnish[ing] the true sphere of man’s spiritual or individual being, the real and 
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immortal being he has in God,” while “this world [. . .] furnish[es] only a preliminary 
theatre of his natural formation or existence” spoke to the senior Henry James’s sense of 
the connectedness of the spiritual and physical worlds.  He was then given, as Croce 
notes, a “sense of personal mission, answering ‘the question of human regeneration,’” 
guiding him in “instructing his children, [and] for writing his essays to reform religion 
and society” (Croce 54-5).   James particularly sought to influence William’s thinking 
and study.  In 1844, William experienced a spiritual crisis, much as his father had.  Croce 
views his reaction to his father’s “unflinching fervor,” which William found 
“constraining, overconfident, and unsuited to the intellectual challenges of his generation, 
especially in the culture he encountered in his scientific education” as a catalyst for the 
crisis (66).   
The changes in thinking that the younger Henry James later came to chronicle 
through fiction, a movement to relations rather than fixity, became a source of William’s 
sense of turmoil.  His search and study, including his appraisal of Darwin’s work, led 
William ultimately to accept scientific thinking that was based on probability and  
plausibility, and not certainty.  William James and the other participants in The 
Metaphysical Club came to see “that neither scientific theory nor religious faith could 
generate conventional forms of certainty, and they searchingly asked whether there could 
be any other basis for belief and action.  They answered. . . that scientific method 
approaches certainty and provides a modern model for belief and basis for action” (Croce 
154).  The modern model, however, cannot provide certainty, but an approach to it, as 
theory, especially Darwin’s, is seen as not provable, but observable and offered to be 
tested.  As Croce describes it, William James “sought to legitimate belief without 
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certainty” (10).  He was greatly influenced by the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, who 
saw Darwin’s theories as probabilistic, both in the randomness of natural selection and in 
the impossibility of proving the theory of the origin of species. Belief, then, is mapped 
“on a continuum of decreasing uncertainty; as doubt recedes, belief emerges as a tentative 
truth, a provisional certainty.  This view of belief reinforces his pragmatic emphasis on 
habit and action” (Croce 210).  Peirce repeatedly refers to “habit which will determine 
our actions” (Croce 208); later, William James describes habit as rooted in the physical, 
and having ethical implications.  He writes, in fact, “habit . . . alone keeps us all within 
the bound of ordinance,” and the “greatest thing is to make our nervous system our ally” 
(Principles of Psychology I, 121), ultimately connecting the moral to the physical.   One’s 
behavior, then, is based on the physical patterns that are created, emerging from a belief 
system which, itself, develops according to decreasing uncertainty rather than a clear 
sense of certainty.  Therefore, behavior is not fixed; a key word used by Croce is 
“provisional,” which reverberates for so many of the ideas presented here.  Through 
Darwin, James came to accept the idea that “chance characterizes all attempts to read the 
deepest workings of the universe” (Croce 175).  He does not reject either scientific 
knowledge or religious belief; in fact, Croce claims that “finding a way, despite those 
limitations, to attain truth and its positive fruits was the challenge of his adulthood” 
(220).   
The above is the central idea illustrating the interconnectedness of this group of 
thinkers, beginning with Swedenborg, who connects the body with the spiritual world. In 
Heaven and Hell, he explicitly delineates “the correspondence of the two kingdoms of 
heaven with the heart and lungs, [which] is the general correspondence of heaven with 
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man; but there is a less general one with each of his members, organs, and viscera” 
(Compendium 177).  He addresses this topic as well in Arcana Celestia, writing of the 
“given correspondences” between things “spiritual and natural,” and the “things which 
are of the mind are spiritual, but those which are of the body are natural” (Compendium 
304).   Swedenborg also discusses the use of gestures, saying they represent “those things 
which are of the mind,” and are, therefore, what he terms correspondences. The use of 
gesture as an alternative to articulate language will be addressed in Chapter Five, 
considered especially in Darwinian terms, but it is evident here that the physical, 
emotional, psychological, and spiritual are connected.  
Developing from Swedenborg, Sampson Reed establishes his belief that  
the natural world was precisely and perfectly adapted to invigorate and 
strengthen the intellectual and moral man.  Its first and highest use was not 
to support the vegetables which adorn, or the animals which cover, its 
surface; nor yet to give sustenance to the human body;—it has a higher 
and holier object, in the attainment of which these are only means.  
(Growth of the Mind 30)
Reed also addresses the nature of language and reason.  From Reed’s theory of 
the connectedness of the natural and spiritual worlds, of course, Emerson’s ideas 
become evident, seen especially in his statement “every natural fact is a symbol of 
some spiritual fact.  Every appearance in nature corresponds to some state of the 
mind” (22).  Emerson’s sense of correspondences or relationships also reflects the 
process of continual growth and remaking, as described in the earlier cited 
passage from Compensation. 
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The expression of the connection becomes significant for both William 
and Henry James.  William James writes about both the psychological and 
mystical aspects of one’s relationship with a larger system.  In The Principles of 
Psychology, he describes consciousness as “from our natal day, . . .a teeming 
multiplicity of objects and relations” (I, 224).  The mind is placed in connection to 
what is “other,” following Swedenborg’s sense of correspondences.  Writing 
earlier in terms that William James seems to echo, Sampson Reed describes “the 
most perfect understanding of a subject” as “simply a perception of harmony 
existing between the subject and the mind itself.”  Reed, Emerson, and William 
James address the role of reason, with Reed declaring that syllogistic reasoning is 
passing away, and “the mind requires to view the parts of a subject, not only 
separately, but together; and the understanding, . . . by which a subject is 
presented in its just relations to other things, takes the name of reason” (43).  To 
James, the mind is “at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities.  
Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection 
of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency 
of attention” (Principles of Psychology I, 228).  Throughout The Ambassadors,
Strether is as one lost in the theatre of possibilities, until he can sculpt a reality 
from what William James calls “the primordial chaos of sensations.”   James 
addresses rationalism in The Varieties of Religious Experience, seeing it in 
opposition to mysticism.  He finds it unsatisfactory for expressing “one’s whole 
mental life,” able only to account for a “relatively superficial” part of it (73).  
Instead, he grants primacy to intuition, saying “articulate reasons are cogent for us 
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only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor 
of the same conclusion” (74). Ross Posnock says that Henry James is “open to 
what William calls ‘the blooming, buzzing confusion’ of primordial experience” 
and “sets aside conventions of control as he lets the world of objects take the lead 
and relaxes (without banishing) the possessive, instrumental thrust of imperial 
subjectivity” (86).  The “primordial experience” is what is negotiated and 
expressed in The Ambassadors through the silences depicted here as vagueness, 
impression, and charged silence.  While one may be connected to the experience, 
reason and rationalism fail as means of expressing it.   
Swedenborg’s Doctrine of Correspondences is not the only one of his ideas to 
have significance for the younger Henry James’s writing.  Swedenborg addresses the 
nature of speech in addressing spiritual truths, especially in his discussion of angels and 
angelic spirits.  It is possible for man to communicate with the spiritual world, “when the 
spirit of a man is in society with spirits in their world, then it is also in spiritual thought 
and speech with them” (Compendium, 91 True Christian Religion 475). However, 
Swedenborg ranks above that the speech of angels, which he terms “ineffable” because it 
“does not consist of things represented by any ideas, such as those of spirits and of 
angelic spirits, but is the speech of ends and consequent uses, which are the principals 
and essentials of things” (Compendium 196; Arcana Celestia 1645).  Swedenborg says 
that in his experience, when he has returned to the “light of the external or natural man,” 
he could not express “by terms, and not even comprehend . . . by ideas of thought” those 
things “which the angels see and think in the light of heaven” (Compendium 202; Arcana 
Celestia 9094).  
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William James also writes of the mystical as ineffable in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience; those who have experienced it say “it defies expression . . . no 
adequate report of its contents can be given in words.”  Additionally, it has a noetic 
quality, states of knowledge “into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect” 
(380-1). In The Principles of Psychology, James writes about consciousness that 
“language works against the perception of truth” (I, 243).   This perception lies not in the 
words themselves, according to Richard Poirier, but instead to “our habitual way of 
ordering them” (143), what James sees as an emphasis on the “resting places” or 
“substantive parts.”  Instead, James would have us focus on the “transitive parts” which 
are “filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain 
between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest” (243).  Poirier 
observes that the grammar William James calls for makes “us aware that the relations 
between things are as important to experience as are the things themselves” (152).  It is 
the movement through, not the stopping at, a point that is significant; in fact, James 
writes “it is the reinstatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I 
am so anxious to press on the attention” (I, 254).  This point brings together the mystical, 
the psychological, and means of expression.  If, as Poirier notes, the “invention of 
consciousness is simultaneous with the invention of language, which, in turn, measures 
both the restraint upon and the expression of human freedom,” methods of expression 
may be reinvented in order to express new insight into the nature of the consciousness.   
James calls for a “re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life” which 
would acknowledge that “every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free 
water that flows round it. . . . The significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo 
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or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it” (254-5).  The halo or penumbra is 
representative of relations.  As William James moves from the idea of certainty to belief 
within uncertainty, the concept of the vague emerges. Henry James creates Strether as 
one who ultimately experiences insight through the seemingly ineffable, but actually a 
reading of relations, or vagueness. 
There is more to the concept of vagueness than merely lack of clarity.  Posnock 
depicts Henry James’s sense of vagueness:  
one implication Henry James draws from equating feeling and action is his 
acute sense that ‘the varieties of his [William’s] application had been as 
little wasted for him as those of my vagueness had really been for me’.  
Rather than being a passive escape from action, vagueness has varieties of 
application.  Indeed, vagueness, at a certain pitch, is application, just as 
‘passion’—as Henry says with reference to George Sand—which can 
always dependably ‘vibrate,’ ‘becomes to that extent action.’  (45) 
The word vibrate is particularly evocative, especially as one recalls Emerson’s 
adjuration in Self-Reliance to “Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron 
string” (260).  The iron string implies a connection to “the place the divine 
providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries, the connection 
of events.”  It suggests an acceptance of what is “right,” and the recognition that 
one might find it through harmonious reverberation.  James evidently draws on 
this imagery in depicting Strether’s ultimate recognitions, which may come to be 
seen in light of Stevens’s later sense of the “unalterable vibration.”  Viewed as 
such, vagueness allows one to become poised for understanding; while silent, the 
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vagueness contains connection and meaning which can be termed “vibration” and 
results in consciousness.  Stevens cites C.E. M. Joad’s description of reality:  
‘every body, every quality of a body resolves itself into an enormous 
number of vibrations, movements, changes.  What is it that vibrates, 
moves, is changed?  There is no answer.  Philosophy has long dismissed 
the notion of substance and modern physics has endorsed the dismissal. . . 
. How, then, does the world come to appear to us as a collection of solid, 
static objects extended in space?  Because of the intellect, which presents 
us with a false view of it.’  (658) 
Stevens continues, “the poet has his own meaning for reality” expressed in the 
word which, he says, “adapts itself instantly” (658).    Ultimately, however, 
“words, above everything else, are, in poetry, sounds.  .  .  . A poet’s words are of 
things that do not exist without the words” (663 ).  The sounds are the 
“unalterable vibration” that has been alluded to earlier.  Hearing the vibration is 
hearing its reality.  Different types of listening are identified in contemporary 
sound theory, but they share what Truax calls the “most basic function,” “the 
survival value implicit in detecting information about the environment through 
acoustic cues” (21).   
One learns not only about the environment through vibration, but also 
about the self.  Truax emphasizes the relationship between the self and the 
environment, describing, as noted earlier, the “sound of the self” as “ultimately 
intertwined with the environment.”  This happens as one adjusts his speech in 
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relation to how it absorbs, reflects, or reverberates other sounds in the 
environment.  As such,  
the listener cannot tell if the voice is activating the space, or if the 
vibration of the space is activating the resonances of the body.  In such a 
situation, sound mediates a unity between self and environment.   
Language creates a division between the two concepts; acoustic 
experience in which the human sound is reflected back to the listener 
imbued with the image of the environment unites them.  (38) 
Truax’s description is particularly enlightening in consideration of Strether’s 
development, as he approaches the state of “perceptive equilibrium,” a harmonious 
relationship with his environment that enables him to make moral decisions.  Whereas 
language may have had a divisive, or sometimes misleading, influence, the vibrations or 
vagueness allows for redefinition through the environment.  Strether’s listening comes to 
permeate vagueness to recognize the vibrations that challenge his earlier stable sense of 
identity.  
Vagueness spans the entire novel, with references beginning virtually 
immediately.  On page 18, the word is used in terms of Strether’s intentions 
regarding Waymarsh: 
That he was prepared to be vague to Waymarsh about the hour of the 
ship’s touching, and that he both wanted extremely to see him and enjoyed 
extremely the duration of delay—these things, it is to be conceived, were 
early signs in him that his relation to his actual errand might prove none of 
the simplest.  He was burdened, poor Strether . . . with the oddity of a 
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double consciousness.  There was detachment in his zeal and curiosity in 
his indifference. 
Here, vagueness is initially used to imply indirectness; Strether is enjoying his 
freedom while awaiting Waymarsh, so may not fully disclose his arrival time to 
Waymarsh.  While this appears to be a rather banal use of the word, what follows 
invests it with greater depth.  The word “relation” signals its complexity and 
fullness: this is perhaps the beginning of Strether’s growing awareness of his own 
consciousness, here referred to as “double.”  Hidden in the vagueness of the 
information Strether plans to reveal to Waymarsh is the truth, about his relation to 
his surroundings, his “errand,” and a sense of the significance of what will be 
revealed to himself.   
The word reappears changed at the end of the novel, after Strether’s 
discovery of the truth about Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship.  In 
revealing their plans to return to Paris to Strether, Chad and Madame de Vionnet 
are not direct, with Madame de Vionnet implying that their plans were “almost 
unnaturally vague” (310); this, of course, is misleading as the full nature of their 
relationship lay within those plans.  Strether later recognizes the “lie in the 
charming affair,” and then “almost blushed, in the dark, for the way he had 
dressed the possibility in vagueness. . . He had made them . . . momentarily pull it 
for him, the possibility, out of this vagueness.”   While the vagueness had been 
operating as a screen blocking meaning, its richness is revealed, and Strether 
moves from “trying all along to suppose nothing” to finding “himself supposing 
innumerable and wonderful things” (313).  This is not, of course, a mystical state, 
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but has connections to the psychological, as Strether comes to realizations about 
the relative nature of truth; in Emersonian and Swedenborgian terms, the vibration 
of truth to which he can fix himself is there.  Recalling Poirier’s comment about 
the invention of language coinciding with the invention of consciousness, one can 
see Strether learning to interpret the language of vagueness when his 
consciousness reveals “innumerable and wonderful things.” The relations are 
established, with a suggestion of the Doctrine of Universal Correspondency, as all 
things are signs, and the “events of the world” are messages.   
These two references to vagueness are not, of course, the only ones.  There 
are many more, with Strether reading them to varying degrees, culminating in his 
final understandings.  The earlier references reveal a struggling Strether, unable to 
penetrate the vagueness.  For example, an important event for Strether is his visit 
to Gloriani’s garden.  The introduction to the sculptor is an important step in 
Strether’s redefinition of his sense of self.  However, when he first meets 
Gloriani, Strether is overwhelmed.  The entire passage leading to the meeting is 
significant for its associations, especially in light of what it suggests in connection 
to the spiritual: 
Strether had presently the sense of a great convent, a convent of missions, 
famous for he scarce knew what, a nursery of young priests, of scattered 
shade, of straight alleys and chapel-bells, that spread its mass in one 
quarter; he had the sense of names in the air, of ghosts at the windows, of 
signs and tokens, a whole range of expression, all about him, too thick for 
prompt discrimination. (120) 
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This instance of vagueness cannot be read by Strether; in fact, he sees Gloriani’s 
face as “an open letter in a foreign tongue.”  It is a very rich illustration of all that 
might be contained within; the evocation of religious imagery suggests an earlier 
conception of spirituality than that to which Strether is moving.  Additionally, it is 
a dynamic force that Strether must penetrate and fix upon.  This will become 
possible as he learns to find relations in the transitives later in his development. 
A critical moment in Strether’s evolution occurs with the arrival of Mrs. 
Newsome’s telegram announcing her dispatching the Pococks unless he returns, 
with or without Chad.  This is a defining moment for Strether, who “had attached 
himself to sounds and suggestions, vibrations of the air” (182).  This is his 
reaction to and reading of Paris and all that it contains.  Sound theory is 
particularly applicable here, as Strether’s reaction presages Truax’s depiction of 
sound and its association with place.  He explains,  
the sound pattern has connected with layers of associations built up over 
the years, and frequently these associations have a predictable fixed 
quality, namely that a particular pattern of sound always produces the 
same response . . . These habitual response lead to certain types of 
behavior, and hence to a particular relationship of the person to the 
environment.  Thus the pattern of sound mediates that relationship. (30)   
Truax points out that the process can be modified, which happens for Strether. 
Again, Strether is responding to his newly emerging sense of unity with Paris, and 
modifies his sense of self through it, as contemporary theory might suggest 
(Truax 38).  Truax describes the “acoustic community” in terms of language, 
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indicating that “the complexities involved in ascribing meaning to such sound 
sequences suggests that environmental sound can function as a ‘language’ within 
a soundscape” (79).  A “soundscape,” we recall, is the system of the listener and 
the environment (65).  He describes “sound symbolisms” (80) within the 
soundscape, coherent patterns of sound that “may take on special significance” 
(80).  As such, they have the associations that confer upon them the status of 
symbol.  Strether’s associations with and reading of Paris are heightened through 
his experience of its sounds.  The language he is hearing may not be finely 
articulated, but it is on the strength of the “vibrations” and his changing 
relationship with Paris that Strether crumples Mrs. Newsome’s telegram, and 
withholds information from a watchful Waymarsh.  This is followed by a “vague 
walk,” after which he returns to his room, destroys an unfinished letter he had 
been writing to Mrs. Newsome, deems it a “sacrifice,” and “slept. . . the sleep of 
the just” (183).  While there are several silences implicit here, including the 
unreported letter and telegram and the unspoken words and glance between 
Strether and Waymarsh, it is the vibration of Paris and the vagueness of his walk 
that enable Strether to disregard Chad’s offer to return. He has begun to negotiate 
William James’s “teeming multiplicity of objects and relations” to arrive at that 
which is represented by them, the truth, be it psychological or spiritual, that is 
represented by the relations.  His concept of how both he and Chad are expected 
to behave, and its contrast with what he is in the process of discovering in Paris 
are contained in the “vibrations in the air,” the sounds of which are mediated by 
his evolving consciousness. 
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Vagueness takes on more complexity when Madame de Vionnet confides 
in Strether that she and Chad are arranging her daughter’s marriage.  Strether is 
unclear throughout the discussion as to Madame de Vionnet’s references; he does 
not know if “we,” for example, means Madame de Vionnet and her husband, or 
Chad.  Much of the scene involves Strether’s clarifications.  He is described as  
“vaguely and confusedly troubled” by the revelation, which contains greater 
“depths” than he had anticipated.  Finally, Strether sees the news “through 
something ancient and cold in it—what he would have called the real thing” 
(238).  The “real thing” may be how Strether’s “heart vibrates to that iron string,” 
the metaphor Emerson uses in Self-Reliance to indicate a connection to what may 
be called truth. Through the vagueness and lack of clarity lies the connection to 
Emerson’s “iron string,” which has, for Strether, an unsettling effect.  The 
language here suggests a primordial truth, and Strether’s reading of it.  Even 
though he may read the truth, he is not comfortable with it in this encounter, 
perhaps because it is not what he later deems “right.”  The scene is presented in 
very physical terms, with Strether figuratively placed in the depths of 
communication, miscommunication, and understanding.  He is described as 
having “struck himself at the hotel, before Sarah and Waymarsh, as being in 
[Madame de Vionnet’s] boat” (239), but through this encounter is unsure where 
that actually is.  The depiction, in fact, suggests his being out of the boat, perhaps 
even in over his head.  Strether’s vagueness and confusion leaves him feeling “as 
if he had even himself been concerned in something deep and dim.  He had 
allowed for depths, but these were greater; and it was as if, oppressively—indeed 
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absurdly—he was responsible for what they had now thrown up to the surface” 
(238).  It is as if Strether is swimming in vagueness until he feels the shock of 
Madame de Vionnet’s news and his earlier misreadings, and grasps “the real 
thing.”  He hastily responds, and “having said the proper thing, he wanted to get 
away.”  Strether is searching for perceptive equilibrium, the “right” response to 
what is revealed.  As the scene ends, the truth “flashed for Strether the next 
moment a finer light, and the light deepened as she went on” (239).  Strether 
emerges from the depths of vagueness in which he had been swimming, and finds, 
through the light, the unalterable vibration of the truth. 
Strether begins to be able to express his understandings, again represented 
through the use of light imagery, as the novel progresses.  In conversation with 
Sarah Pocock about his, and Chad’s, duty to their obligations, with Sarah 
questioning Strether’s actions, Strether “found himself just checking a low vague 
sound” which he likens to a “growl.”  This is quite out of keeping with any prior 
exchanges Strether has engaged in, and lends an actual physicality to the scene.  
Additionally, Sarah’s response is presented in almost violent terms.   Strether 
realizes that Sarah fails to recognize Chad’s “transformation,” and “everything 
that had lent intention to this particular failure—affected him as gathered into a 
large loose bundle and thrown, in her words, into his face.”   Strether catches his 
breath, and responds to Sarah Pocock in language that recalls the vague and 
William James’s “primordial chaos of sensations,” telling her, “everything has 
come as a sort of indistinguishable part of everything else [. . .]. Our general state 
of mind had proceeded, on its side, from our queer ignorance, our queer 
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misconceptions and confusions—from which, since then, an inexorable tide of 
light seems to have floated us into our perhaps still queerer knowledge” (277).  
The phrasing places them within chaos and confusion, but Strether is finally able 
to see light that emerges as he reaches the unalterable vibration through a very 
physical representation of communication.   
 Finally, when Maria later tells Strether “there were moments . . . when 
you struck me as grandly cynical; there were others when you struck me as 
grandly vague,” and he responds, “I had phases.  I had flights” (330), vagueness is 
seen in terms established by William James.  Strether has been able to read the 
transitive states, and has seen light, suggesting knowledge on both the levels of 
consciousness and spirituality.  Strether has learned to recognize meaning through 
terms in which Truax later describes the language within a soundscape.  Truax 
accounts for environmental sound’s functioning as language, but calls those 
languages “localized, even idiosyncratic,” with the information encoded “in terms 
of a holistic image that can be recognized as a ‘gestalt’ or analyzed for some 
particular qualitative feature” (79).  Strether reads the “gestalt” and describes his 
understanding to Maria.  Regarding his initial misreading of Chad and Madame 
de Vionnet’s relationship, Strether cites Bilham’s terminology, saying “it was but 
a technical lie—he classed the attachment as virtuous. That was a view for which 
there was much to be said—and the virtue came out for me hugely” (330).  
Strether extracts the sense, his changing perception of “virtue” rather than the 
denotative meaning of it. When Maria questions the basis for his judgments, he 
replies that they were centered upon “[Madame de Vionnet’s] beauty of 
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everything.  The impression she makes.  She has such variety and yet such 
harmony.”  Despite “the irritations they flooded over,” Maria calls Strether 
“complete.”  He has been able to determine the sense of things beyond their 
words, reconciling apparent contradictions to arrive at meaning. Connections have 
been revealed and recognized both to the stream of thought and beyond that to a 
sense of Swedenborgian spirituality.  Swedenborg writes in Divine Love and 
Wisdom,
there are in the brain innumerable substances and forms in which every 
interior sense, which has relation to the understanding and the will, 
resides.  All the affections, perceptions and thoughts there, are not 
exhalations from the substances, but they are actually and really the 
subjects, which do not emit any thing from themselves, but only undergo 
changes, according to the influences which affect them. (Compendium 15)
Swedenborg’s concept of the correspondence of the physical to the abstract is 
translated into psychological terms as William James describes consciousness.  
Strether’s interaction with the vague shows his change according to the influence 
that affects him, with the recognition of the gestalt signaling the unalterable 
vibration.  
In Nature (1836), Emerson describes a similar connectedness, calling 
Spirit an “ineffable essence” that “puts [nature] forth through us” (40-41).  As 
Sampson Reed sees it, “everything which surrounds us is full of the utterance of 
one word, completely expressive of its nature.”  This is the “language, not of 
words, but of things” (33).  It is this language, in vagueness, that Strether comes 
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to experience in Paris.  Knowledge has been created and recognized by Strether.  
In a late and lengthy encounter with Madame de Vionnet following their surprise 
encounter in the countryside, Strether finally fully reads the truth.  The exchange 
is the subject of the first two chapters of Book Twelfth.  As Book Twelfth opens, 
Madame de Vionnet summons Strether by letter the day following their climactic 
meeting.  As is often the case in this novel, her identity is not revealed until some 
time into the chapter; the reader knows Strether receives a letter that he assumes is 
from Chad, and learns as Strether opens it that it is from Madame de Vionnet.  
Again, the knowledge is revealed to the reader as it is to Strether.  The language 
throughout the pages is rich with reverberations, as Strether approaches the 
unalterable vibration through vagueness.  Again, there is reference to the life of 
Paris,  
the something in the air of these establishments; the vibration of the vast 
strange life of the town, the influence of the types, the performers 
concocting their messages; the little prompt Paris women, arranging, 
pretexting goodness knew what, driving the dreadful needle-pointed 
public pen at the dreadful sand-strewn public table: implements that 
symbolized for Strether’s too interpretative innocence something more 
acute in manners, more sinister in morals, more fierce in the national life.  
(314-315) 
Through his correspondence, Strether is himself a part of Paris, seeing himself 
and those around him as “mixed up with the typical tale of Paris,” and his reading 
of it deepens even further.  The vibrations become tangible, as Strether is 
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conscious of the day changing to “heat and eventual thunder” as he awaits his 
meeting with Madame de Vionnet.  The tension mounts for Strether as he 
approaches her home. He anticipates that she wished “to assure him that she now
took” all responsibility, which, too, he felt was “in the air.”  Arriving in her 
formal room, Strether sees “a pair of clusters of candles that glimmered over the 
chimney-piece like the tall tapers of an altar.”  The imagery suggests Strether’s 
sacrifice for Madame de Vionnet.  He struggles to make sense of his situation and 
“the vague voice of Paris” as he sees the truth as “queer beyond words,” but again 
attributes it to the “effect of the thunder in the air, which had hung about all day 
without release.”   Release is not yet imminent as Madame de Vionnet is a 
mistress of controlled communication; Strether feels the “associations of the 
place” in the “quietness of her own note as the centre.”  The note has both 
quietness and timbre, and as seen in the discussion of acoustic communication, a 
mediation that reflects the environment. As their interview proceeds, Strether 
reads and revises the impressions he has had of Madame de Vionnet.   He begins 
to see things in contradictory terms; for example, she is different from the 
preceding night, but “there was nothing of violence in the change—it was all 
harmony and reason.”    The oppositions perplex him; he wonders how she would 
explain her and Chad’s “fraud,” and comes to realize “that their eminent ‘lie,’ 
Chad’s and hers, was simply after all such an inevitable tribute to good taste [. . 
.]” .  Lines between truth and deception are blurred, and the language reflects it.  
Strether realizes that “he could trust her.  That is he could trust her to make 
deception right.  As she presented things the ugliness—goodness knew why—
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went out of them. . . She let the matter, at all events, lie where it was.  . .” (318-
319).  Through this passage, trust is equated with deception, and ugliness and 
goodness are juxtaposed, while the use of a pun keeps the “lie” alive. 
As Strether’s interview with Madame de Vionnet comes to a close, there is 
a definite movement away from the thunder in the air.  As the image is filled with 
sound, Strether is somewhat lost in its vibrations.  As he recognizes all that is 
inherent in her communication, Strether acknowledges that “strikingly sincere as 
she let these things come from her, she yet puzzled and troubled him—so fine was 
the quaver of her quietness.  He felt what he had felt before with her, that there 
was always more behind what she showed, and more and more again behind that” 
(321).   Beyond the vagueness and sound is the unalterable vibration; it is through 
such moments as a recognition of the “quaver of quietness” that Strether arrives at 
the language of things. The truth of that language lies deep within the vagueness 
and soundscape.  By negotiating it in Paris, and through conversation with 
Madame de Vionnet, Strether learns to read it.  Madame de Vionnet 
acknowledges that Strether takes with him an impression of her; he takes time to 
respond to her question about his leaving because “his last impression was more 
and more so mixed a one.  It produced in him a vague disappointment, a drop that 
was deeper even than the fall of his elation the previous night” (322).  Ultimately, 
impression is critical in Strether’s development, as Maria Gostrey tells him at the 
novel’s end, “With your wonderful impressions you’ll have got a great deal” 
(345).  As he taps into the unalterable vibration beneath the vagueness, Strether is 
also negotiating his way through his impressions.  He leaves Madame de Vionnet 
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with an ambiguous statement, “Ah but you’ve had me!”, implying both 
possession and duplicity, but does so “with an emphasis that made an end” (324) 
as he is prepared to read his impressions and finally, “to be right” (345).  
Once Strether comes to understand somewhat the nature of vagueness, he 
must go further.  As cited above, Posnock addresses James’s acceptance, for 
Strether, of the “‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ of primordial experience.”  He 
also notes, however, that “his project simultaneously manages to accept the 
obligation of order and selection (what he calls the ‘treating,’ not the ‘feeling,’ of 
impressions) and to devise a way to resist the potentially coercive rationality of 
the ordering impulse” (85).  Citing “impression” is particularly significant, 
because impression becomes yet another type of silence.  It is the silence through 
which Strether can somewhat approach a degree of fixity within vagueness, while 
still surrendering to experience.   Impression as used in The Ambassadors must be 
viewed in relation to its definition by way of the thinkers cited earlier.  Sampson 
Reed’s depiction of impression is particularly valuable in light of Strether’s 
development.  Reed describes impression’s significance: 
Every one must have remarked, that a peculiar state of feeling belongs to 
every exercise of the understanding; unless somewhat of this feeling 
remained after the thought had passed away, there would be nothing 
whereby the latter could be recalled.  The impression thus left, exists 
continually in the mind . . . These impressions go to comprise the 
character of an individual. (27) 
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Strether’s remaking is, to a large degree, a result of the impressions he has 
garnered from a sharper focus on, or attention to, the elements of the vague.  In 
The Principles of Psychology, William James describes the varieties of attention, 
including attention to objects of sense or represented objects, immediate or 
derived attention, and passive or active attention.  What is most applicable to 
Strether is James’s comment that “each of us literally chooses, by his ways of 
attending to things, what sort of a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit” 
(I, 424).  Through his silent reaction to soundless impressions, such as that of 
Paris, and his impression of Madame de Vionnet’s manipulation of him, Strether 
achieves a greater degree of consciousness.  From this point, Strether can then 
“reason,” which, according to Sampson Reed is “beginning to learn the necessity 
of simply tracing the relations which exist between created things” (43) and to 
William James is “another form of the selective activity of the mind” (Principles 
I, 287), all of which is done, for Strether, silently.  Posnock sums it up nicely 
when he observes that Strether “violently repudiate[s] instrumental rationality, 
making the logic and value of groping incommunicable save to Maria’s (and the 
reader’s) intuitive understanding” (246). Strether’s logic emerges silently through 
his attention to and reading of impressions.  As cited above, in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience William James observes that in “the metaphysical and 
religious sphere, articulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate 
feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor of the same conclusion.  
Then, indeed, our intuitions and our reason work together” (74).  Interpreting 
impression, then, is a necessary focusing act. 
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Posnock’s citing of Maria’s role underscores her importance in Strether’s 
development.  Remember that she and Strether meet at the novel’s outset.  After 
their initial time together, Strether feels “she knew even intimate things about him 
that he hadn’t yet told her and perhaps never would.  He wasn’t unaware that he 
had told her remarkably many for the time, but these were not the real ones.  
Some of the real ones, however, precisely, were what she knew” (22).    One often 
has “first impressions” upon meeting someone new, but they are also often 
inaccurate.  Maria, however, really knows Strether through her impressions and 
what he does not articulate, perhaps better than Strether, or the reader, knows 
himself.  Interpreting impression is a movement towards consciousness.  If, as 
Martha Nussbaum says, the novel “began with a question, [and] ends on just such 
a moment of surprised arrival” (181) with Strether’s “Then there we are!” it is 
because he is finally able to read impression.  Of course, as cited on the opening 
page of this chapter, Maria acknowledges Strether’s final impressions, confirming 
for the reader their accuracy and, therefore, Strether’s success. 
Impression means more for Strether than mere silent awareness; 
Nussbaum cites the crucial scene in Gloriani’s garden and discussion with Bilham 
as indicative of its depth.  She, of course, discusses the role of perception in terms 
of moral awareness, but also deems “the life of perception . . . to Strether—and to 
us—to be richer, fuller of enjoyment, fuller too of whatever is worth calling 
knowledge of the world.  In one of the novel’s most famous passages [Gloriani’s 
garden] he connects immersion in impressions with being really alive, having 
one’s life; and he passionately urges Little Bilham not to miss that adventure” 
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(181).  It is from this point on that Strether begins to be aware of his impressions, 
consciously attempting to read them as one reads a telegram, as they convey life 
and meaning.   
Strether’s attempts at reading impression become more successful when 
the Pococks arrive.  Recall that he is increasingly aware of the “vibrations of the 
air” of Paris upon receipt of Mrs. Newsome’s telegram announcing their planned 
visit; while still not reading fully accurately, Strether experiences more clarity of 
consciousness.  He reads the Pococks, his relationship with them, and his standing 
in Woollett, upon their arrival: 
It was in the cab with Jim that impressions really crowded on Strether, 
giving him the strangest sense of length of absence from people among 
whom he had lived for years.  Having them thus come out to him was as if 
he had returned to find them, and the droll promptitude of Jim’s mental 
reaction threw his own initiation far back into the past.   (211) 
Strether’s estrangement from the Woollett crowd is indicated by his reaction to 
impressions, which are not recorded for the reader to share.    It is enough to learn 
that Strether begins to see everything differently, including his relationship with 
the Pococks and, by extension, Mrs. Newsome, and his understanding of Chad, 
Madame de Vionnet, and Paris.  The change in his reaction challenges his earlier 
held beliefs and understandings, directing Strether towards perceptive equilibrium 
as he recognizes the connections among and interworkings of people and 
situations.   
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Based on his emerging impressions, Strether reevaluates everyone.  Soon after the 
previous incident, he speaks with Madame de Vionnet about Chad and the Pococks.  The 
situation has become complicated by his changing relationships, evident in the way “his 
impressions, though multiplied, still baffled him” (228). Impression demands attention 
and interpretation.  From the midst of these impressions, Strether emerges further allied 
with Madame de Vionnet, arriving there by unspoken means.  While withholding 
information from Madame de Vionnet about his changing relationship with the Newsome 
family might appear duplicitous, Strether is amassing impression, and as a result, “it 
ended up by being quite beautiful between them, the number of things they had a 
manifest consciousness of not saying” (230).  The phrasing sounds ironic: again, it is 
consciousness without language to express it, exemplifying the growth of expression 
through silence.   It is within changing relationships that Strether ultimately defines 
himself.  As Ross Posnock observes, Strether’s “impulse of ownership is compromised 
by a ‘letting go’ of self that makes him less an entity to be possessed than a nexus of 
relations to others” (227), much like Paris which “eludes definition and demands 
relation.”   
Strether is in the process of remaking himself, exemplifying William 
James’s depiction of consciousness as a “teeming multiplicity of objects and 
relations,” in which even simple sensations are seen as “elements of thinking” that 
are experienced as the result of “discriminative attention, pushed often to a very 
high degree” (I, 224).  Posnock’s description of  “the reciprocal entwinement of 
hoarding and openness” which “shapes Strether’s behavior, anchoring his act of 
‘giving up’ to the social world that has defined him” (227) may be seen as 
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consistent with William James’s view of consciousness.  After all, James asserts, 
“knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its relations” (259); Strether further 
garners impressions, and through “discriminative attention” to relations, his 
consciousness emerges.   His consciousness flows in the way James describes, as 
former stages of consciousness “[melt] into each other like dissolving views,” 
until “they are but one protracted consciousness, one unbroken stream” (247-8). A 
significant moment occurs for Strether on Chad’s balcony.   Posnock discusses 
the importance of the balcony as metaphoric of what he calls “Parisian 
indeterminacy,” in that it is “neither wholly public nor private.” Two balcony 
scenes have been discussed in terms of their syntactical and symmetrical structure 
in Chapter Two, but yet another balcony scene signals Strether’s growing 
awareness of impression. Upon Strether’s return to Chad’s following his visit to 
the Pococks, it becomes clear to Strether that he and Sarah disagree about Chad’s 
development, and “it [the entire Parisian experience] probably was all at an end” 
(280).  Posnock cites the scene as signaling Strether’s “profoundest realization of 
freedom from the confines of the monadic ego” (230).  There is symmetry, as 
Strether leans over the balcony as he had seen Bilham do on his first visit to 
Chad’s.  Posnock observes, “Strether’s responsiveness on the balcony transmutes 
loss into rapt awareness;” the awareness emerges through Strether’s capacity to 
read his impressions of Paris as  “Strether found himself in possession as he never 
yet had been” (281).  As Strether continues to wait for Chad, moving from the 
balcony within the apartment, from the “perched privacy” of observing the street 
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below him to contemplation of the inner workings of consciousness, he is 
confronted by his impression: 
He spent a long time on the balcony; he hung over it as he had seen little 
Bilham hang the day of his first approach, as he had seen Mamie hang 
over her own the day little Bilham himself might have seen her from 
below; he passed back into the rooms, the three that occupied the front and 
that communicated by wide doors; and, while he circulated and rested, 
tried to recover the impression that they had made on him three months 
before, to catch again the voice in which they had seemed then to speak to 
him.  That voice, he had to note, failed audibly to sound, which he took as 
the proof of all the change in himself.  He had heard, of old, only what he 
could then hear; what he could do now was to think of three months ago as 
a point in the far past.  All voices had grown thicker and meant more 
things; they crowded on him as he moved about—it was the way they 
sounded together that wouldn’t let him be still. (281)  
This passage mirrors Strether’s development.  There is the movement from outer 
to inner, suggesting the connection between the external world and the internal, 
the physical and the spiritual.  James’s choice of the word “communicated” to 
describe the passage from the balcony to the rooms suggests the lingering voice. 
But, like William James’s stream of thought, the voices have changed, or rather, 
Strether has.  The voices crowding in on him suggest impression being read; the 
remade voices “fail audibly to sound” for the reader, who must again interpret 
silence.  William James says, “the Object of your thought is really its entire 
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content or deliverance, neither more nor less” (Principles of Psychology I, 275); 
to Strether, the remade voices contain the entire content, including his knowledge 
of self, place, others, and the relations among all of them.  To consider this in 
terms later addressed by Barry Truax, what Strether hears from the balcony has 
become a “sound symbolism” in that it “mediates the relationship of the person to 
the environment” and thereby has “come to symbolize that relationship” (Truax 
80).  The voices of Paris symbolize all he has internalized throughout his visit, the 
changing view he has of relationships, and what he will ultimately come to see as 
“right.” He becomes aware, yes, of his loss of youth, as Posnock emphasizes, but 
also of his change, of the “wide late life of Paris” which was “in the outside air as 
well as within” (282) and which contributes to his emerging “perceptive 
equilibrium.”  It is shortly after this point that Strether will go to the countryside 
and confront the truth about Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship; he is 
preparing to read that truth as he interprets his impressions and the voices in 
which they speak to him.  
As he often does, Strether follows these visits with one to Maria Gostrey, 
who serves as his means of working things through, or as a “ficelle,” as James 
calls her in the Preface (12), the thread leading him out of the labyrinth.  It is to 
her that Strether says, upon attempting to examine his motivations, “I can’t 
separate—it’s all one; and that’s perhaps why, as I say, I don’t understand” (294).  
Ross Posnock sees this moment as a refusal to sort out, calling it the “note that 
makes Strether’s ‘relish quite so like a pang’” (230).  While Strether says he does 
not understand, and cannot articulate what has happened, and Posnock sees a 
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refusal (italics added) to understand, instead it appears that the oneness does not 
need to be understood. Strether is experiencing unity of experience; William 
James addresses unity in both psychological and mystical terms.  In “The Stream 
of Thought,” he addresses the conflicting ideas of unity and discrete elements of 
the subjective stream in relation to ego.  James rejects the idea of manifold 
coexisting ideas, writing “Whatever things are thought in relation are thought 
from the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, 
feeling, or state of mind” (Principles of Psychology I, 278).  He uses similar terms 
to describe mystical consciousness in The Varieties of Religious Experience: “The 
keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation.  It is as if the opposites of the world, 
whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were 
melted into unity” (388) upon implementation of stimulus.  Strether experiences a 
degree of oneness, the connection of the physical and spiritual worlds suggested 
by Emerson and Swedenborg, and is approaching consciousness.  He does so 
when he reads the voices of impression, and Paris, which becomes a “sign of a 
natural fact,” speaks to him and contributes to his remaking.  His remaking 
reflects an awareness of his conflicting motivations, including both his desire to 
please Maria Gostrey and his moral commitment to Mrs. Newsome, as well as his 
recognition of the possibilities of Paris.  Because the voice of Paris is “ineffable,” 
Strether recognizes it through the impressions amassed during his journey, 
culminating in the inaudible voices of the balcony scene with the silence 
becoming even more of a physical presence, and oppositions are reconciled. 
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After his revelation in the countryside, Strether’s impressions take on an 
even stronger physical presence.  As he reviews what he has discovered, for 
example, “his impression took fuller form—the impression, destined only to 
deepen, to complete itself” (310) of the reality of the situation.  Then, “it was a 
part of the deep impression for Strether, and not the least of the deep interest, that 
they [Chad and Madame de Vionnet] could so communicate” (312) in silence.  
Not only is Strether’s impression taking form, but so is an awareness of what 
happens within silence.  Awareness of the physicality of impression leads to 
another type of silence employed: charged silence.  While this type is present 
throughout the novel, it is most strongly represented at the end, when Strether is 
most conscious of the workings of silence.  While the group is still in Chester and 
taking a stroll early in the novel, Strether is aware, for example, of “the element of 
stricken silence.  This element indeed affected Strether as charged with audible 
rumblings, but he was conscious of the care of taking it explicitly as a sign of 
pleasant peace” (37).  The silence described here, accompanying Strether’s walk 
with Maria and Waymarsh, has depth that may be read, but Strether does not have 
the ability to do so yet.  By accepting it as a sign of peace, Strether is revealing his 
incapability, or refusal, to recognize the relations suggested by the “audible 
rumblings.”  Strether’s misreading augers what is to follow, a series of 
misinterpretations before his eventual realization. 
Charged silence changes, of course, with Strether’s development.  While 
Maria, Strether’s interpreter, is away, Strether must learn to read as he finds 
himself  “in presence of new facts.”   When upon her return he does fill Maria in 
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on recent developments, “they had, in the matter that so much interested them, 
come so far as this without sounding another name—to which however their 
present momentary silence was full of a conscious reference” (193).   While he is 
not yet interpreting, Strether is, at least, conscious of the presence within the 
silence, an indication that there is something that demands attention within the 
seeming gaps.  The “conscious reference” within the silence is a gap similar to 
those William James describes as “intensely active” gaps in our consciousness 
when, for example, we are trying to recall a forgotten name.  James writes, 
namelessness is compatible with existence.   There are innumerable 
consciousnesses of emptiness, no one of which taken in itself has a name, 
but all different from each other.  The ordinary way is to assume that they 
are all emptiness of consciousness, and so the same state.  But the feeling 
of an absence is toto coelo other than the absence of a feeling.  It is an 
intense feeling.  (Principles of Psychology I, 251-2) 
While it may appear that James is describing simply the attempt to capture the 
sound of a forgotten word, he accounts for the presence of reverberations in 
silence of which consciousness is aware.  It is only when Strether acknowledges 
the “intense feeling” that resounds in the gaps that he approaches a sense of self. 
Finally, Strether and Maria’s last conversation, during which he 
recognizes that “it rested, all so firm, on selection.  And what ruled selection was 
beauty and knowledge,” is set up so that “they fronted each other, across the table, 
as if things unuttered were in the air” (341).  Strether is ready for confrontation, 
and though in silence, explication, as he can finally read the unuttered expressions 
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between them.  This, of course, gives silence an even stronger physical presence 
and energy than it has ever had.   
This scene does nothing to further plot for the reader.  Posnock cites 
James’s commentary on it, in the preface, where he calls it a “delightful 
dissimulation” which “has ‘nothing to do with the matter (the matter of my 
subject)’ but ‘everything to do with the manner (the manner of my presentation of 
the same).’  In short, the scene’s function is purely technical and adds ‘nothing 
whatever’ in terms of content” (248).  Its significance is in its revelation of 
James’s method of communicating consciousness, and Strether’s apprehension of 
it.  The reader learns that Strether has come to recognize the relations among 
people and things, as well as between himself and that which interacts with his 
consciousness in order to help shape it.  In Sampson Reed’s description of the 
language  “not of words, but of things,” he asserts, “it is because we are unwilling 
to hear, that we find it necessary to say so much” (33); Strether has become 
willing, and able, to hear the language that expresses connections.  This, then, 
becomes Strether’s unalterable vibration, or iron string, as he attains 
consciousness and the state of perceptive equilibrium.  In his “Project of Novel,” 
Henry James says that in the end, Strether acts “on full reflection.”  His decision 
to support Chad’s change and his refusal to urge him to return to Woollett is a 
conscious choice made with an awareness of what he is himself to lose by his 
position.  James describes Strether’s reflection as thus: “No, I’ll be hanged if I 
purchase the certainty of being coddled for the rest of my days by going straight 
against the way in which all these impressions and suggestions of the last three 
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months have made me feel, and like to feel, and want to feel” (570).  Not only is 
Strether conscious of his change, but also of the role of impression in creating his 
new sense of identity in the relation of his subject and his mind, as Reed might 
phrase it.   
With the emergence of Strether’s consciousness, then, comes the 
emergence of a new Strether, one who is aware that his earlier stable identity, as 
Posnock describes it, was “a mere convenience, rather than an essence” (227).  
Posnock cites James’s sense of “bewilderment” as the “highest degree of feeling” 
(238).  By the novel’s end, Strether is willing to abandon his stable identity, and 
embrace change, in himself and his perception of others, ultimately being defined 
through change, including becoming so “marginal,” as Posnock calls him, that “he 
has no language to describe his intentions” (244).  While Posnock sees this 
condition and “freedom to dwell in indeterminacy, to hoard impressions” as being 
closely aligned with a capitalist economy, Strether does not appear to be operating 
with the intention of maintaining his place within Woollett’s capitalistic system as 
he has rejected the particular identity circumscribed by his previous life and 
relations there. 3 Instead, Strether is seeking “to be right,” a condition imbued 
with moral implications, and his loss of language and social standing indicates an 
Emersonian loss of ego; Strether can stand “on the bare ground” until “all mean 
egotism vanishes” and “become a transparent eye-ball” until “the currents of the 
Universal Being circulate through” him (Nature 10).  By rejecting stable identity 
 
3 Posnock cites George Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money, in which he describes “the inherent laws of 
possession,” in relation to the “dialectic of the self’s hoarding and expansion.”  He suggests that those who 
desire to own money attain freedom; Posnock sees Strether’s hoarding of impression as consistent with this 
philosophy. 
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and accepting his position within vagueness and the language of impression and 
charged silence, Strether has insights such as those suggested by William James 
in The Varieties of Religious Experience that remain inarticulate, but “carry with 
them a curious sense of authority for after-time” (381).  Able to penetrate the 
vagueness and become attuned to the unalterable vibration, Strether’s awareness 
is one of consciousness.  He has emerged as a modern figure conscious of, though 
not articulating, what it is to be right in his social milieu, and has moved to that 
point through silence with real physical presence.  As will be shown, the physical 
realm takes on even greater significance for Strether as the connection between it 
and the psychological becomes even more pronounced in additional silences to 
follow.  
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Chapter Four: Arresting Moments 
 
Thought is an abstraction; William James, however, gives physical presence to 
thought, claiming “we think; and as we think we feel our bodily selves as the seat of the 
thinking” (Principles of Psychology I, 241-2). Describing thought in this way redefines 
consciousness.  While pioneered by William James, this type of thinking has firmly taken 
hold throughout twentieth-century and contemporary examinations of consciousness, 
influencing such current theorists as Gerald Edelman and Antonio Damasio.  For the 
reader of The Ambassadors, it underlies silences apparent in the work, moving from the 
more mystical or psychological silences examined earlier, to types which reverberate 
with physicality. These types, “responsive arrest” and awareness after a fact, mark the 
movement to Henry James’s representation of one’s physical nature and its place in 
thought. In addressing his brother’s work, William James looks for “great vigor and 
decisiveness in the action” (Selected Letters, 22 October 1905, 463); the vigor is found in 
Strether’s coming to consciousness through physical means.  In the novel’s climactic 
scene, upon sighting Chad and Madame de Vionnet in a boat upon the river, Strether is 
brought to his feet (307), a moment signaling the birth of consciousness through the 
physical.  James actually uses the term “responsive arrest,” and illustrates the concept of 
awareness after a fact early in the novel, introducing the reader to these moments of silent 
communication as Strether is introduced to Maria Gostrey.  In their very first encounter, 
Strether and Maria stroll throughout Chester, “constantly pausing, in their stroll, for the 
sharper sense of what they saw” (25).  The pauses indicate perching, much like that 
described by William James in his “Stream of Thought” chapter. In his analogy of 
thought to the “flights and perchings” that make up a “bird’s life,” the perchings are the 
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“substantive parts” or “resting places. . . usually occupied by sensorial imaginations” 
which “can be held before the mind for an indefinite time” (Principles of Psychology I, 
243).  In the novel, they are moments that Strether encounters on his journey towards 
recognizing the relations among things.  His and Maria’s pauses are preceded by 
Strether’s “sharp sense” (17) and “sharper survey” (20), culminating in “another of those 
responsive arrests that we have had so repeatedly to note” (27) when they come face to 
face with Waymarsh.  This is the first of many moments of consciousness that Strether 
encounters in the novel, and its representation takes on physical attributes, as if Strether is 
held by the “oddity of a double consciousness” (18) of which he increasingly becomes 
aware.  He knows that he is “always considering something else; something else, I mean, 
than the thing of the moment” (26).  The repetition of “something else” confers a separate 
identity on the object of his thinking.  Through these early hints of revelation, James 
introduces both the reader and Strether to a physical awareness of consciousness, 
establishing the centrality of this method of representation in the novel. 
 Alfred North Whitehead, writing in 1925, describes the connection of the mind to 
the natural world: 
The effect of physiology was to put mind back into nature. The 
neurologist traces first the effect of stimuli along the bodily nerves, then 
integration at nerve centers, and finally the rise of a projective reference 
beyond the body with a resulting motor efficacy in renewed nervous 
excitement. (Science and the Modern World 148)
The return of the mind to the physical world necessitates consideration of how the 
resulting “renewed nervous excitement” translates into consciousness.  Whitehead calls 
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consciousness “the function of knowing” aspects of “one real universe” (150).  The 
process of knowing, for William James, also begins with the physical world, with 
sensations, which “first make us acquainted with innumerable things, and then are 
replaced by thoughts which know the same things in altogether other ways” (Principles 
of Psychology II, 6).  Needing no precedent, sensation is the first step in consciousness.  
The mind, however, must proceed from sensation.  William James addresses the 
subsequent stages of knowing in “The Stream of Thought” chapter, charting the mind’s 
selection from among sensations to represent an object.  Ultimately, one comes to 
“know” the thing, but James warns, “language works against our perception of the truth” 
because each thought knows the thing it is named for, and nothing else.  This is not 
sufficient, as he says “some of them are always things known a moment ago more 
clearly; others are things to be known more clearly a moment hence” (Principles of 
Psychology I, 241), as when Strether is “always considering something else . . . than the 
thing of the moment.”  Duration and physical presence play roles in knowing and 
thinking.  Therefore, the physical world must be accounted for when considering 
knowledge.   
Despite their different disciplines and styles, Henry James was aware of the work 
his brother had done in the field of consciousness.  In their correspondence, the two 
address one another’s writings, with Henry indicating in his letter of April 21, 1884 that 
he had “attacked your two Mind articles,” one of which, “On Some Omissions of 
Introspective Psychology,” John J. McDermott calls “the most important of William 
James’s early essays, for it became the basis of the famous chapter ‘The Stream of 
Thought’ in his Principles of Psychology” (Introduction to William and Henry James: 
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Selected Letters xiii).  In return, William read and commented on Henry’s writing, often 
critiquing his style.  After reading The Golden Bowl, for example, William implores 
Henry to write a book “with no twilight or mustiness in the plot, with great vigor and 
decisiveness in the action, no fencing in the dialogue, no psychological commentaries, 
and absolute straightness in the style” (Selected Letters, 22 October 1905, 463).  In 
response, Henry acknowledges the “different ends” of their “respective intellectual lives,” 
but also indicates that he has read William’s recent writings and “philosophically, in 
short, I am with you” (Selected Letters, 23 November 1905, 467).  While these particular 
letters follow the publication of The Ambassadors by several years, it is clear that each 
contemplated the other’s theories and approaches. What William may have termed 
Henry’s “fencing in the dialogue” or “psychological commentaries” appear to be Henry’s 
rendering in fiction his representation of consciousness and communication.  Just as 
William James allows for the physical aspect in knowledge, Henry James presents 
consciousness in concrete moments. While Strether’s growing awareness lacks 
exclamation, it is captured for readers in silent moments of arrest, during which elapsing 
duration is made explicit, and Strether’s understanding occurring after events, in 
reflection.  There are points in the novel where Strether is said to be “perching there,” 
borrowing William James’s rhetoric in describing the life of the mind, or becoming aware 
of knowledge in an almost confrontational way, as it becomes distinctly separate from the 
event.  It is in these moments that Henry James clearly anchors thought in the physical 
world.  In both the novel’s climactic scene and several examples of Strether’s wandering 
through Paris, approaching the balcony and even climbing stairs, Strether’s physical 
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movement reflects the “renewed nervous excitement” that Whitehead names.  In each 
case, the physical movement indicates the arrival at consciousness. 
James establishes a distancing effect between thought and narration, created as 
Strether virtually witnesses the emergence of his understanding, in a way perhaps 
influenced by the thinking of William James. William James, according to Paul Jerome 
Croce, was in turn inspired by both Charles Darwin and Charles Sanders Peirce. 
Darwin’s thinking, as examined by Chauncey Wright, places thought in the physical 
world, showing “connections between animal and human intelligence and propos[ing] 
that even human consciousness is a product of natural selection and evolution” (Croce 
169).  William James was familiar with his friend Wright’s Evolution of Self-
Consciousness, in which, says Croce, Wright attempted to provide the certainty that 
religion lacked through science.  James was uncomfortable with what Croce calls 
Wright’s “quest for certainty,” but his connection of human consciousness to natural 
selection and evolution is significant in establishing the mind’s physicality, a concept that 
will be examined more fully in chapter 5. Likewise, William James finds that Peirce’s 
ideas expressed in articles in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy  “interest me 
strangely;” further, Peirce’s view that the mind cannot “refer . . . immediately to its 
object,” and that the mind “can never reach the essences of things, but only come to know 
them in mediated ways” (Croce 214) comes to reverberate for Henry James’s 
representation of consciousness expressed in the silences indicated herein.   
The ideas inspired by these theorists, who clearly considered and reflected upon 
one another’s work, evolves into current analyses of the connection of the mind and the 
brain, those of Edelman and Damasio, as noted earlier, as well as in the work of Daniel 
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Dennett, Francis Crick, and Christof Koch and many other contemporary researchers, all 
acknowledging their debt to William James4. Gerald Edelman observes that William 
James’s greatest achievement is “pointing out that consciousness is a process and not a 
substance” (37).  The process, as described by Edelman, has its roots in the embodied 
mind.  In fact, he implies that his thesis that “mind is a special kind of process depending 
on special arrangement” is inspired by James (6-7).  He explains, “nerve signals in the 
form of electrical discharges occur at the membranes of neurons” (22).  The brain has 
what Edelman calls “evolutionary morphology,” with maps that ‘speak’ back and forth to 
one another.  He describes nervous system behavior as being “self-generated in loops; 
brain activity leads to movement, which leads to further sensation and perception and still 
further movement.  The layers and loops between them are the most intricate of any 
object we know, and they are dynamic; they continually change” (29).  While this 
description of nervous system behavior aptly describes the creation of Strether’s 
consciousness, it mirrors what’s been referred to in these pages as his “negotiation,” as 
Strether ultimately comes to recognize and confront knowledge.  His negotiation is done 
silently, as the loops in the nervous system allow for perception that builds and changes 
continually. Edelman considers the study of the mind from earlier philosophers, including 
Descartes, whom he describes as having “sidestepped biology” in his “conclusion that 
there was a thinking substance.”  In his belief that “his conclusions depended on himself 
alone and not on other people,” Descartes neglects what Edelman believes: “that to be 
 
4 For example, in Crick and Koch’s article “A Framework for Consciousness,” they describe the neural 
activity in the front of the brain as “largely unconscious.”  They cite a proposal that “humans are not 
directly conscious of their thoughts, but only of sensory representations of them in their imagination”  
(120).  While acknowledging that there is “no consensus about this” theory, the language suggests William 
James’s concept of   knowing things “a moment ago more clearly” while “others are things to be known 
more clearly a moment hence.”   
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aware and able to guide his philosophical thought, he needed to have language” (34-35).  
Edelman’s view of language involves process; he says that while an interlocutor is 
necessary, it may even be “the memory of someone in one’s past, an interiorized 
interlocutor.”  Considered in these terms, James’s deliberate silences constitute a 
complex lexicon unto themselves as Strether’s “articulation” is based in the process of his 
mind. The depth of the work can only be understood through the reader’s interpretation 
of that language.  
Early in the novel, Strether’s “ability to have concepts” (Edelman 108), is 
revealed to the reader through glimpses of his assessment of himself, Waymarsh, and 
Mrs. Newsome.  These perceptions—that he is a failure, that Waymarsh “was a success” 
because he “had held his tongue [regarding his relationship with his wife] and had made a 
large income” (31), and that Mrs. Newsome  “is—wonderful” (45)—require Strether’s 
later re-examination. While the details upon which his judgments are based are often 
revealed through exchanges with Maria Gostrey, his re-evalutions and conclusions are 
not.   Strether’s view of each changes, however, but not through discussion.  Instead, the 
changes occur through Strether’s consciousness, as his silent interlocutions mark 
evolution.  His discovery, for example, made through a silent glance, that Waymarsh has 
been in contact with Mrs. Newsome, resulting in her exigent request that Strether return, 
reveals that Waymarsh has not necessarily held his tongue (190), and leads to their 
further estrangement.  Mrs. Newsome’s resulting cessation of communication results, 
ironically, in Strether’s feeling that he knows her, that “he had never so lived with her as 
during this period of her silence; the silence was a sacred hush, a finer clearer medium, in 
which her idiosyncrasies showed” (195).  She is no longer “wonderful,” but is, instead, 
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“‘cold.’”   Her silence forces Strether to make a judgment about her; his recognition of 
Mrs. Newsome’s provinciality shapes his later assessment of Chad and the decisions he 
must make about his relationship with both.  His reaction is couched in animate terms, as 
he “lived” with her through her silence; it indicates a movement and turn in his 
perception.  Strether comes to speak to Maria about Mrs. Newsome after this, but the 
discussion follows the workings of Strether’s interior interlocutor.  These moments lead 
to his final reassessment, the recognition that he, no longer perceiving himself a failure, is 
“right.”  
Using terminology reminiscent of both Darwin and William James, Edelman 
describes the brain as a “selective system” which can account for psychological functions 
such as perception, memory, and consciousness (80).  He supports neural Darwinism, 
describing what he calls the theory of neuronal group selection (TNGS) which, he claims, 
will “provide a bridge between psychology and physiology.”  Edelman proposes that 
maps in the brain lead to generalizations of perceptual responses, “even in the absence of 
language,” and account for the emergence of language (82-3).   The significance of 
Edelman’s work for a study of The Ambassadors lies in the physiological brain maps, 
which interact by what he calls “reentry,” or signaling between resulting maps of the 
brain (83).  From this, memory and conceptual capabilities develop, and may exist before 
speech.  Edelman distinguishes between primary and higher-order consciousness; 
primary consciousness, which he also calls the “remembered present,” is the condition 
“of having mental images in the present.”  Edelman’s conception of primary 
consciousness meets, as he notes, William James’s requirements for consciousness, “it is 
individual. . ., It is continuous and yet changing . . ., and it is intentional.”  Its 
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intentionality, a term Edelman credits early in his book to the German philosopher Franz 
Brentano, lies in its always having an object (5), or “referring necessarily to internally 
given or outside-world signals derived alternately from things and events” (121).  
Edelman’s description of “the self and nonself components,” the “constant interaction 
between self and world systems,” and “the occurrence in real time and in parallel of
perceptual categorizations for each sensory modality via the cortical system” (120-121) is 
applicable to the negotiations in which Strether participates as he silently approaches 
moments of cognition.  The emergence of primary consciousness results from what 
Edelman calls the “evolutionary development of the ability to create a scene” (118), 
based on an ongoing process of “self-categorization” built by “matching past perceptual 
categories with signals from value systems, a process carried out by cortical systems 
capable of conceptual functions.  This value-category system then interacts via reentrant 
connections with brain areas carrying out ongoing perceptual categorizations of world 
events and signals” (119-120).  Even primary consciousness necessitates constant 
interaction with the physical world for the creation of scenes, without yet the awareness 
of the process.   A moment crucial in the development of Strether’s consciousness, and 
clearly representative of a created scene, is the event in Gloriani’s garden, discussed in 
chapter 2 in terms of the significance of its rhetoric of art and music.  As noted there, 
Henry James saw this scene as the moment of Strether’s crisis; in his exhortation to 
Bilham to “Live!” he begins his journey to consciousness.  In the context of primary 
consciousness, Strether constructs a scene from the impressions he has garnered, 
categorizes himself and the others, and reacts to “my impressions of Chad and of people 
I’ve seen at his place—well, have had their abundant message for me, have just dropped 
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that into my mind” (132).  While the scene has had an effect on Strether, the effect is 
almost imposed; he is not yet “conscious of being conscious” which comes with higher-
order consciousness.  As a tableau, or somewhat still scene, it inspires a reaction from 
Strether;  Strether’s exhortation to “Live!” involves more than a search for lost youth.  
The complexity of Strether’s discovery is to come later, with movement, and an 
understanding of “relations.” 
Similarly, Strether’s first meeting with Miss Barrace elicits a surprising response 
from him.  Bilham introduces Miss Barrace to Strether, and in response to signals that he 
cannot quite read accurately, Strether asks “himself if the occasion weren’t in its essence 
the most baited, the most gilded of traps” (76).  Strether is not even sure why he would 
see it as a trap; in fact, “he blinked in the light of a conviction that he should know later 
on” (77), perhaps after he has achieved higher-order consciousness.  He knows his initial 
reaction to the object, and while responding to a signal, is not conscious of what it 
signifies.  He constructs a scene inspired by Miss Barrace, but it is only “the very 
beginning with him of a condition as to which, later on, it will be seen, he found cause to 
pull himself up; and he was to remember the moment duly as the first step in a process” 
(78).  Strether is approaching movement as he “pull[s] himself up,” so the process away 
from the tableau to awareness is underway.    
The moments signaling primary consciousness are necessary stages in the 
evolution of higher-order consciousness, which by contrast,  “involves the recognition by 
a thinking subject of his or her own acts or affections.  It embodies a model of the 
personal, and of the past and the future as well as the present.  It exhibits direct 
awareness—the noninferential or immediate awareness of mental episodes without the 
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involvement of sense organs or receptors.  .  .  . We are conscious of being conscious” 
(Edelman 112).   Strether does become “conscious of being conscious,” but while the 
expression of “an inner life, based on the emergence of language in a speech community, 
becomes possible” (133), Strether’s higher-order consciousness is expressed through very 
concrete representations of his awareness of thought, and of what Edelman calls a 
“socially based selfhood” (125).   Edelman writes that as a “somatic selective system,” 
the brain “uses value constraints to project the future in terms of categories and goals,” 
and “our language and ideas of meaning go far beyond the rules of grammar” despite our 
being “limited in our thought by the way in which we are constituted as products of 
evolutionary morphology” (161).  Strether’s expression and awareness are based on a 
sense of meaning that “takes shape in terms of concepts that depend on categorizations 
based on value.  [Meaning] grows with the history of remembered body sensations and 
mental images” (170).  Significant illustrations of Strether’s higher-order consciousness 
appear later in the novel and his development.  The pivotal event of seeing Chad and 
Madame de Vionnet crystallizes everything for Strether, both in terms of understanding 
them and himself.  Upon his return to Paris, he reflects upon what has happened.  His 
reflection itself indicates another level of consciousness.  Significantly, he mentally 
reviews Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s hurried exchange in the boat, and “it was a part 
of the deep impression for Strether, and not the least of the deep interest, that they could 
so communicate” (312) as they make a rapid-fire decision as to how to address Strether’s 
sighting them.  After confronting their consciousness, Strether confronts his own, as “he 
almost blushed, in the dark, for the way he had dressed the possibility in vagueness, as a 
little girl might have dressed her doll.  He had made them—and by no fault of their 
123
own—momentarily pull it for him, the possibility, out of this vagueness; and must he not 
therefore take it now as they had had simply, with whatever thin attenuations, to give it to 
him?” (313).  Strether stands back and assesses the accumulated images, and recognizes 
what he had not been able to earlier about Chad and Madame de Vionnet, and his own 
understadings.  He is fearful of Maria Gostrey’s reaction as he anticipates her saying 
“‘What on earth—that’s what I want to know now—had you then supposed?’ He 
recognized at last that he had really been trying all along to suppose nothing.  Verily, 
verily, his labour had been lost.  He found himself supposing innumerable and wonderful 
things” (313).  The suppositions follow what Edelman might term Strether’s “interaction 
between self and world system” (120) as his consciousness takes shape in relation to his 
latest discovery and reevaluation of his surroundings.  Later that morning, Strether once 
again wanders the streets of Paris, which have spoken to him throughout his time there, 
the “vague voice of Paris” that was discussed in chapter 3 in relation to the unalterable 
vibration.  His walk is familiar to him as he goes once again to the Postes et Tèlègraphes,
but now “the something in the air of these establishments; the vibration of the vast 
strange life of the town” has new meaning as the signal, while the same, becomes fuller 
for Strether.  He recognizes that “he was mixed up with the typical tale of Paris” (315) as 
it contributes to Strether’s higher-order consciousness through his awareness of his 
physical surroundings. The tale of Paris, and Strether’s reading of it, is overflowing with 
the richness of Chad’s change, Strether’s change, and the recognition of Woollett’s, and 
by extensions Mrs. Newsome’s, provinciality, along with an emergent sense of what it 
means to be “right.” As meaning grows for Strether, he truly becomes an ambassador, not 
merely one who is doing Mrs. Newsome’s bidding, but one who can make judgments 
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based upon his perceptions and consciousness, and can deliver an informed message 
gleaned from his experience.   
In his section titled “Attention and the Unconscious,” Edelman cites William 
James’s definition of attention, concentrating on what James called “‘the taking 
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought’” (141).  Edelman credits the 
development of attention to “evolutionary pressure on an animal to select one out of a set 
of appropriate actions,” (141) once again placing the development of consciousness 
within the physical, and ultimately, social world. Once Strether becomes aware of his 
consciousness, it is necessary for him to select appropriate action, deciding whether to 
return to the United States or stay in Paris, as well as choosing whether or not to 
encourage Chad in the direction requested by Mrs. Newsome.  He makes the decision that 
“he must do both things; he must see Chad, but he must go.  The more he thought of the 
former of these duties the more he felt himself make a subject of insistence of the latter.  
They were alike intensely present to him as he sat in front of a quiet little cafè into which 
he had dropped on quitting Maria’s entresol” (332).  Not only is Strether aware of his 
choices, but they also acquire physicality through his contemplation.  From here, Strether 
again walks through Paris, this time passing by Chad’s house “as if his last day were 
oddly copying his first” (333), but this time Chad, not Bilham, is on the balcony, and 
calls to Strether, whose perambulations mark his awakened consciousness. Strether 
quickly recognizes that it is “Chad’s more solid shape; so that Chad’s was the attention 
that, after he had stepped forward into the street and signaled, he easily engaged; Chad’s 
was the voice that, sounding into the night with promptness and seemingly with joy, 
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greeted him and called him up” (333).  The description is in marked contrast with his 
earlier mistaking Bilham for Chad.  His physical movement through Paris and the 
countryside, and metaphoric movement through his mind, allowing for the growth of 
consciousness, results in Strether’s being able to see Paris and Chad accurately.   As he 
climbs the steps, signaling his ascension to higher-order consciousness, he sees “what 
Chad’s life was doing with Chad’s mother’s emissary” as his awareness is intertwined 
with the physical representation of his social world.  Coming at a final stage in Strether’s 
development, his ascension is a culmination of moments of  “responsive arrest” and 
“awareness after a fact” that are remembered and re-experienced as he relives bodily 
experiences and images. 
Edelman’s consideration of George Lakoff ‘s  Women, Fire, and Dangerous 
Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind is useful in illustrating the connection 
between silence and consciousness. Lakoff describes language as emerging from 
“cognitive semantics,” proposing that meaning results from the “intrinsic workings of the 
body and the brain.” As Edelman explains, 
meaning is already based in embodiment by means of image schemas, 
kinesthetic schemas, metonyms, and the categorical relations that underlie 
metaphor.  But this is not enough: Language is supposed to be 
characterized by symbolic models.  These are models that pair linguistic 
information with the cognitive models that themselves make up a 
preexisting conceptual system.  Inasmuch as preexisting conceptual 
models are already embodied through their link to bodily and social 
experience, this link is not an arbitrary one.  (247)   
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His view of “idealized cognitive models,” that use conceptual embodiment, occurs 
“through bodily activities prior to language” (247), so that language “can be understood 
in terms of bodily functioning” (250). According to this model, language emerges from 
bodily experience, rather than being imposed by a “God’s-eye view.”  As such, Strether’s 
“language” may first emerge through a syntax of silence.  His conceptualizing occurs in 
concrete terms, with his understanding conveyed through his language of silence.  While 
the more physical representations of sensation and gesture will be addressed in chapter 5, 
his concrete conceptualization accounts for his silent cognition.  The emergence of 
Strether’s recognitions during his repeated walks through town and the images he creates 
reflects the physical basis of cognition.  Finally, as Strether approaches his sense of what 
he must do to be right, he consciously withholds language and information from Maria 
Gostrey, as he considers their situation in metaphoric terms.  While waiting to hear from 
Chad after discovering the truth, Strether spends a great deal of time with Maria; the two 
“said for the time no further word about the matter” as their roles change and he shows 
Maria through Paris.  Strether has a “final appreciation of what he had done,” and sees 
himself and Maria as “Babes in the Wood” as he awaits a final meeting with Chad. He 
considers the “reckoning . . .which also faced him” and which he would “float to it duly 
through these caverns of Kubla Khan” (326-327).  The allusion to floating on the river 
Alph evokes Strether’s own stream of consciousness.  The metaphoric and physical 
representations signal his contemplation of a Woollett where “everything there changed 
for him.”  His understanding stands in marked contrast to an early moment of knowledge 
inspired by sensation.  Strether meets Chad for the first time in a box at the theatre, 
foreshadowing their final encounter in Chad’s balcony.  At their first meeting, Strether is 
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surprised by Chad, much as he will be in the later encounter.  He realizes that “they were 
in presence of Chad himself” through sensation.  It is, in fact, a significant sensation, 
viewed by Strether in retrospect as “quite one of the sensations that count in life; he 
certainly had never known one that had acted, as he might have said, with more of a 
crowded rush” (89).  This is an early example of Strether’s recognizing a moment of his 
consciousness prompted by sensation but fully appreciated after its completion; the 
incident is somewhat overwhelming for him as he relives it for several days.  He will 
later come to recognize such moments as his consciousness emerges, following the same 
physical patterns, both in Paris and in his sensory path, recalling the “renewed nervous 
excitement” that Whitehead later comes to name.   In the absence of articulation, meaning 
is embodied. 
The process Strether is participating in will ultimately lead to the creation of his 
metaself, a term coined by Antonio Damasio, another contemporary theorist, in 
addressing the creation of subjectivity and the self.  Using the metaphor of the body as a 
landscape, Damasio describes “the body ‘structure’ [as] analogous to object shapes in a 
space, while the body ‘state’ resembles the light and shadow and movement and sound of 
the objects in that space” (xiv).  Damasio accounts for both thought and feeling, with 
feeling arising as a “momentary ‘view’ of a part of that body landscape.  It has a specific 
content—the state of the body, and specific neural systems that support it—the peripheral 
nervous system and the brain regions that integrate signals related to body structure and 
regulation” (xiv).  Damasio considers the brain as a collection of systems that addresses 
both the “goal-oriented thinking process we call reasoning,” and the “response selection 
we call decision making” (70), implying a connection between the two, which are 
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intertwined and have a biological base.  As such, “a brain design likely to have prevailed 
in natural selection may have been one in which the subsystems responsible for reasoning 
and decision making would have remained intimately inter-locked with those concerned 
with biological regulation,” with both intrinsic to survival (85).  In this view, thought and 
feeling are physically based, and the “organism constituted by the brain-body partnership 
interacts with the environment as an ensemble,” much in the way we have seen Strether’s 
thoughts inspired by his sensation, or feeling, and reaction to his environment.  The 
interaction results not just in external, physical response, but may also “generate internal 
responses, some of which constitute images.” The internal responses become the basis for 
the mind (89). 
Feelings are described as a means of communicating signals to others; they are a 
necessary part of the “metaself construction” that Damasio presents.  As with Edelman’s 
sense of consciousness, the metaself, too, is a process.   The metaself as Damasio 
portrays it is “a schematic view of the main protagonists from a perspective external to 
both [i.e. images or organism responses to images].  In effect, the third-party view 
constitutes, moment-by-moment, a nonverbal narrative document of what is happening to 
those protagonists (i.e. the ‘unfolding’ of the consciousness). The narrative can be 
accomplished without language” (243).   While he does distinguish between the creation 
of the “self” and of the “I,” with language being necessary for the “I,” Damasio creates a 
schematic through which one might view the emergence from a neural basis of Strether’s 
sense of consciousness and self as he perches on the edge of concrete recognitions and 
his consciousness.  Damasio says William James would be pleased to discover this 
representation of the metaself.  In The Feeling of What Happens, Damasio calls language 
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merely one translation of consciousness; language, he says, cannot develop from nothing, 
so there must be underlying concepts to language (108).  It is, however, “a major 
contributor” to a high-level form of consciousness which Damasio terms “extended 
consciousness.”  
The first representation of Strether’s consciousness is through its unfolding, what 
Damasio calls its “nonverbal narrative document,” which is “accomplished without 
language, using the elementary representation tools of the sensory and motor systems in 
space and time” (243).  For example, early in the novel, a simple response to Maria 
Gostrey’s initial question to Strether yields much more than he realized. Maria, watching 
as Strether inquires after Waymarsh, asks if his friend is Mr. Waymarsh of Milrose, 
Connecticut.  Strether gives a rather lengthy response, but “it wasn’t till after he had 
spoken that he became aware of how much there had been in him of response; when the 
tone of her own rejoinder, as well as the play of something more in her face—something 
more, that is, than its apparently usual restless light—seemed to notify him” (19).  The 
language of the passage is rich with sense references.  Instead of Maria’s response, James 
focuses on the tone, or sound, of it. Her expression, and suggestion to a play of light in it, 
as well, speaks to Strether.  These things do not merely speak to him, but “notify” him, 
suggesting that he is alerted, or that his consciousness is sparked.   The recognition 
unfolds for Strether in time, an early example of James’s awareness of duration.  
Additionally, he both responds to and receives a response from Maria, but in sensory 
rather than verbal terms.   At this point, Strether is not quite aware of his feelings about 
meeting Waymarsh; yet he knows he is relieved that Waymarsh is not yet there.  The 
feelings ultimately lead to consciousness about his ambivalence toward Waymarsh and 
130
his judgment, but it is never articulated. As noted earlier, Strether discovers through a 
silent glance that Waymarsh may have betrayed him to Mrs. Newsome; the nonverbal 
narrative of their relationship unfolds through a series of interactions with one another, 
and even Maria Gostrey, as Strether’s metaself unfolds.  This exchange is paradigmatic 
of the entire novel; Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship, Strether’s coming to 
consciousness, and the decision he comes to make are all revealed to the reader and to 
Strether in a nonverbal narrative. Damasio’s evocation of space and time lend linearity to 
the development or expression of consciousness.  He sees the self as being “constructed,” 
saying in fact, that the individual reconstructs and remakes the self.  The unfolding 
becomes explicit as he describes that the “metaself only ‘learns’ about the ‘now’ an 
instant later” as the “present continuously becomes past” and we are “hopelessly late for 
consciousness” (240).  The depiction that Damasio creates here echoes what happens to 
Strether, as his awareness of his unfolding consciousness, which takes him a long time to 
process, is presented to the reader, who is kept somewhat in suspense regarding the 
outcome.  The unfolding happens for Strether through his moments of responsive arrest, 
where he pauses and acknowledges glimpses of consciousness, and his awareness after a 
fact, where he goes beyond the pausing and is aware of the interplay of his mind and 
distinct knowledge, as has been illustrated in his relationship with Waymarsh.  The 
ability to create a metaself emerges from what Damasio calls the brain-body partnership 
which is the basis for the mind, and which he defines as the “ability to display images 
internally and to order those images in a process called thought” (89).  Strether 
experiences those moments of visualization in points of “responsive arrests.”   
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As noted earlier, the term “responsive arrest” is used from the beginning of The 
Ambassadors, when Strether and Maria Gostrey return to their inn to find Waymarsh 
waiting.  James presents this as a significant moment: 
the effect of the sight of [Waymarsh] was instantly to determine for 
Strether another of those responsive arrests that we have had so repeatedly 
to note.  He left it to Miss Gostrey to name, with the fine full bravado, as it 
almost struck him, of her ‘Mr. Waymarsh!’ what was to have been, 
what—he more than ever felt as his short stare of suspended welcome took 
things in—would have been, but for herself, his doom.  It was already 
upon him even at that distance—Mr. Waymarsh was for his part joyless. 
(27)   
Strether is stopped by Waymarsh’s presence and how he reads Waymarsh’s response to 
them; significantly, he does not articulate anything, leaving it to Maria, whom Waymarsh 
does not recognize, to name him.  In this scene, it is clear that Maria is the only one who 
possesses knowledge.  James creates a distancing effect, as the narrator does intrude by 
referring to “we,” and by placing Waymarsh at a physical remove from Strether.  While 
Strether does pause at the moment, it is not until later in his emergent consciousness that 
he is able to negotiate the interaction.  William James describes voluntary acts of 
attention as “momentary arrests, coupled with a peculiar feeling, of portions of the stream 
[of thought]” (Principles of Psychology I, 452).  At these arrests, the stream of thought is 
obstructed, and “things temporarily move the other way.”  When Strether sees 
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Waymarsh, his stream of thought is momentarily diverted, and the arrest is the initial 
stage in redefining his sense of self.5
As Strether later wanders in Paris, he is in the process of defining both the 
personal and social selves.  On his way to find Chad’s apartment for the first time, he 
pauses in the neighborhood, desiring to “put himself in relation, and he would be hanged 
if he were not in relation” (67).  He is putting himself in relation to his surroundings, and 
by doing so, is “there to reconstruct” a connection to Paris, and to feel “the brush of the 
wing of the stray spirit of youth,” and by doing so, recreate a sense of self. Strether’s 
desire to reconstruct the past and his awareness of it reflect what Damasio describes as 
the reconstruction of the self.  While, as noted above, Damasio understands self as an 
evanescent state, with the owner not knowing unless something goes wrong that he was 
in the process of remaking, Strether is more conscious of the remaking process.  In fact, 
his desire to feel again “the brush of the wing,” he conjures images similar to those later 
suggested by Damasio:  
images are not stored as facsimile pictures of things, or events, or words, 
or sentences; we all have direct evidence that whenever we recall a given 
object, or face, or scene, we do not get an exact reproduction but rather an 
interpretation, a newly reconstructed version of the original.  In addition, 
as our age and experience change, versions of the same thing evolve; this 
 
5 Ross Posnock addresses William James’s description of attention in relation to the will and the individual 
mind.  He cites James’s observation that “the ability to ‘voluntarily bring back a wandering attention . . .is 
the very root of judgment, character, and will’ (401).  A healthy will enables the self to insulate itself 
against distraction” (35).  However, while James suggests that “insulation” is necessary for the individual 
mind, Posnock observes that he does allow for interaction of the mind and a narrow view of the “social 
self” as “one among several selves.”  
133
must be reconciled with sensation that we can conjure up approximations 
of images we previously experienced. (98)     
 Damasio’s evocation of sensation recalls William James’s depiction of memory and its 
reverberations as addressed in Principles of Psychology; James describes it as “the 
knowledge of an event, or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the 
additional consciousness that we have thought or experienced it before” (I, 648).  
Especially significant for the description of Strether’s evocation of the past is William 
James’s sense that one cannot think of “a thing as in the past, except by thinking of the 
past together with the thing, and the relation of the two” (650).  Strether’s desire to “put 
himself in relation” echoes the language here; by doing so, not only would he recall an 
event, but also the sensation associated with it in a remade self built on the relation of the 
two.  It is in this moment of “responsive arrest” that Strether approaches a step in silent 
consciousness, a physical sense of self as silence adopts additional reverberations when 
based on the interworking of the mind, brain, and its stimulus.  He approaches the point 
described by William James as consciousness, which does not “inhabit any place.”  
Instead, “it has dynamic relations with the brain, and cognitive relations with everything 
and anything” (Principles of Psychology II, 34).   
From here, Strether moves on to Chad’s apartment, and as noted in chapters 2 and 
3, experiences a moment of consciousness at the approach of a balcony.  This particular 
moment is one of responsive arrest.  As he reaches the Boulevard Malesherbes, he pauses 
and observes the “continuous balcony” of Chad’s apartment.  Again, this serves as entry 
into Chad’s world, and Strether’s consciousness of self.  The description of the balcony 
as “continuous” emphasizes its, and Strether’s, connectedness to place and relations in 
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Paris, and evokes William James’s depiction of the continuous stream of thought 
(Principles of Psychology I, 237).  Standing there, Strether again is aware that “many 
things came over him here” and recognizes “the truth that wherever one paused in Paris 
the imagination reacted before one could stop it.”    Fixed on the balcony, Strether is 
aware of the “fine relation of part to part and space to space,” both of the balcony to 
building and, by implication, of himself to his surroundings.  Finally, a young man 
emerges from the apartment, and he and Strether notice one another.  Strether is surprised 
to see that this young man is not Chad; he thinks perhaps the young man is “Chad 
altered.”  James prolongs the description of Strether’s recognition; through the workings 
of Strether’s consciousness he finally realizes that it is indeed someone else, Bilham.  The 
momentary arrest in which the “relation of part to part” is revealed also uncovers 
Strether’s emerging understanding of Chad, despite his not being present.  Perched for 
consciousness himself, Strether senses that the balcony with its “perched privacy” might 
not be “a convenience easy to surrender;” moreover, he sees it as “the only domicile . . . 
on which [Strether] had the shadow of a claim” (69-70).  Strether’s perception “by a rapid 
process, was that this knowledge of a perched privacy appeared to him the last of 
luxuries” evokes Edelman’s sense of the mind created through process, as well as of 
William James’s description of perching at the substantive moments of thought. The 
rapidity of the process also conveys an awareness of duration, which is significant for 
awareness after an event. Strether is coming to an understanding of himself and his sense 
of self in relation to both Chad and Waymarsh as he pauses at Chad’s balcony.  He thinks 
of Waymarsh in contrast to Chad; Strether sees him as an alternative to the young man on 
the balcony, and decides that he will “consciously leav[e] Waymarsh out.”  In doing so, 
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Strether begins to define his sense of self as he begins to recognize Paris and a changed 
Chad, and move towards a rejection of the standards of Woollett.  As Ross Posnock 
describes it, the balcony suggests that Strether is on the “margin” as it allows for privacy 
while still somewhat public.  As the “architectural embodiment of Parisian 
indeterminacy, of a blurred boundary” (Posnock 229), it mirrors Strether’s perching on 
the boundary of Woollett and his past, while he considers the freedom the balcony, and 
Paris, suggest.   
The moments of arrest become more significant as Strether’s perceptions sharpen.  
In fact, the arrests even interrupt speech, representing a greater awareness than language 
provides and significant stages in his reconstruction of self.  Much later in the novel, 
Strether and Maria have a conversation, in which the words are somewhat extraneous to 
their communication.  Maria is planning to leave Paris, but Strether wants her to stay.  
The knowledge comes to him, in language that echoes the earlier references to Strether’s 
“sharper sense,” through “a still sharper sense than he would have expected.”  While 
Maria “took it as if the words were all she had wished,” the “sharper sense” carries 
greater weight than the words, as “it had broken as with a slight arrest into the current of 
their talk” (292).  The phrasing recalls William James’s metaphor of the stream of 
consciousness, with talk being one means of articulating what they are coming to 
recognize.  The slight arrest illustrates William James’s substantive moment making it 
possible for Strether to ask Maria a direct question about her earlier absence.  This 
moment defines Strether’s emerging self in relation to Maria and all that is going on 
around him.  It happens in the arrest. 
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A final moment of arrest occurs in the novel’s climactic scene.  Antonio Damasio 
defines the mind as the ability to display images internally and to order those images in a 
process called thought; Strether’s mind clearly emerges in his visit to the countryside and 
in his recognition of Chad and Madame de Vionnet and the nature of their relationship.  
The scene is rich with significant moments and methods.  While it has been discussed in 
terms of dramatic and artistic discourse as a symbol system in chapter 2 and vagueness in 
chapter 3, as a crucial moment in the action and Strether’s development the scene is 
necessarily comprised of several methods of representation.  The reader is given a signal 
even before Strether’s own awareness of what is happening in the scene that this moment 
is decisive; James ends Chapter III of Book Eleven with Strether’s, and the reader’s, 
anticipation: 
Such a river set one afloat almost before one could take up the oars—the 
idle play of which would be moreover the aid to the full impression.  This 
perception went so far as to bring him to his feet, but that movement, in 
turn, made him feel afresh that he was tired, and while he leaned against a 
post and continued to look out he saw something that gave him a sharper 
arrest.  (307) 
Strether has not yet spotted Chad and Madame de Vionnet, but the reader is poised for 
the critical event. Strether and the reader are taken afloat on the “river”of consciousness.  
Strether becomes aware of his tiredness, ironically feeling “afresh” that he is tired.  The 
contradiction of terms heightens the moment’s physicality as he is brought to his feet 
with awareness, then leans, perched for consciousness.  Ultimately, Chad and Madame de 
Vionnet come around the river in their boat; at first Strether recognizes merely “a man 
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who held the paddles” and “a lady” with a “pink parasol.”  This information comes at the 
opening of the next chapter, after Strether’s “arrest” and pause, signaling a substantive 
moment of consciousness.  It is this moment of arrest which will result in Strether’s 
finally understanding the nature of Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship; it is a 
silence that advances not only the boat’s progress on the river, but also Strether’s 
developing consciousness, propelling him to movement.  The language is that of William 
James; the metaphoric sense of the progression of consciousness is clear; even more 
significant, however, is Strether’s awareness of it, based in the very physical moment of 
responsive arrest.  He can now order images, as Damasio suggests occurs in the creation 
of mind.  Strether takes with him from this scene a series of images that he replays and 
mulls over repeatedly; from this, his knowledge is silently articulated in his mind.  He 
can, additionally, visualize a course of action for himself.  He has become aware of Chad 
and Madame de Vionnet’s reality as well as his own reaction to it and the implications for 
the future.  The process of visualization is a culmination of the emergence of his mind 
through a responsive arrest on the stream of thought. 
While the interaction of mind and situation, subject and object, occurs in the 
arrest, Strether does not become fully aware of its ramifications until after he physically 
removes himself and returns to Paris.  The responsive arrest, one silence, yields to 
another, awareness after a fact, which is a more conscious silence, rich with physical as 
well as psychological reverberations in its presentation, as Strether comes to confront 
knowledge that is revealed to both himself and the reader after it has occurred.  The mode 
of silence here labeled “awareness after a fact” is complex in that in addition to silence, it 
makes both Strether and the reader aware of duration and its relation to consciousness.  
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Strether expresses awareness of the distance between the moment and his contemplation 
of a situation early in the novel, telling Maria “I’m always considering something else, 
something else, I mean, than the thing of the moment” (26).  What he is considering must 
be something he has experienced prior to the moment.  The issue of the relationship to 
knowledge and how it understood, and thereby connected to time and memory, is 
addressed by virtually all of the thinkers addressed herein.  While time may not appear to 
be significant for knowledge, it provides contrast, as seen even in terms of music.  It 
evokes John Cage’s depiction of the nature of time and its distancing effect: “duration is 
the only characteristic of sound that is measurable in terms of silence” (14).  In the 
silence of duration, Strether contemplates his consciousness.   
William James calls attention to the perception of time, identifying it as “a 
duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were—a rearward- and a forward-looking end.  It 
is only as parts of this duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to the 
other is perceived” (Principles of Psychology I, 609). This concretization of duration 
mirrors what Strether comes to perceive as he confronts knowledge from a distance of 
time and place. William James goes on to write in his chapter on “Memory” that “all the 
intellectual value for us of state of mind depends on our after-memory of it. Only then is 
it combined in a system and knowingly made to contribute to a result.  Only then does it 
count for us.  So that the EFFECTIVE consciousness we have of our states is the after-
consciousness” (644).  Henry James bases his presentation of Strether’s later 
consciousness on this perspective.  It is in the time after he has moved from the event, 
after it has unfolded in duration and his consciousness, that Strether makes the choice “to 
be right.” 
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Duration and consciousness are significant in later theory as well, as Edelman 
describes higher order consciousness, which takes into account the ability to “model the 
past and the future.”  He identifies categorizations as a necessary step in the creation of 
meaning, which “takes shape in terms of concepts that depend on categorizations based 
on value.  It grows with the history of remembered body sensations and mental images” 
(170).  Edelman then attaches linguistic and semantic capabilities to the ability to create 
“new models of the world,” but warns that this system of meaning is “charged with 
emotion” because of its basis.  Strether’s emerging “awareness after a fact” is based in 
this same continuum.  He does not, of course, articulate his consciousness, but in the 
silent moment achieves higher-level consciousness as he confronts new knowledge in 
memory. 
While Strether’s consciousness does not emerge in a strictly linear way, the 
silence described here does appear more frequently at later points in the novel, suggesting 
its significance in the creation of Strether’s sense of an “I” as well as in others’ 
perceptions of him.  One of the earlier representations of  Strether’s awareness after a fact 
is seen in his encounter with Mamie.  James tells the reader that Strether “passed forty 
minutes” with Mamie, immediately directing attention towards duration.  Strether does 
not expect much to develop from this exchange; in fact, Mamie had mistaken Strether for 
Bilham just as earlier Strether had mistaken Bilham for Chad.  The confusion is corrected 
immediately, but again, the question of knowing is raised.  It is not until after he leaves 
Mamie that Strether realizes the significance of their encounter: “he was doubtless not to 
know till afterwards, on turning them over in thought, of how many elements his 
impression was composed; but he none the less felt, as he sat with the charming girl, the 
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signal growth of a confidence” (249-250).  Strether discovers that he has an ally in 
Mamie; of course, she does not articulate this.  James writes that “never a direct word 
pass[ed] between them all the while on the subject of his own predicament,” but Strether 
reads her silence.  Additionally, “it fully came up for them then, by means of their talking 
of everything but Chad, that Mamie, unlike Sarah unlike Jim, knew perfectly what had 
become of him.”  Communication between Strether and Mamie and an emerging 
understanding of Mamie’s perceptions of Strether and Chad are accomplished through 
silence, and realized fully only after the incident has passed.  Notice the physicality of 
Strether’s “turning [the elements] over in thought” as reflection creates awareness.  
Duration is stressed as the reader recognizes knowledge emerging in time. Multiple 
realizations take place within this time frame: Strether becomes aware of the nature of his 
impressions, of Mamie’s understanding of Chad, of Sarah and Jim’s lack of 
understanding of Chad, and of Mamie’s feelings towards him. All is accomplished 
silently, and recognized by the consciousness “afterwards.”  
Strether has a similar encounter with Jeanne de Vionnet.  He finds himself “sitting 
with the child in a friendly silence” (154).  He has no real sense of what she is like when 
they first sit together; of course, “it came back to him afterwards that she had told him 
things.”  This seems contrary to their sitting in silence, but once again the reader is not 
privy to what Jeanne told Strether, so it exists in silence.  Again, he recognizes it later, 
after “she had dipped into the waiting medium at last and found neither surge nor chill—
nothing but the small splash she could herself make in the pleasant warmth, nothing but 
the safety of dipping and dipping again.”  The imagery, with its physical references to 
dipping, chill, and warmth, suggests the stream of thought that Strether and Jeanne 
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encounter together; he comes away, “at the end of ten minutes,” with the impression that 
she is “thoroughly bred,” but doesn’t have a clear sense of her relationship with Chad. 
This will not come until much later in their acquaintance.  What is significant here is the 
dive, with its very physical representation, that Strether takes into consciousness, and its 
sense of duration with recognition occurring from the distance of time. 
These early examples of Strether’s self-conscious awareness after an event give 
way to stronger representations, later in the plot, implying a distance from which Strether 
can stand and interpret situations and impressions and what is left unsaid.  As such, they 
prove that James has manifested William James’s theories and fictionalized the process.  
An integral part of the narrative is the reader’s decoding of the silences.  Once again, an 
examination of the climactic scene in which he travels to the countryside is called for.  
While the responsive arrest described above captures Strether’s pause and dip into the 
stream of consciousness, the scene does not end there.  In fact, the scene reverberates for 
some time, as befits the significance of the moment.  From responsive arrest, Strether 
moves, over the course of many hours, to awareness after a fact.  Awareness cannot be 
fully accomplished until he returns to Paris and has had the lapse of time necessary for 
contemplation and interpretation, and he can fully comprehend the significance of what 
he witnessed. Edelman’s above-cited description of higher-order consciousness requires 
that one is “conscious of being conscious,” and occurs once systems of memory are 
“related to a conceptual representation of a true self (or social self) acting on an 
environment and vice versa.  A conceptual model of selfhood must be built, as well as a 
model of the past” (130).  Strether appears, at the later moments of awareness after a fact, 
to be moving into the state of higher-order consciousness.  While he does not use spoken 
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language to articulate it, he can model events in his mind based on memory; in the 
memory, meaning emerges for Strether, in relation to the self that has developed through 
social interaction, an understanding of situations, and awareness of their ramifications.  
Memory, of course, implies duration, so again, Strether’s recognizing from a distance 
underscores his creation of consciousness.  From here, he can determine a course of 
action for himself.     
James’s descriptions of Strether from the time he encounters Chad and Madame 
de Vionnet on the river virtually through the end of the novel reflect his awareness after a 
fact.  Beginning with their discussion of returning home together and Madame de 
Vionnet’s “vagueness” on the subject, Strether is said “afterwards to remember that Chad 
had promptly enough intervened to forestall this appearance, laughing at his companion’s 
flightiness” (310).  Interestingly, the reference to duration and contemplation is placed 
immediately within the paragraph describing the event.  There is a distancing effect 
created, as the reader is moved back and forth in time.  A sense of multiplying impression 
is created as, in addition to remembering Chad’s “sole intervention,” Strether is said “to 
remember further still, in subsequent meditation, many things that, as it were, fitted 
together,” as he literally re-members, or reconstructs, the experience.  The parallel 
phrasing of “to remember” in the above two passages, with the latter followed by 
“further” has the effect of furthering the action, or moving the reader physically along in 
time and awareness as Strether becomes conscious of being conscious.   
The passage above blends into that which follows, as James takes the reader home 
with Strether and his contemplation.  A scene examined in chapter 2 for its use of syntax 
is again significant in this context, as the narrator makes the reader very aware of 
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Strether’s passing of time and its contribution to his consciousness.  Consider the 
language related to time here:  
Since we have spoken of what he was, after his return, to recall and 
interpret, it may as well immediately be said that his real experience of 
these few hours put on, in that belated vision—for he scarce went to bed 
till morning—the aspect that is most to our purpose.  He then knew more 
or less how he had been affected—he but half knew at the time.  (311) 
The narrator manipulates awareness of past and present, as he refers to having already 
spoken of Strether’s recollection; then, the adverb “immediately” breaks into the 
sentence, as he directs the reader towards the significant revelation in what is called a 
“belated” vision.  A direct reference to time is made at the end of the passage, indicating 
Strether’s full knowledge emerging later. 
Not only is Strether aware of the passing of time and of the process of thought, he 
becomes aware of his sense of self by knowing “how he had been affected.”  Earlier, he 
would not have been cognizant of how the “relations” he has entered into help to shape 
his consciousness.  The movement of the sentence, both in time and structurally, has the 
effect of moving the reader along with Strether as he confronts consciousness.  As 
discussed in chapter 1, this passage is important in reflecting Strether’s sense of “I” 
despite what William James calls “gaps in consciousness” (The Principles of Psychology 
I, 238-9).  The self that he calls “myself, I, or me” remains one as the gaps provide a 
distance from which to view the self.  Damasio’s description of the creation of the 
“metaself” reflects the same movement in time.  Strether seems to embody what Damasio 
later describes as “subjectivity,” which “emerges during the latter step when the brain is 
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producing not just images of an object, not just images of organism responses to the 
object, but a third kind of image, that of an organism in the act of perceiving and 
responding to an object.” He calls this view  “moment-by-moment, a nonverbal narrative 
document” (243).  This is the view that Strether has at the end of this all-important scene; 
he can see what has led up to his development at various stages, and his reactions to his 
perceptions and interactions.  The narrative finally makes sense to Strether as he watches 
it unfold through his subjective self.  Once it unfolds, Strether can predict outcomes, 
which include his participation in the events, and make appropriate decisions.  
This is a significant step for Strether as he is then able to achieve Martha 
Nussbaum’s sense of “perceptive equilibrium,” which she describes as a state  “in which 
concrete perceptions ‘hang beautifully together,’ both with one another and with the 
agent’s general principles.” Reaching this state, Strether is then able to respond to his 
consciousness in relation to that which informs it, and rest at “an equilibrium that is 
always ready to reconstitute itself in response to the new” (183).  The “new” is that which 
will follow Strether’s understanding.  From this point on, Strether’s thought process 
becomes even more concrete and observable, both for him and the reader.  It is revealed 
when “he might have been thinking that if he didn’t go before he could think he wouldn’t 
perhaps go at all” (314).  Again, the reader is forced to step back with Strether and 
contemplate his decision at this point not to leave Paris immediately, but to respond to 
Madame de Vionnet’s request to see him that evening.  From the distance he is aware of 
what has happened, the possible next steps and their ramifications for him, and how he 
has come to understand it.  The intrusion of the subordinate clause concretizes his 
thought reference and implies hesitation; aware of his consciousness after the fact, he is 
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also aware of how his thoughts and actions reverberate in his ultimate decision “to be 
right,” his perceptive equilibrium. Hesitation is underscored by the use of “might have 
been” and “perhaps,” which lend an air of tentativeness to his thinking.  He confronts and 
questions the issue of the “state of the wrongdoer,” but throughout the day does not act.  
Instead, he spends the day “idling, lounging, smoking, sitting in the shade, drinking 
lemonade and consuming ices” (316), and contemplating what Madame de Vionnet might 
say to him.  As Damasio would say, Strether is responding to the object.  He is predicting 
outcomes, and considering his role. From this point on, however, Strether is able to read 
more clearly.  He walks through Paris and hears the “vague voice of Paris” which now 
carries “the smell of revolution, the smell of the public temper—or perhaps simply the 
smell of blood.”  He attributes these vibrations to “the effect of the thunder in the air,” 
but is also able to read the vibrations and the changes that are indicated for him. 
Finally, in his walk, Strether “knew in advance he should look back on the 
perception actually sharpest with him as on the view of something old, old, old, the oldest 
thing he had ever personally touched” (318).  The phrasing suggests the movement in 
time; ironically, he considers beforehand what he will review later.  The repetition of 
“old” and advancement to “oldest” lends an air of ancient knowledge; it moves onward, 
and therefore backward, with only the slight pause of the comma; Strether is taken along 
seemingly beyond his control, so that when he finally does meet with and confront the 
situation with Madame de Vionnet, he has a recursive knowledge.  Their discussion is, of 
course, not initially recounted through dialogue for the reader, but through Strether’s 
perception of Madame de Vionnet’s explanations.   
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The first chapter of Book Twelfth ends in the middle of their meeting; Strether 
recognizes Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s “eminent lie,” and as discussed in chapter 3, 
lets it “lie” as he decodes the vibration of her silence.   As their interview progresses, 
Strether is increasingly aware of their exchange, its existence in time, and how it would 
be reported later to Chad.  For the first time Strether grows impatient with Madame de 
Vionnet, and when she asks when he will leave, “he took some time to reply” (322).  All 
consciousness is suspended in time as he has his “sharpest perception yet” which is “like 
a chill in the air to him.”  He finally expresses it to Madame de Vionnet: “You’re afraid 
for your life” (322).  The physicality of the moment is apparent, as Strether moves from 
his perched position and grasps consciousness.  Now able to read Madame de Vionnet, 
Strether is the ambassador with a message, interpreted fully for himself over time and 
through physical arrests; he can articulate through his silence what it means “to be right” 
to himself.  From the tangible representation of the mind, it is a short distance to silences 
that reflect Darwinian influences as we move from the mind to the body in chapter 5.  
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Chapter Five:  Naturalized Silence 
 
In his analysis of the shift in language use in the nineteenth century, The Wisdom 
of Words, Philip Gura successfully attempts to “resurrect the topics of language and 
symbol” and “show how our writers addressed the question of ambiguity inherent in the 
gesture of human speech and so began to move in their writings as well as in their 
philosophy toward a concept of symbolic discourse” (4).   Gura’s study is not limited to 
writers of imaginative literature; instead, he traces the changes in thinking and practice in 
philosophical, religious, and imaginative writing.  He follows a movement away from 
language seen as incapable of expressing a “shimmering, ever-shifting truth” (7) to more 
Utilitarian view of language, based on Lockean premises, its truth lying in its utility.  
From there, he describes the Transcendentalist reaction against the Utilitarian restriction 
of “man’s awareness of his true spiritual nature” (35), which results in a view of language 
that seeks to “explore the promptings of intuition and to attempt a recovery of some more 
primitive accuracy to speech” (50).  Horace Bushnell believed in language “built on 
physical images” and having a double range of uses (52).  He viewed the first words 
uttered as descriptions of the “sensations of the physical objects around men—and 
arbitrarily designated.”  As such, words have very concrete origins, but ultimately 
became “‘hints or images’ to help one toward the comprehension of some fact or 
thought.”  Language evolved, according to Bushnell, mending its errors “‘by multiplying 
its forms of representation’” (62-63).    It is this multiplication of forms that has 
significance for Henry James, as his work also multiplies the forms of language, 
reflecting late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophical shifts, in the same 
way earlier views of language disclose contemporary theoretical concerns. 
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At the end of The Ambassadors, Strether has come to recognize the truth about 
many things: Chad’s relationship with Madame de Vionnet; his own relationship with 
Mrs. Newsome; Maria Gostrey’s feelings towards him; and even his own sense of moral 
behavior.  These truths are ultimately communicated to Strether and expressed in the text 
in silence that resonates with changes in the method of representation.  The concreteness 
that Emerson and Thoreau seek is supplanted in imaginative writing by symbolism, as 
described in Gura’s discussion of Hawthorne and Melville; while James does, of course, 
use symbolism, he multiplies language’s forms so that just as he manipulates other types 
of silence in order to reach more perfect expression, he depicts Strether as returning to 
more physical forms of expression.  He does this by first using broad gesture that replaces 
language and signals communication, then moving toward the more pointed meeting of 
eyes, a very specific gesture that uncovers the characters’ awareness of their 
communication, finally culminating in moments of recognition, a complex silence 
comprised of different expressions.  
Leon Edel reports that Henry James both read and met Charles Darwin in 1869.  
Edel says, “the new science, however, and the debates about determinism, was to take on 
particular meaning for him only later in its literary manifestations, in the naturalisme of
Zola” (166). Edel acknowledges naturalistic influences in The Ambassadors, however, 
when Strether implores Bilham to “Live!” (132).  Edel sees the novel’s “‘deterministic’ 
post-Darwinian philosophy” as evident in Strether’s recognition that “we are all moulds, 
‘either fluted and embossed, with ornamental excrescences, or else smooth and dreadfully 
plain, into which a helpless jelly, one’s consciousness, is poured’” (Henry James: A Life 
536).  While James was not steeped in the scientific method, it appears that he did 
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assimilate elements of Darwin’s philosophy into his fiction. Before considering James’s 
move to silence as reflecting his awareness of the Darwinian information, specifically 
man’s animal and physical nature, an overview of the ways in which Darwin addresses 
language in his writing is called for.  Darwin considers language from different 
perspectives in different works, from analyzing language as analogous to classification in 
On the Origin of Species (1859), to forming principles for the development of language 
in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), and finally to considering 
it as a reflection of psychological development and social interaction in The Descent of 
Man (1871). Language, which Gillian Beer calls “anthropomorphic by its nature and 
anthropocentric in its assumptions” and which thereby “might subvert the truth-telling 
powers of language” (Darwin’s Plots 50), viewed in light of its origins reveals its 
physical and gestural nature. These alternatives to articulated language bring one closer 
to pure, unmediated expression.  
In Darwinism and the Linguistic Image, Stephen Alter describes the linguistic 
analogue of evolutionary change, in which “languages undergo steady transformation 
over the course of time; gradualism suggested that this process took place incrementally.”   
The gradual change “always maintained a degree of continuity with the past and 
preserved, as Darwin put it, ‘traces of anterior states’” (18).  If that is the case, then we 
can read Strether’s use of physical gesture and meeting of eyes as a movement to 
expression reminiscent of what Darwin describes in The Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals. In contrast to Darwin’s examination of simple gesture, James’s use of 
physical communication is much more complex. Their shared method of expression, 
however, removes some of the barriers to knowledge. One of which, language, is said by 
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Beer to control “our apprehension of knowledge, and is itself determined by current 
historical conditions and by the order implicit in syntax, grammar and other rhetorical 
properties” (51).  Ironically, by removing language, with its imposed structure, one may 
move closer to meaning.  
In Open Fields, Beer examines Darwin’s views on language theory, indicating 
that he “uses language as metaphor, as model, and as illustration, and as an example of 
evolutionary process” (98).  Beer believes that by using the analogy of classification in 
Origin, Darwin uses linguistic theory as an “‘illustration’ of evolutionary processes.”  By 
explaining that 
the various degrees of difference in the languages from the same stock, 
would have to be expressed by groups subordinate to groups; but the 
proper or even only possible arrangement would still be genealogical; and 
this would be strictly natural, as it would connect together all languages, 
extinct and modern, by the closest affinities, and would give the filiation 
and origin of each tongue (423)   
Darwin follows the pattern of the evolution of languages, which branch out from a 
common source, to explain evolution.  Through a study of language theory, Darwin is 
able to recognize what Beer calls the “discovery of fundamental laws” (103).  Those laws 
include the “continuity between humankind and other species” that Darwin read about in 
Henry, Lord Brougham’s 1839 work Dissertations on Subjects of Science Connected with 
Natural Theology. Initially, Darwin appeared to resist Brougham’s depiction of animals’ 
use of language.  Beer reports that Darwin wrote “don’t understand” in the margin next to 
Brougham’s description of animals’ connecting action with the sign of language, which is 
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the abstraction that is the origin of all language.  Brougham calls the “sign” that is 
connected with the act  “purely arbitrary”; Beer believes that Darwin’s problem with the 
theory involved the “move from the idea of abstraction to that of language” and its 
arbitrary nature, which might have conflicted with his emphasis on “continuity and 
connection” (105).  She sees his later acceptance of the theory emerging from his 
recognition that “resemblance may in fact indicate separation,” and that “the filial 
relationship between languages was expressed through differences, not only through 
resemblances” (108).   He saw that “language study therefore provided not only 
metaphors and illustrations but also a hopeful model for future research. It seemed to 
promise the transformation of chance into ‘as yet unknown laws’” (Open Fields 109).   
 The connection between physical and linguistic evolution is made explicit when 
Darwin writes in The Descent of Man that “the survival or preservation of certain 
favoured words in the struggle for existence is natural selection” and parallels the 
“differentiation and specialization of organs.”  Darwin indicates that language may be 
viewed in the same way specialized organs are, with each having its function.  If, as 
Darwin says, “the most symmetrical and complex ought not to be ranked above irregular, 
abbreviated, and bastardized languages, which have borrowed expressive words and 
useful forms of construction from various conquering, conquered, or immigrant races” 
(113-114), then it would appear that different forms of language, if expressive and useful, 
are acceptable alternate modes of expression. Darwin considers the development of 
language from its most basic expression of emotion in The Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals to its role in the moral and social development of man in The Descent 
of Man. In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin outlines his 
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“General Principles of Expression”: the principle of serviceable associated habits; the 
principle of antithesis; and the principle of direct action of the excited nervous system on 
the body.  Within these categories, he addresses both man and other animals, noting that 
intercommunication between members of a community is crucial to social animals.  He 
observes that it is “generally effected by means of the voice, but it is certain that gestures 
and expressions are to a certain extent mutually intelligible.  Man not only uses 
inarticulate cries, gestures, and expressions, but has invented articulate language; if, 
indeed, the word invented can be applied to a process, completed by innumerable steps, 
half-consciously made” (60).  By describing language in this way, Darwin explicitly 
presents language as merely one point on a continuum of expression that includes 
gesture.  Goethe also addresses gesture in his Scientific Studies, in which he envisions a 
common descent for species, but separates man from other animals, citing human’s 
“expression of the mind” as a point of difference.  While he sees “the language of 
gesture” as “restrained in well-bred people,” he does credit it “as much as the language of 
words to elevate man above the animal” (22-23).   Here, too, one sees the value placed on 
gesture.  
Darwin fully describes a number of gestures in The Expression of Emotion,
explaining that “every true or inherited movement of expression seems to have had some 
natural and independent origin” (355), and then has come to be voluntary, aiding in 
communication, and often accompanying language.  Gesture described in relation to the 
Principles of Expression depends, of course, upon the physical nature of humans.  The 
principle of serviceable associated habits reads,  “whenever the same state of mind is 
induced . . .there is a tendency through the force of habit and association for the same 
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movements to be performed” (28).  This includes, for example, “the involuntary closing 
of the eyelids when the surface of the eye is touched,” and starting at danger, both real 
and imagined (38). Further, according to the first principle, “when any sensation, desire, 
dislike, &c., has led during a long series of generations to some voluntary movement, 
then a tendency to the performance of a similar movement will almost certainly be 
excited, whenever the same, or any analogous or associated sensation &c., although very 
weak, is experienced” (48). These physical associations express emotion and pure 
response, without intervention, and result in the principle of antithesis, which results in an 
opposite response to an opposite state of mind.  For example, Darwin explains,  
every movement which we have voluntarily performed throughout our 
lives has required the action of certain muscles; and when we have 
performed a directly opposite movement, an opposite set of muscles has 
been habitually brought into play, as in turning to the right or to the left, in 
pushing away or pulling an object towards us, and in lifting or lowering a 
weight. (64) 
The third principle, that of direct action of the excited nervous system on the body, 
accounts for expressive effects resulting from “nerve-force [which] is generated in 
excess” (29), such as “the trembling of the muscles,” which is “of no service, often of 
much disservice” (67).   These principles account for expression based on simple nerve 
response.  As pure response, it does not involve learning, or the influence of social or 
moral concerns.   
In The Descent of Man, Darwin describes verbal language as an art rather than a 
true instinct, in that it has to be learned. Owing “its origin to the imitation and 
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modification of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and man’s own 
instinctive cries, aided by signs and gestures” (109), language is comprised of varied 
means of expression, arrived at incrementally.    In parallel, Strether’s use and 
understanding of gesture has the complexity of articulated language in that it is 
influenced by and influences external response, as well as internal development.   In his 
chapter “Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals,” Darwin 
attributes man’s capacity for progressive improvement to his “power of speaking and 
handing down his acquired knowledge” (101).  Vocal language emerges from the 
“principle of the inherited effects of use,” with its continued use closely linked to the 
development of the brain.   Darwin indicates that complex thought is dependent upon the 
“aid of words, . . . spoken or silent” (110).  The “silent” words allow for the logical 
progression of ideas.  As though in illustration of this point, many of the complex 
thoughts expressed by Strether are unarticulated, both for the reader and himself, but 
nonetheless reflective of growing awareness.  For example, when Mamie Pocock arrives 
in Paris, Strether comes to see her in a new light.  He recognizes that she “was charming” 
and “was in his interest” through a series of impressions that logically unfold for Strether 
without articulation.  The awareness is called the “mark of a relation” that Strether 
recognizes as he becomes “aware of the little drama” (250).  The phrasing implies a lack 
of verbalization, yet Strether comes to understand Mamie’s perceptions and plans.  In 
fact, he “made it out . . . though with never a word passing between them all the while on 
the subject of his own predicament” as in their conversation, they speak of “everything 
but Chad.”  Further, Mamie proposes to keep Chad’s change a secret.  Her observations 
are not stated; Strether’s position is not stated; Strether logically arrives at an 
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understanding of Mamie’s position without either of them articulating it. Their exchange 
signals Strether’s development and ability to have and read complex thought without 
verbal language, but through an equally valid representation.   
Labeling “Imagination” (sic) “one of the highest prerogatives of man,” Darwin 
credits it with contributing to the development of the moral being.  Through imagination, 
one “unites former images and ideas . . . and thus creates brilliant and novel results” (95). 
A moral being is one who “is capable of comparing his past and future actions or 
motives, and of approving or disapproving of them” (135). 6 The moral being recognizes 
the relationship between past events and results, and visualizes the effects of his own 
actions, weighing them in relation to social good.  Social instincts, says Darwin, “still 
give the impulse to some of [man’s] best actions” and emerge from the “wishes, 
approbation, and blame of his fellow-men, as expressed by their language and gestures" 
(133).  This situation is illustrated by Strether, who ultimately emerges from his 
experience aware of his moral and social responsibility, reading it in the language of 
gesture.   
In his work Literary Darwinism, Joseph Carroll reads texts through their ability to 
provide for the reader a “sense of psychological order.” It is through “stories and verse 
and dramatic enactments” that “we realize our deeper nature” and “situate ourselves 
 
6 Samuel Taylor Coleridge defines the imagination in Biographia Literaria (1817) in contrast with fancy.  
Coleridge divides the imagination into primary and secondary, with primary imagination described as “the 
living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM.”  He considers secondary imagination “an echo of the former, co-
existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and 
differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation.  It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-
create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still, at all events, it struggles to idealize and to 
unify” (167).  In that both definitions of imagination result in the creation of an idealized self, they suggest 
Strether’s redefinition of self as a result of his ability to perceive past action, and envision a future self, in 
Strether’s case, as moral man. Darwin’s definition is consistent with Coleridge’s as in each case, actions 
and possibilities may be examined, and synthesis arrived at in creation of self. 
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consciously within our environments and organize the feelings and thoughts through 
which we regulate our behavior” (116).  Carroll describes the reader’s experience, which 
mirrors Strether’s experience.  Strether’s decision to return to the United States is a result 
of his desire “to be right.”    He establishes his place in relation to his social world, 
Woollett, and Mrs. Newsome, and realizes what he must do to behave morally and for the 
common good.  It is evident to the reader that Strether would prefer to stay with Maria 
rather than to face the unknown, anticipating Mrs. Newsome’s wrath. Instead, he sees his 
mission through, so that a sense of social order is maintained.    
In his portrayal of Strether’s changing social sense and his understanding of 
gesture to convey it, James frames the novel within a Darwinian context.  According to 
Stephen Alter in Darwinism and the Linguistic Image, “the Descent passage7 suggested 
that naturalistic mechanisms sufficed for producing both linguistic and biological 
development” (104).   Alter suggests that by establishing parallels between the two types 
of development, Darwin “supported his antidesign view of nature: the innumerable 
trifling variations in the long history of language, so many of them eliminated rather than 
selected, were hard to reconcile with divine purpose” (103).  Variation among languages 
invites further change: silence that incorporates diverse means of expression, in this case 
gesture, which allows for communication when existing forms fail. With this in mind, it 
is time to turn to the use of physical representation for silent language.  
 
7 Alter discusses Darwin’s passage in Descent, in which Darwin summarizes the beginnings of language:  
“I cannot doubt that language owes its origin to the imitation and modification of various natural sounds, 
the voices of other animals, and man’s own instinctive cries, aided by signs and gestures.”  According to 
Alter, this passage establishes a series of ten analogies between language and biological development.  He 
cites: the community of descent and similar formation resulting in homologies; the variational symmetry 
paralleling sound correspondences; the existence of sound rudiments as counterparts to vestigial organs; the 
classification of languages artificially or naturally; the competition for dominance among languages; the 
extinction of languages as with species; the blending of languages; and finally, the survival of a semantic 
variation based on its “novelty and fashion.”  These analogies pave the way for a consideration of the 
development of gestural language as a variation of articulated language. 
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The category “gesture,” while broad, introduces the reader to the sweeping, yet 
meaningful language of movement.  Michael Corballis writes of gesture as being “as 
‘natural’ to the human condition as is spoken language,” and provides a “visual, iconic 
component that can provide extra information or circumvent prolonged explanation.”  
Verbal language and gesture, according to Corballis, emerge from the same neural 
systems, which suggests an inextricable relationship.  He asserts, “gestures are not 
haphazardly associated with speech; they can convey information in a systematic way.” 
Corballis cites, in fact, a study which indicates that communication through gesture is 
innate and rather uniform, as those congenitally blind persons observed routinely 
gestured as they spoke, and used gestures similar to sighted people (2).  Through 
evolution, there is a shift to vocalized language, but as Darwin describes, the physical 
memory of gesture remains. 
George Levine, citing The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in his 
discussion of Darwin and Dickens, observes  
just as, for Darwin, organisms are connected by physical inheritance, so 
moral and emotional states are expressed by physiological activity 
directed at physical defense and relief.  All those aspects of human 
identity and experience that are traditionally regarded as uniquely human, 
connected with spiritual states unavailable to lower organisms, are in fact 
physical conditions shared by other organisms.    (Darwin and the 
Novelists 146)
An emotional state is revealed through gesture when, soon after meeting Chad and 
revealing his task to him, Strether gives Chad as much information as he can. Of course, 
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the reader is not privy to the actual conversation that takes place; rather, James describes 
Chad’s reaction through gesture:  
He walked up and down in front of this production, sociably took 
Strether’s arm at the points at which he stopped, surveyed it repeatedly 
from the right and from the left, inclined a critical head to either quarter, 
and, while he puffed a still more critical cigarette, animadverted to his 
companion on this passage and that.   (104)   
While James does tell the reader that Chad “animadverted,” the content of his verbal 
criticism is not revealed. His gesture, however, finds Strether “thrown back on a felt need 
to remodel somehow his plan.”  Clearly, the language of gesture is meaningful; in this 
encounter it reflects Chad and Strether’s interplay, Strether’s reaction, and his 
reconsideration of his action. The gestures become a subtle dance of exchanged meaning; 
the reader watches a dramatization of their exchange in which the information is referred 
to as a “production” which is “surveyed.”  In fact, James’s choice of the vivid word 
“animadverted” underscores this sense.  The reader as onlooker does not know the nature 
of Chad’s critique, but witnesses Strether’s attention being directed.  The derivation of 
“animadvert,” according to the American Heritage Dictionary, is from the Latin “to turn 
toward,” which suggests the word’s tangible and visual nature. A pantomime is enacted 
between the two.  The gestures described, including the inclination of Chad’s head and 
his taking Strether’s arm, emphasize the physical nature of their communication and 
Chad’s manipulation of Strether.  Chad appears to be directing the show; Strether 
considers “remodeling” his plan, which is, again, a very tangible way of referring to the 
exchange of information, and suggests a certain manipulation on Chad’s part, both 
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physical, through his grasping Strether’s arm, and psychological, as Strether reconsiders 
his plan.  Chad’s gesture and unreported conversation convinces Strether that Chad is 
free: “his changed state, his lovely home, his beautiful things, his easy talk, his very 
appetite for Strether, insatiable and, when all was said, flattering—what were such 
marked matters all but the notes of his freedom?” (104).  Strether may be said to be 
actively engaging his imagination, as Darwin suggests, examining past and present 
actions and determining future plans; however, he is doing so based upon a misreading.   
In contrast with his later epiphany when he sights Chad and Madame de Vionnet, 
Strether is not yet privy to the workings of the language of gesture, so that he cannot 
accurately read the real meaning behind Chad’s gesture.  Nor can the reader, who is 
dependent upon Strether’s point of view for understanding the circumstances and Chad’s 
ability to manipulate Strether’s perceptions.  Strether’s interpretative ability has clearly 
developed later, when he sights Chad and Madame de Vionnet and can infuse her 
gestures to Chad with meaning.  From a glance, Strether  
became aware, with this, of what was taking place—that her immediate 
impulse had been to control it, and that she was quickly and intensely 
debating with Chad the risk of betrayal. He saw they would show nothing 
if they could feel sure he hadn’t made them out; so that he had before him 
for a few seconds his own hesitation.  It was a sharp fantastic crisis that 
had popped up as if in a dream, and it had had only to last the few seconds 
to make him feel it as quite horrible. They were thus, on either side, trying 
the other side, and all for some reason that broke the stillness like some 
unprovoked harsh note.  (308) 
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The diction suggests immediacy, and even violence.  It is a turning point for Strether, a 
moment which turns on a sharpness and harshness as he is jolted to awareness. The 
“unprovoked harsh note” is in marked contrast with he earlier “notes of [Chad’s] 
freedom” which Strether accepts without analysis. 
Each experience that Strether has with gesture heightens his ability to read and 
use it as an adequate replacement for language.  The novel represents Strether’s 
development in accelerated form.  It is useful here to consider Gerald M. Edelman’s 
description of Darwin’s sense of the “evolutionary origin of the human mind,” and how 
“the morphology underlying behavior arose during evolutionary history, and how 
behavior itself alters natural selection” (45).  Behavior connects, but is not limited to, 
gesture in this context.    The connection among gesture, behavior, and interpretation is 
made even more explicit when Strether “reads” Chad’s behavior as the narrator reports 
the contents of Strether’s missive to Mrs. Newsome after having met Madame de 
Vionnet.  While not reported verbatim, the letter’s contents and omissions are revealed.  
Strether gauges his behavior as “still all right” by reflecting “on the unimpaired 
frequency of their correspondence.”  His communication with Mrs. Newsome reflects the 
morality of his actions, and “he now often brought himself balm by the question, with the 
rich consciousness of yesterday’s letter, ‘Well, what can I do more than that—what can I 
do more than tell her everything?’  To persuade himself that he did tell her, had told her, 
everything, he used to try to think of particular things he hadn’t told her.”   Strether 
justifies his omitting telling “Mrs. Newsome that he promised to ‘save’ Madame de 
Vionnet” by telling himself “so far as he was concerned with that reminiscence, he hadn’t 
at any rate promised to haunt her house.”  Doing and telling appear interchangeable as 
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Strether is learning to read his own actions, Mrs. Newsome’s reactions, and Chad’s 
responses.  In fact, “what Chad had understood could only in truth, be inferred from 
Chad’s behaviour, which had been in this connexion as easy as in every other” (153).  
Strether’s cannot yet wholly read Chad’s behaviour, a type of gesture, perhaps because 
Chad is able to manipulate gesture and adjust his reactions to and expectations of 
Strether. 
Chad’s use of gesture may be seen in contrast with Maria Gostrey’s, who both 
provides Strether with insight and uses the power of language and gesture to further her 
own purpose of drawing Strether in.  From early on, they communicate almost intuitively, 
as when Maria “arrived, at the end of a week, [and] she made him a sign” (79), upon 
which he immediately visits her. The reader does not know what the sign is, but the 
connotation suggests something extra-lingual.  Throughout the novel she is more aware 
than Strether of the true nature of Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship; in fact, 
she absents herself from the scene at times, presumably so that she does not reveal too 
much and thereby influence Strether’s actions.  Maria’s awareness is illustrated in an 
exchange between the two upon her return from London in the third chapter of Book 
Seventh. Strether fills her in on the developments since her departure.  This is a 
significant vignette, in which a number of literal and figurative “turns” take place and 
reflect Strether and Maria’s communication.  When, at the beginning of the chapter, she 
learns that Strether has received a cable from Mrs. Newsome requesting his return, she 
“just escaped changing colour.  Reflexion arrived but in time and established a 
provisional serenity.  It was perhaps exactly this that enabled her to say with duplicity: 
‘And you’re going--?’” (190).   The exchange reflects a blend of gestural language and 
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conscious manipulation of expression.   Maria manages to stop herself from “changing 
colour,” controlling her gestural language; instead, she communicates duplicitously with 
articulated language. She reflects and makes a comment that furthers her desired goal.  
Presumably, if she does not change color, Strether is unaware of her ingenuous response, 
and so can read only her words at this point.  It is her absence and silence that ultimately 
allow Strether to develop and begin to be able to read beyond language.  As Maria tells 
Strether, “My absence has helped you—as I’ve only to look at you to see.  It was my 
calculation, and I’m justified.  You’re not where you were.  . . . You’ve got your 
momentum and can toddle alone” (190).   Still at the “toddling” stage, Strether has indeed 
progressed in his ability to read situations, but he is not yet capable of reading beyond 
carefully constructed responses, as he will be later in the novel. 
 Reunited, Maria and Strether communicate in a number of ways, indicated in 
very concrete terms.  Strether informs Maria that he told Chad that he wants both himself 
and Chad to stay, and Maria “turned it over.”  The “turn” suggests both her reading of 
Chad’s remark, saying “he wants then himself to stay,” and her contemplation of 
Strether’s exchange with Chad, which signals his growing ability to manage interaction.  
When Strether and Maria discuss Mamie, whom they see as Mrs. Newsome’s and the 
Pococks’ “great card” in trying to bring Chad home, Strether reveals that the Pococks 
will be coming; Maria is “quite in the current now and floating by his side” as he 
responds with “contemplative silence”  (193).  The implication is that they are sharing a 
moment of consciousness, or awareness.  They agree that they are “sorry” for Mamie, but 
Strether concedes, “it can’t be helped” (193).  When Maria asks for clarification, Strether 
“explained after another turn what he meant.”  The “turn” may refer, of course, to his 
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moving about the room, but in the context of their analyses, it suggests a “turn” in 
consciousness, treating his understanding of the situation as Maria does Strether’s 
development, a specimen to be held up and examined.  The concrete nature of their 
communication is underscored when “they had come so far as this without sounding 
another name—to which however their present momentary silence was full of a 
conscious reference” (193).  The name, of course, is Madame de Vionnet’s, whose 
presence pervades their silence.  Both Maria and Strether feel its significance, and finally, 
“a single gesture from her could pass for him as a vivid answer,” but because Strether is 
still not fully adept at reading gesture, what would be a “vivid answer,” Maria then asks 
him if Chad will introduce Sara Pocock to Madame de Vionnet.  Strether responds, “I 
shall be greatly surprised if he doesn’t.”  Maria “seemed to gaze at the possibility” (194), 
assessing both the response and the event in concrete terms. Strether, too, is beginning to 
assess the situation, reading the significance of the parts played by each member of the 
Newsome family, and his role among them. He is not ready to return to the United States 
at this moment in the novel, nor does he want Chad to return; he wants the opportunity to 
read and understand Chad’s development more fully.  Conscious of his social milieu, 
Strether examines his behavior and the “rightness” of it, considering his promises to Mrs. 
Newsome and the impact his treatment of Chad may have on them.  His letters to Mrs. 
Newsome “make him come nearer than anything else to the consciousness of doing 
something” (194), but he begins to question his own honesty and motives in writing 
them, seeing himself as “some master of the great new science of beating the sense out of 
words” (194).  Strether becomes aware of the artifice of his letters, and is somewhat 
uncomfortable with it; in fact “it had become quite his habit not to like to read himself 
164
over” (194).  The writing is equated here with the self, and Strether is aware of how he 
and his communication have changed.  This scene, approximately midway through the 
novel, shows Strether evaluating his role in maintaining social order and development, all 
the while on his way to recognizing the use of alternate expression.  
Maria’s restraint and control of gesture indicates her ability to control 
communication and, to some degree, manipulate Strether, but he too begins to understand 
and read more fully as the emphasis in communication shifts from the broad and 
indistinct gesture to more pointed interaction, in which characters experience real 
communication through eye contact. The shift begins in subtle ways, as for example, 
Strether moves about as Maria’s “eyes followed him” in the scene just discussed; just as 
she “gazed at the possibility,” Strether too begins to take “another turn,” eschewing broad 
gesture until he is later able to read the glance between Chad and Madame de Vionnet 
“under this odd impression as of violence averted—the violence of their having ‘cut’ him, 
out there in the eye of nature” (309).  The use of the eye, eye contact, and the metaphoric 
“eye of nature” implies pointed reading.  Strether’s development is incumbent upon his 
going beyond impression to what William James terms “knowledge about” (Principles of 
Psychology I, 259).    Eye contact, which becomes Strether’s means of going beyond 
impression, takes on even greater significance in the context of Darwin’s emphasis on the 
eye.  He addresses the eyes’ connection to a number of emotions and conditions, 
including the more complex states of reflection and meditation, contending that  
vision is the most important of all the senses and during primeval times 
the closest attention must have been incessantly directed towards distant 
objects for the sake of obtaining prey and avoiding danger; there is indeed 
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much analogy, as far as the state of the mind is concerned, between 
intently scrutinizing a distant object, and following out an obscure train of 
thought .  .  .  (The Expression of the Emotions 224)   
James adds to the myriad functions of vision as it becomes, for Strether, an opportunity 
for understanding. 
For the eye, “with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to 
different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of 
spherical and chromatic aberration,” to have evolved through natural selection seems, 
according to Darwin, “absurd in the highest possible degree”  (Origin 186).  He 
concludes, however, that it did develop through “numerous gradations” (186).   Gillian 
Beer discusses Darwin’s sense of what she calls “incongruence between mind and world” 
based upon “insufficient or imperfect adaptations.”   She concludes that Hermann 
Helmholtz’s canceling the “Wordsworthian ‘pre-existing harmony’ between mind and 
material world” was important for Darwin. While harmony may ultimately exist, it is 
“created through process, by means of according sequences, provisional always in that 
they are held within time, though capable of incessant renewal” (Darwin’s Plots 75).  
Harmony between mind and the world is created through an on-going negotiation. The 
movement towards harmony is paralleled by Strether’s negotiation with his own 
consciousness and social world through eye contact.   
Strether’s experiences throughout the novel with virtually every character result in 
significant realizations.  His encounters through the glance will not be examined in 
strictly chronological order, but rather through interaction with other characters as each 
one influences him differently. In his first encounter with Chad after the play, Strether 
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and he come face to face, and while the reader is not privy to Strether’s words, his 
reaction to Chad’s look is made clear: “It was the kind of consciousness for which he had 
to thank the look that, while the strain lasted, the young man’s eyes gave him. They 
reflected—and the deuce of the thing was that they reflected really with a sort of shyness 
of kindness—his momentarily disordered state” (94).  Strether fears, from this look, that 
Chad will feel sorry for him, and quickly follows with an explanation, and when asked by 
Chad if he looks improved, Strether responds that he does not know. In Strether’s 
recollection, he feels dissatisfied with his answer.  While this might not seem to be an 
ideal means of communication, one must remember that Strether’s early contact with 
Chad is inconclusive; Chad does mislead Strether. The conditionality of the language, 
setting off commentary with dashes that qualify with prepositional phrases, contributes to  
James’s depiction of Strether’s sense of disorder as the “reflection” is muddled. This very 
early encounter, however, establishes communication through eye contact as Strether 
learns to read and adjust his focus, in both literal and figurative ways.   
Soon after this, Chad introduces Strether to Jeanne de Vionnet at Gloriani’s party, 
and Strether misreads the truth of their relationship.  The emphasis on vision is striking; 
again, the reader feels suspended in time with Strether, as he watches Chad and 
Mademoiselle de Vionnet approach.  Strether and Bilham have just had their crucial 
conversation, ending with Strether’s imploring Bilham to “Live!” and Strether is about to 
reveal whom he would most be like.  The response is delayed as Strether’s attention is 
caught, and the presentation is clearly visual, as Chad and Jeanne come into focus.  The 
language intensifies, as “what was presently clear” becomes “clearer still” and then “was 
clearest of all.”  This phrase is repeated, as it is “clearest of all” not just that Jeanne 
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accompanies Chad, but with “the click of a spring—he saw the truth” (133). The truth 
that Strether reads is that Chad’s attachment is to Jeanne, which is, of course, incorrect.  
This happens upon his having “met Chad’s look.”  Strether is using vision to recognize 
objects and relationships, as well as to come to conclusions about truths.  He is not yet at 
the point of interpreting truth since his consciousness is still somewhat vague, despite his 
thinking he knows the truth about Chad.  Strether’s vision still needs sharpening and 
focus. 
An extended section in Chapter III of Book Sixth demonstrates the emerging use 
of a look in relation to understanding.  The section begins with Strether engaged in 
conversation with Madame de Vionnet, and the narrator’s recalling Strether’s earlier 
exchange with Chad: “Twice during dinner he had met Chad’s eyes in a longish look; but 
these communications had in truth only stirred up again old ambiguities—so little was it 
clear from them whether they were an appeal or an admonition.”  He goes on to 
comment, “perhaps he should see now” (161).  The narrative intrusion calls attention to 
Chad and Strether’s exchange, Strether’s inability to interpret the “longish look,” and its 
place in what follows.  The conversation with Madame de Vionnet reveals that she has 
been misleading Strether about Jeanne and Chad, recognizable to Strether and the reader 
when finally, “though his eyes had been wandering he looked at her longer now. ‘I see 
what you mean’” (163).  Strether’s situation becomes even more complicated when he 
recognizes that he “hadn’t detached, he had more closely connected himself” as “his 
eyes, as he considered with some intensity this circumstance, met another pair which had 
just come within their range and which struck him as reflecting his sense of what he had 
done” (164).  The eyes are Bilham’s; notice the development from the ambiguity of his 
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glance with Chad, to his knowledge through his exchanged glance with Bilham.  While 
his reading is still not wholly accurate since he believes in Bilham’s version of Chad and 
Mme. de Vionnet’s “virtuous attachment,” he is moving towards fuller knowledge. 
Perhaps he’s somewhat limited because Bilham does not fully return his gaze when, after 
describing the nature of Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s friendship as “the finest thing I 
ever saw in my life,” Strether “dropped on him a momentary look which filled a short 
interval and of which he took no notice.  He only gazed before him with intent 
participation” (166).  While not getting the full picture, Strether does recognize Mme. de 
Vionnet’s influence on Chad, his development of “manners and morals” and into what 
Strether terms a “social animal” (167).  The appellation has Darwinian overtones, as 
Darwin describes social instinct as playing a major part in man’s moral development.  
Discussing Chad’s changed character with Bilham, Strether confirms Bilham’s 
observation that it is as “a social animal that you also want him” (168).  Strether believes 
that through their friendship, Chad and Madame de Vionnet are “straight, they feel; and 
they keep each other up” (168).   Strether, too, is considering his best move for Chad’s 
development and future place in society, and while he is reading it incorrectly, he sees 
development in terms of being “straight,” or “right,” much in the way he will view his 
own behavior at the novel’s completion. This chapter is quite complex in its portrayal of 
Strether’s emerging glance and understanding; he is interacting with characters who are 
misleading him, and he cannot quite read that yet.  James presents this physically through 
the missed or ambiguous glances, or the suspension of a character’s gaze.  For 
communication through meeting eyes, full exchange is needed. 
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Such a development occurs in Strether’s relationship with Chad after Strether’s 
epiphany about Chad and Madame de Vionnet during his trip to the countryside.  In 
conversation with him afterwards, Strether acknowledges their relationship, and his belief 
that Chad should not leave Madame de Vionnet.  There is a self-consciousness about the 
words, of course, “once he had heard himself say it he felt that his message had never 
before been spoken,” implying the transience of the spoken word.  However, Strether 
then “met his eyes with a sense of multiplying thoughts” (335), and at that point reaches 
consciousness about his own changing perceptions and feelings towards Chad and 
Madame de Vionnet’s situation.  Then Strether speaks, but not what he is thinking.  His 
recognition of Chad’s change and justification of his insistence that Chad stay with 
Madame de Vionnet is enacted through his exchanged glance with Chad.  It is from this 
moment that Strether and Chad can communicate forthrightly, about Chad and Madame 
de Vionnet’s relationship, about whether Strether feels Chad should stay or return to the 
United States, about Chad’s changed personality, and ultimately about Strether’s change 
as evidenced by his urging Chad to act against his mother’s wishes.  At this point, 
Strether is in control of the exchange as “he turned his eyes away, and they lost 
themselves, through the open window, in the dusky outer air.”  When he turns back to 
Chad, “the light of his plural pronoun was sufficiently reflected in his companion’s face 
as he again met it; and he completed his demonstration” (336).  Strether makes Chad 
aware that he has decided that Chad has an obligation not to return to the United States.  
Following the exchanged glances, Strether verbalizes his position.  The evolution of 
Strether’s articulated language and awareness of what it means to be “right” is closely 
intertwined with the evolution of his gestural language. 
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Strether’s changing relationships with others are also chronicled through his 
gestural encounters.  His exchanges with Waymarsh, for example, are crucial in 
registering his changes: when he first meets Waymarsh in Chester, Strether is bound by 
his sense of obligation to the ways of Milrose.  As he progresses, however, Strether 
becomes more uncomfortable with Waymarsh and feels a schism; recall that even at the 
beginning of the novel, Strether is somewhat relieved that Waymarsh is unable to meet 
him immediately.  Strether meets with Waymarsh at a crucial moment in plot and 
character development; interestingly, Waymarsh’s presence does not further the plot at 
all, so that the scene between them seems superfluous.  It does, however, provide 
momentary reflection for Strether, accomplished through their meeting eyes.  Strether has 
received, in Chapter II of Book Seventh, a telegram delivering Mrs. Newsome’s 
ultimatum: return with or without Chad.  He picks up the telegram just as he is about to 
meet Waymarsh for dinner, but does not reveal its contents to him.  Instead, Waymarsh, 
unnoticed, watches Strether read the telegram until Strether looks up.  Strether then “saw 
Waymarsh watching him from within.  It was on this that their eyes met—met for a 
moment during which neither moved” (182).  Strether decides to say nothing about the 
telegram, but it is clear that something significant occurs between them.  While “our 
friend had moreover the consciousness that even less than usual was on this occasion said 
between them,” more seems to happen between them.  The moment during which their 
eyes meet is reflective; the repetition of “met” before and after the dash has a mirroring 
effect.  After contemplation, Strether makes the conscious decision to exclude Waymarsh 
from the developments in his situation.  Finally, Strether “closed the door to confidence” 
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by evading Waymarsh’s direct question. In doing so, Strether is, in effect, choosing sides, 
deciding that Waymarsh is allied with Mrs. Newsome, and that he no longer is. 
Interestingly, Strether’s development may be gauged, to a large degree, through 
his interaction with Waymarsh.  Later, when Waymarsh is more involved with the 
Pococks, Strether detects dishonesty in Waymarsh’s response to him.  Waymarsh tells 
Strether that he and the Pococks will be leaving Paris for Switzerland.  Strether asks 
about the contents of Mrs. Newsome’s cable to Sarah, to which Waymarsh responds, “I 
know nothing about Mrs. Newsome’s cables.”  It becomes clear to Strether that 
Waymarsh is withholding information from him, but only as  
their eyes met on it with some intensity—during the few seconds of which 
something happened quite out of proportion to the time.  It happened that 
Strether, looking thus at his friend, didn’t take his answer for truth—and 
that something more again occurred in consequence of that. (272)          
From this point on, Strether is able to read both Waymarsh and his situation with Mrs. 
Newsome accurately, hearing the “false note” (272) in Waymarsh’s speech and 
through that, “the conscience of Milrose in the very voice of Milrose” (273).  
Following this recognition, Strether directly confronts Waymarsh’s challenge, telling 
him, “I know what I’m about” (274).  It is clear that Strether is beginning to have a 
sense of his emerging self. 
As Strether approaches the moment of his greater change, the trip to the 
countryside during which recognizes the truth about the relationship between Chad 
and Madame de Vionnet, he becomes very conscious of Waymarsh’s, and by 
extension, Milrose’s and Woollett’s judgment of him.  Moments before Strether sees 
172
Chad and Madame de Vionnet together, he visualizes the remainder of his day, which 
he sees as culminating in a “fine and felicitous” dinner before his return to the city on 
the 9:20 train.  He envisions a conversation with the carriage driver who would bring 
him to the train, and in doing so, would “tell him what the French people were 
thinking, and remind him, as indeed the whole episode would incidentally do, of 
Maupassant” (302).   Strether initially sees the real in terms of art; he views the 
landscape as a Lambinet painting, and associates his imagined interactions with 
Maupassant’s fiction.  He hopes to find authenticity, even picturing washing down his 
dinner “with authentic wine” (302).  Through his encounter with Chad and Madame 
de Vionnet, however, Strether will be plunged into the real.  But as he approaches the 
climactic moment, Strether is finally beginning to recognize his authentic self, as he 
“heard his lips, for the first time in French air, as this vision assumed consistency, emit 
sounds of expressive intention without fear of his company” (303).  It is not revealed 
what these sounds are; are they actual words?  Are they in French, about which he 
might be fearful of his accent, or are they in English, in which case he would be 
fearful of their content?  Regardless of which, the narrator articulates that Strether  
had been afraid of Chad and of Maria and of Madame de Vionnet; he had 
been most of all afraid of Waymarsh, in whose presence, so far as they had 
mixed together in the light of the town, he had never without somehow 
paying for it aired either his vocabulary or his accent.  He usually paid for 
it by meeting immediately afterwards Waymarsh’s eye.  (302-3)  
Notice the complex sentence structure in which the adverbial prepositional phrase 
“without somehow paying for it” precedes “aired,” the verb it modifies. Strether is, in 
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effect, concretely turning the phrases around and examining them, as he analyzes his 
relationship with Waymarsh.  Significantly, Waymarsh’s judgment is conveyed to 
Strether as they meet eyes.  Strether is aware of this and the narrator explicitly states it 
as Strether is about to experience a shaping revelation about Chad and Madame de 
Vionnet, and ultimately, himself.  After his encounter with the pair, and recognition of 
their relationship, Strether makes the conscious decision to return to Woollett having 
failed in his assigned mission.  He comes to recognize his “authentic” self, one distinct 
from Mrs. Newsome and Woollett, whose judgment is reflected by Waymarsh and the 
voice of Milrose.  While his interactions with Waymarsh may seem superfluous to the 
text, they are, in fact, crucial, as it is through them that Strether’s changing social 
impulse is emerging.  True to the Darwinian model of self-actualization, Strether 
recognizes his deeper nature and regulates his behavior through those glances, 
ultimately realizing that he no longer has a place in Waymarsh’s social world.   
While Waymarsh serves as a moral judge for Strether, it is Maria Gostrey who 
emerges as his touchstone.  As noted above, from the time of their meeting the two 
engage in meaningful exchanges. Their glances are particularly rich.  When they first 
try to make sense of Chad’s “attachment,” Strether and Maria “exchanged a look—a 
look that was perhaps the longest yet. It seemed in fact, the next thing, to require to 
explain itself; which it did as it could” (117).  The exchange is structurally represented 
by the mirrored phrase “a look” which extends the duration of the reading, and 
thereby, the look.  At this point in their communication, further discussion is required, 
but still does not get them to truth.  As the novel progresses, of course, a great deal of 
knowledge passes between them, so much so that Maria must absent herself from 
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Strether’s presence so that she is not too great an influence on him.  As she tells 
Strether upon her return from London, and as noted earlier, “my absence has helped 
you—as I’ve only to look at you to see.  It was my calculation, and I’m justified.  
You’re not where you were.  . . . You can go of yourself” (190).  By leaving Strether 
alone, Maria has compelled him to read his environment carefully. 
As Maria and Strether approach the end of the novel, and their time together, 
Strether achieves a greater sense of autonomy.  While waiting to hear back from Chad to 
address Strether’s reaction to his revelation about Chad and Madame de Vionnet, Strether 
spends time with Maria.  He shows her some amusements; he is no longer the tourist, 
feeling, in fact, “an odd sense of leading her about Paris” (325).  The knowledge of place 
reflects Strether’s growing knowledge of himself, and they spend the day without 
discussing “the matter they had talked of to satiety.”  While the topic remains 
unaddressed, “she gave herself up to him with an understanding of which mere mute 
gentleness might have seemed the sufficient expression” and “she met [his sense of the 
situation] with a new directness of response, measuring it from hour to hour with her 
grave hush of acceptance” (326).  She leaves questions unasked, and they accept one 
another’s knowledge, conveyed through silent recognition, which deepens through their 
on-going encounters and exchanges, including those of glances. 
By the end of the novel the two appear equally matched in insight.  When he 
meets Maria for the last time in her dining room, Strether and Maria sit across the table 
from one another.  He sees even the dining room differently, as it becomes for him 
“sacred to pleasant knowledge, to intimate charm, to antique order,” perhaps infused with 
his newly gained knowledge and sense of moral self.  Again, the glance is significant, as 
175
to Strether, “to sit there was . . . to see life reflected for the time in ideally kept pewter; 
which was somehow becoming, improving to life, so that one’s eyes were held and 
comforted” (340).  The reflection provides for Strether an emerging recognition, a type of 
silence in which the other types of silence culminate.  It begins with the comforting 
knowledge Strether gains upon literal and figurative reflection.  Maria and Strether come 
face to face, a phrase repeated throughout the novel, as if facing their reflections in a 
mirror, signaling the understanding he has arrived at upon contemplation, or figurative 
reflection.  As Strether begins to explain to Maria that he must leave, “they fronted each 
other, across the table, as if things unuttered were in the air” (341).  The exchange is 
difficult for them both; while they reach and express the recognition of truth and 
consciousness, Strether averts his glance, focusing “his eyes on a small ripe round 
melon” (341).  It is only after Maria cuts and serves Strether the melon that “he met her 
question.”  The sequence implies that the meeting is in their exchanged look, and Strether 
is finally willing and able to acknowledge it and his sense of moral and social obligation. 
Ruth Yeazell captures Strether’s position when she describes him as having “long 
been in the uncomfortable position of sensing more than he can allow himself to know. . . 
for the very rhythms of James’s late style enact this relentless unfolding of awareness; in 
the language itself we sense the peculiar force with which knowledge—half-dreaded, 
half-desired—thrusts itself upon the conscious mind” (25).  While he has been dodging 
full knowledge throughout, Strether must finally confront it, again literally and 
figuratively, as he fronts Maria across the table and meets her eye.   It is the culmination 
of smaller moments of recognition approached earlier.  Early in his encounters with 
Madame de Vionnet, Strether sees her as a woman who can make a “relation of mere 
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recognition” (150) with Madame de Vionnet.  He has some insight into her dealings with 
others.  Later, as he sits with Mamie, Strether feels the “signal growth of a confidence” 
and recognizes that she is on his side (249). Later still, he participates in an exchange 
with Miss Barrace in which she tells him that Madame de Vionnet is helping him, and 
they see “the quantity in each other’s face.” In each of these moments, though, the 
recognition is not complete as “links were missing and connexions unnamed” (266). In 
all his relationships, connections are not explicitly made, but Strether can fill in the 
connections himself with an accurate reading of gesture.  He attains the half-dreaded, 
half-desired knowledge, truths about others and his own moral sense, at the end of the 
novel.  
In the novel’s final pages, we see Strether, after being served the melon by Maria 
and meeting her question, able to “see” several things, about Chad, Mrs. Newsome, and 
himself.  Their conversation returns to his never having disclosed the “article produced at 
Woollett” (342).  While he is willing to reveal this information and recollects so much of 
their earliest encounter, Maria no longer wants to know, as she is “done with the products 
of Woollett” (342).  She brings up the topic only as a reminder that they had wondered 
where Strether would “come out,” and they now see.  While Maria tries to get a definitive 
response from Strether about his projections concerning Chad’s possible actions, Strether 
does not respond satisfactorily, “pleading with her in various suggestive and unspoken 
ways for patience and understanding” (342).  Strether has reached his defining moment, 
and can no longer be influenced by Maria.  When he acknowledges that he is returning to 
a changed relationship with Mrs. Newsome, Maria believes it’s because Strether sees 
Mrs. Newsome differently. His response signals his recognition: “She’s the same.  She’s 
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more than ever the same.  But I do what I didn’t before—I see her” (342-3).  
Interestingly, his recognition is conveyed in physical terms—he “sees” rather than 
“knows.”  Only through the physical is knowledge clear to Strether. 
It is through these moments of awareness that James perches Strether at the 
threshold of consciousness and modern literature. On the final page of the novel, Strether 
has, as Maria Gostrey observes, “wonderful impressions,” and has become aware that 
everything rests “on selection” which itself is “ruled” by “beauty and knowledge.” The 
selection involves the choice that Strether makes concerning his future.  Of course, its 
resting on “selection” recalls Darwin’s language, just as Strether becomes the moral 
being Darwin describes in The Descent of Man. As discussed earlier, Darwin describes 
man as a social being guided in his interaction with others through his instinct combined 
with “improved intellectual faculties.”  James assimilates Darwinian information, with 
the language of the novel conveying Strether’s figurative reflection in physical terms; 
through gesture and eye contact, he is finally able to capture past impressions and images, 
and combined with an ability to visualize, makes a decision which he views as morally 
“right.”  In describing the difference between man and lower animals, Darwin calls the 
“moral sense or conscience” the most important factor, “summed up in that short but 
imperious word ought, so full of high significance” (Descent 120).  Strether’s accelerated 
evolution is real; his fully developed conscience and consciousness lead him to make a 
decision that may not be the one he prefers, but as seen in his discussion with Maria, 
there is no other decision he would consider making.  Strether “knows” that he must 
return, but does not know to what he will return.  He is at a decisive and transitional 
moment in his evolution as a consciously moral being; the evolution is psychological and 
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social.  The physical languages of gesture and the meeting of eyes recall pre-linguistic 
state, what today is known as mentalese, but far surpass it with the introduction of 
recognition, or awareness of the workings of consciousness.   
Strether and Maria’s final exchange is rich with physical language and 
terminology that recall William James’s chapter on “Instinct.”  Strether deems his 
decision “to be right” his “only logic” (344).  Maria’s responds, “with your wonderful 
impressions you’ll have got a great deal” (345).  While she does not like his going, she 
accepts it and credits his “horrible sharp eye” for being right.  Being right is a factor in 
William James’s description of instinct, about which he says “every impulse and every 
step of every instinct shines with its own sufficient light, and seems at the moment the 
only eternally right and proper thing to do” (Principles of Psychology II, 387).  Instinct is 
not always the same for humans as for other animals; it is modified, for example, by 
logic. James explains, “owing to man’s memory, power of reflection, and power of 
inference” instincts are no longer termed “blind,” but are “felt by him . . . in connection 
with a foresight of those results” (390).   He continues later in the chapter, “there is no 
material antagonism between instinct and reason” as reason does not inhibit impulses, but 
may “make an inference which will excite the imagination so as to set loose the impulse 
the other way” (393).  For both William James and Darwin, instinct and reason are not 
mutually exclusive; together they result in socially beneficial behavior.  Strether achieves 
the ability to “see” what is right, both through the glances he exchanges as a means of 
communication, and as a metaphor for the recognition that signals the silent exchanges.  
The shift in language from Utilitarian to Transcendentalist to symbolic described 
by Philip Gura is mirrored by James’s creation of a form of representation that 
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incorporates Darwin’s understanding of what Gerald Edelman later calls “the 
evolutionary origin of the human mind” (44).  James’s movement to gesture and glances 
encompassing an evolving consciousness signals a movement ahead, into the modern 
world.  Strether does not know what his return to the United States will hold for him, but 
he knows he must go.  Similarly, in writing about George Eliot’s fiction George Levine 
observes, 
in realist narrative change and development become both subject and 
moral necessity, and they tend to be as well a condition of plausibility; 
character can only be understood fully if its history is known because 
character, as George Eliot wrote, is not ‘cut in marble,’ and it is intricately 
embedded in ‘plot.’  Moreover, closure is perceived as artificial and 
inadequate because it implies an end to history and is incapable of 
resolving the problems raised by the narrative. (17)    
Not only is Strether’s return ambiguous, signaling a movement to modern ambiguity and 
lack of resolution, but James has left the reader with a language that no longer relies on 
the old forms; by adapting silence, and incorporating physicality, he has made expression 
more complex.  In response to Strether at the end of the novel, Maria “sighed it at last all 
comically, all tragically, away.” In doing so, she dismisses long-standing forms of 
expression, bringing Strether to the threshold of modernity with his closing words in the 
novel being “then there we are” (345).  Where we are, indeed, is perched on the edge of 
the modern age in which consciousness is arrived at through an evolutionary process that 
comprises the mind and the means of understanding it: language that, borrowing Gura’s 
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phrase, multiplies its forms of representation, and by doing so, accounts for man’s 
physical nature. 
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